La animi acquiescentia en la quinta parte de la Ética de Spinoza
Fecha
2017
Tipo
artículo original
Autores
Rojas Peralta, Sergio E.
Título de la revista
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
Resumen
A partir de los estudios de Totaro y Carlisle sobre la acquiescentia en Spinoza, este trabajo estudia una forma de la acquiescentia entre las múltiples expresiones que emplea Spinoza en la quinta parte de la Ética (la animi acquiescentia) para determinar qué sentido le da el autor. Spinoza distingue entre animi acquiescentia (satisfacción del ánimo) y mentis acquiescentia (satisfacción de la mente) en la medida en que ánimo remite inmediatamente a la estructura afectiva hace referencia a la fluctuación, a la presencia y la fortaleza del individuo, y puede nacer de la recta norma de vida; mientras la mentis acquiescentia nace claramente de la intuición y hace referencia al conocimiento de sí, de Dios y de las cosas. Por derivar del dictamen de la razón, la satisfacción del ánimo es en parte racional. Ahora bien, a diferencia del ignorante que está sujeto a la fluctuación de ánimo, el sabio no sufre conmociones del ánimo, por lo cual la suprema satisfacción de la mente produce como resultado una absoluta satisfacción del ánimo en el sabio, expresión efectiva y práctica de su tranquilidad derivada del conocimiento sub specie æternitatis. Así, la satisfacción de la mente tiene como consecuencia la del ánimo, mas no al revés.
From the studies of Totaro and Carlisle on acquiescentia in Spinoza, this work studies a form of acquiescentia among the multiple expressions used by Spinoza in the fifth part of the Ethics (the animi acquiescentia) to determine what sense does the author give to them. Spinoza distinguishes between animi acquiescentia (satisfaction of the spirit) and mentis acquiescentia (satisfaction of the mind) insofar as mood immediately refers to the affective structure refers to the fluctuation, presence and strength of the individual, and can be born of the straight norm of life, while the mentis acquiescentia is clearly born of intuition and refers to the knowledge of oneself, of God and of things. To derive from the opinion of the reason, the satisfaction of the mind is partly rational. Now, unlike the ignorant who is subject to the fluctuation of mood, the wise does not suffer concussions of the mind, for which the supreme satisfaction of the mind produces as a result an absolute satisfaction of the mind in the wise, effective and practical expression of its tranquility derived from knowledge sub specie æternitatis. Thus, the satisfaction of the mind has as a consequence that of the mind, but not the other way around.
From the studies of Totaro and Carlisle on acquiescentia in Spinoza, this work studies a form of acquiescentia among the multiple expressions used by Spinoza in the fifth part of the Ethics (the animi acquiescentia) to determine what sense does the author give to them. Spinoza distinguishes between animi acquiescentia (satisfaction of the spirit) and mentis acquiescentia (satisfaction of the mind) insofar as mood immediately refers to the affective structure refers to the fluctuation, presence and strength of the individual, and can be born of the straight norm of life, while the mentis acquiescentia is clearly born of intuition and refers to the knowledge of oneself, of God and of things. To derive from the opinion of the reason, the satisfaction of the mind is partly rational. Now, unlike the ignorant who is subject to the fluctuation of mood, the wise does not suffer concussions of the mind, for which the supreme satisfaction of the mind produces as a result an absolute satisfaction of the mind in the wise, effective and practical expression of its tranquility derived from knowledge sub specie æternitatis. Thus, the satisfaction of the mind has as a consequence that of the mind, but not the other way around.
Descripción
Palabras clave
Satisfacción, Ánimo, Teoría de los afectos, Libertad, Potencia, Satisfaction, Mood, Affects theory, Freedom, Potency, 152.4 Emociones y sentimientos