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# SISTEMA DE ESTUDIOS DE POSGRADO

ENTRE LA CONCIENCIA Y LA ACCIÓN:
La constitución de subjetividad a partir de imágenes en el pensamiento de Husserl

Tesis sometida a la consideración de la Comisión del Programa de Estudios de Posgrado en Filosofía para optar por el grado de Maestría Académica en Filosofía

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Ciudad Universitaria Rodrigo Facio, Costa Rica
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
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Resumen

En esta investigación se aborda la pregunta de cómo constituyen subjetividad las imágenes desde una perspectiva husserliana.

En el primer capítulo se estudian los mecanismos a través de los cuales las imágenes son aprehendidas por la subjetividad trascendental y, más en específico, las relaciones entre la modalidad de la conciencia llamada por Husserl "conciencia de imagen" y la percepción. Se concluye que las imágenes poseen la capacidad de demarcarse de los dictados perceptivos y, por lo tanto, que ver una imagen es más que percibirla.

En el segundo capítulo se pone a la conciencia de imagen en coordinación con la lógica trascendental husserliana. Se determina que el sentido donado a las imágenes consiste en la posibilidad de experiencia de aquello que estas hacen visible mediante la intervención corporal. A través del estudio de casos provenientes de la ciencia, el arte, la política y otros, se determinan tres componentes de la subjetividad constituida por las imágenes: cuerpo, acción y futuro.

Finalmente, el tercer capítulo está dedicado a la sistematización de los resultados encontrados en los dos capítulos previos mediante la ontología husserliana del mundo de la vida. Dado que en la investigación se accede a las imágenes desde la óptica de la subjetividad trascendental, pero sus resultados apuntan más bien hacia una subjetividad constituida en los órdenes culturales, se acude a las consideraciones hechas por Husserl en lo que atañe a la vida social y cotidiana. Al hacer esto, se concluye que cuerpo, acción y futuro y, por tanto, la subjetividad constituida por imágenes, se manifiesta y articula como arreglos de personas, praxis e historia en el mundo de la vida.

Abstract

The following dissertation addresses the question of how do images constitute subjectivity from a Husserlian point of view.

In the first chapter, I study the apprehension of images fulfilled by the transcendental subjectivity and, more specifically, the relationship between perception and the mode of consciousness called by Husserl "image consciousness". I claim that images have the capability of detaching themselves from the dictations of perception and, therefore, seeing an image is more than perceiving it.

In the second chapter, I address the sense bestowed upon images by investigating the relationships between image consciousness and Husserl's transcendental logic. Through the logical notion of possibility, I argue that the sense bestowal is based upon the possibility of experiencing that which images render visible by means of corporeal mediations. By exploring cases from science, art, politics, and others, I determine the three main features of the subjectivity constituted by images, i.e. body, action, and future.

Finally, the third chapter consists in a systematization of the results of the previous chapters in the light of Husserlian life-world ontology. Given that my initial approach to images is performed through a transcendental scope, but the results point towards a subjectivity that is constituted within cultural orders, an examination of Husserl's considerations on social and quotidian life becomes necessary. By doing so, I determine that body, action, and future, and hence the subjectivity constituted by images, manifest and articulate in the life-world as arrays of persons, praxes, and history.

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FIRMA ESTUDIANTE

INTRODUCTION

More than enclosed and well-defined entities, images are points of intersection. That which we call 'images' are regions of constant tension between reality and fiction, essence and appearance, materiality and ideality. And, along with images, we always find ourselves, creating, experiencing, and using them. Thus, it is not only images that undergo such fluctuations between ontological statuses, but also we the subjects that employ them. In the contemporary context, this 'we' virtually entails every human being. We just simply cannot think of our daily existence without images. Whether it is for informative, cognitive, communicative or entertaining purposes, we use at least one image per day. Even further, our consumption of images is no longer only a matter of will, but also a frequent imposition in many fields of human activity. More than subjects dealing with images, we are subjected to images and their aforementioned variances and tensions between different modes of existence.

In light of the above, a philosophical reflection on images must address subjectivity as a fundamental concern. Perhaps, the most immediate way in which one might think of the relationship between subjectivity and images is by presupposing an already constituted subjectivity and simply describing the ways in which subjects perceive, apprehend, interpret, and utilize images. However, as we have already stated, neither have images nor subjects before them a steady ontological position. Playing a video game, we move our actual bodies trying to defeat a fictional enemy on the screen; at the movie theater, we cry or jump off our seats as a reaction to the things projected in front of us; people go to museums or laboratories and stare at images hoping to learn truths and facts of the world, while others dedicate their lives to the creation of images with the purpose of installing in the world things that do not exist yet. The relationship between images and subjects does not occur only in one way. To the same extent that subjects affect images by using them, subjectivity also becomes somewhat modified by images. Hence, a philosophy of images should entail not only the question regarding what do we do with images but also the question regarding what do images do with us.

Let us gather the two conditions of a philosophical reflection on images that we have pointed out so far. On the one hand, subjectivity must be included in such reflection and, on the other hand, we cannot presuppose an already constituted subjectivity. The inevitable consequence of these premises is that, in the context of images, subjectivity must be understood as something to be constituted. We must understand subjectivity not as the

counterpart of images, but rather something that results out of our encounter with them, which finally leads us to the question: how do images constitute subjectivity?

The term 'subjectivity' is itself a vast field of study within philosophy. From a merely epistemological point of view, researches on subjectivity are carried out with the purpose of finding a cognizing structure of reality. On another note, practical philosophical investigations on subjectivity deal with the processes according to which individuals gain (or lose) their status of subjects within social and political scenarios. While the first approach deals more with a certain definition of a subject, the second one is more preoccupied with the problem of subjectivation. The rough distinction between these two different ways of addressing subjectivity might give the impression that it is in the second field of research where we must inscribe our investigation on images. However, it is important to comprehend that, just because images are often associated with practical purposes, the question concerning the epistemology behind our employment of them should never be disregarded. If we do not deepen into the ways in which we perceive, apprehend and cognize images, we would only be able to describe the employment of images without giving account of the underlying logic and reasons of such employment.

But why should we care about both the epistemology and the pragmatics of images in order to determine how do they constitute a subjectivity? Can we not just recognize that the practical scenarios in which images always take part suffice to analyze the constitution of subjectivity? Undoubtedly, the very context in which images are employed determines the subjective features that they enable, however, our main concern is not the contexts *per se*, but the subjectivity immersed in them. It is completely viable to conduct separate investigations concerning the way in which subjectivity is constituted when images participate in political, scientific, religious, and other scenarios and it would contribute significantly to political, scientific, religious and other studies. But, if we want to study subjectivity in the broadest sense possible, we should lay a common ground in which we can set a dialogue between the multiple contexts where images are employed. It is precisely because of this that an epistemological approach to images becomes as necessary as a pragmatic one. Having a clear understanding of the way in which we perceive and apprehend images will help us elucidate how is it that we constitute ourselves as subjects by using them in a multitude of fields.

We must add to the aforesaid that it is not only because of methodological purposes that a philosophical reflection on images should fluctuate between epistemology and pragmatics. As visual studies have been insisting for several years, contemporary culture

has undergone a sort of paradigm shift oriented towards visuality. Taking this into consideration, more than a reflection on how do we gain knowledge of images, an epistemology of images means nowadays a reflection on the features that the gaining of knowledge has acquired in a cultural panorama where images play a fundamental role. In other words, it is not just a matter of describing how a cognizing subject directs towards images, but instead a reflection on how has such a subject been affected by the explosion of visual means in the contemporary landscape. Evidently, this is completely in consonance with our concern on a constituting (and not already constituted) subjectivity.

Taking a step further, it is now necessary to address the question regarding the philosophical perspective under which our investigation must be conducted. There are two conditions that our philosophical support must meet. First of all, we need to work with a philosophy that engages with an active discussion on images and, moreover, one that does it without restricting the term 'image' to a specific type. Images are not rare objects of study within philosophy, however, historically speaking, a majority of philosophical approaches to images have been part of a philosophy of art and not a philosophy of images as such. The extension of the term 'image' is by far more numerous than the one of 'art'. As a matter of fact, artistic images are just a region (an important one, of course) of the total domain of images. Thus, even though the reference to art and philosophy of art will be part of our investigation, we must seek above all a philosophical thought concerned with the generality of images.

The second condition that our philosophical perspective must meet concerns the way in which subjectivity is understood. We have to work with a philosophy according to which subjectivity is something in a continuous constitution, and not a rigid and invariable structure. Moreover, what we need is a philosophical position that considers subjectivity not only as the result of continuous constitution processes but also that such a result depends upon the kind of objects with which one encounters. In our particular case, this means that we have to work with an approach according to which images constitute a certain kind of subjectivity that can be clearly differentiated from the subjectivity that other entities constitute.

As we mentioned earlier, images have to do both with materiality and ideality, reality and fiction, essence and appearance. Taking this into account, it is necessary to conduct our investigation through a philosophical perspective that allows us to move freely between such realms of experience. We cannot reduce our comprehension of what a subject is

neither to a strictly spiritual or mental entity nor to a physical or biological fact for the simple reason that images launch us beyond their mere presence.

Certainly, the aforementioned conditions are not exclusive of a sole philosophical tradition, however, it is in phenomenology where we find not only a coincidence of such conditions but also an elaborate articulation of them. More specifically, it is Husserlian phenomenology the philosophical perspective that better suits our purposes. Husserl might not be the first and most obvious choice in order to deepen into the world of images. On the one hand, the author might strike as a thinker more concerned with the foundations of science and the development of a scientific philosophy than aesthetics. On the other hand, it seems that other phenomenologists have reflected on images in a deeper fashion than Husserl (for instance, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty or Sartre). However, this is something rather arguable if one pays attention to other Husserlian works than his most famous ones.

In 1980, the Volume XXXIII of Husserl's complete works (entitled *Husserliana*) was first published in German, under the title *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein und Erinnerung* (*Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory*). This volume contains texts written by Husserl between 1898 and 1925 in which the author, as the title indicates, deals with three different modes of consciousness, one of them having specifically to do with images, i.e. image consciousness. Husserl presents a threefold model of what an image is: the image-thing (the material entity), the image object (what the material entity renders visible) and the image subject (what the image object depicts). Given this particular ontological configuration of images, Husserl claims that consciousness has a specific modality of apprehension before images, about which he develops an extensive philosophical reflection.

Husserl's image consciousness theory meets our first requirement, i.e. being a philosophical reflection on the generality of images and not only on a specific type. Also, the Husserlian account on images allows us to investigate a kind of subjective constitution specific to images. Consciousness is the main topic in Husserlian phenomenology, so any reflection on subject and subjectivity must be linked to a reflection on conscious life. Thus, if there is a modality of consciousness referred to images only, there is indeed a distinctive way in which images contribute to a constitution of subjectivity. This is better defined by the Husserlian notions of intentionality and correlation, that is to say, the absolute correspondence and interdependence of consciousness and thing or, in more classical terms, *noesis* and *noema*, *cogito* and *cogitatio*. And it is in correlation where Husserl's phenomenology meets yet another of our requirements. Since consciousness is always consciousness of something (that is to say, it has an intentional structure), Husserl does not

comprehend the constitution as some sort of past foundational event, but rather as something that is continuously occurring when consciousness performs acts in order to bestow sense upon its objects. Hence, subjectivity has in Husserlian thought precisely the constituting character that we seek.

Finally, it is important to foreground that Husserlian phenomenology suits our purposes for yet another reason. Husserl aims to analyze, as we have just stated, the acts of consciousness that bestow sense upon its objects and, when the author uses the expression "objects of consciousness", he does not exclude any stratum of experience whatsoever. Numbers, animals, works of art, memories, songs, imaginations, mathematical functions, photographs, plants, dreams, and whatever it is that consciousness tries to apprehend counts for Husserl as an object. Since conscious life is a continuous flow of experience, subjects fluctuate between different ontological strata without abrupt interruptions, which is precisely the type of subjective experience that fits our understanding of images.

Even though the previously mentioned features of Husserlian phenomenology suffice for taking it as our most suitable philosophical perspective, there are two more aspects that must be pointed out because of the consequences they have for our investigative purposes. First, within the Husserlian frame, subjectivity and consciousness are absolutely embodied. Instead of conceiving consciousness as a phantasmatical entity, Husserl is aware that conscious life has as a necessary condition its corporeal existence. Contemporary investigations on images make an effort to think our relationship with images beyond mere contemplation and thusly thinking other ways of interaction such as participation or enaction, which turns Husserlian phenomenology into an interesting approach to image studies.

The final feature worth noticing of Husserlian phenomenology is the author's late notion of the life-world, which will play a fundamental role in our investigation. Husserl conceived his phenomenological project as a transcendental inquiry, nonetheless, this never made him exclude the non-transcendental experience from the philosophical reflection. The whole phenomenological method consists in bracketing our experience in the life-world or, as the author also called it, bracketing the "natural attitude". But this never meant that the life-world is of no philosophical relevance, since it does not disappear when the bracketing is performed. This means that Husserlian phenomenology encompasses a tension between transcendental life and a more quotidian, cultural, and social experience. We will find that a phenomenological account on images has to necessarily pass through a transcendental

stage, but this will always clash somehow with the cultural and anthropological codes surrounding images and their uses. And it is because of this reason that the life-world philosophy is a fundamental aspect to conduct our investigation.

Having determined that we will engage with Husserl's phenomenology, we must start from the most basic level of experience, i.e. perceptive intuition, in order to elucidate how do images constitute subjectivity. In the first chapter, we will study how is it that consciousness apprehends images. This might strike at first as a rather simple task. The visual nature of images gives us the idea that intuiting an image is nothing else than perceiving it. However, as we have already pointed out, consciousness has different modalities depending on the type of object that it apprehends, which is why we must analyze the specific mechanisms that are involved in the encounter of consciousness with images. Hence, our first goal will be to find out if apprehending an image is the same as perceiving it. This will be achieved by establishing a comparison between image consciousness and perception. At the end of the first chapter, we will see that, in spite of the perceptive character of images, our apprehension of them goes beyond mere perception. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that images have the capability of detaching themselves from the dictations of perception.

In the second chapter, we will deepen into the apprehension of images by addressing the question of how does consciousness bestow sense upon them. It is in this chapter where the tensions between ontological statuses will become more evident. Given that images make subjectivity fluctuate between the ideal and the empirical spheres, it is necessary to find a common ground where both of them converge and that allows consciousness to perform its sense-bestowal upon images. In order to achieve this, we will move from Husserl's image consciousness theory to some of his logical remarks regarding the notion of *possibility*.

We will examine that, when consciousness apprehends an image, the bestowed sense has to do with the possibility of the existence of that which is rendered visible and, moreover, the possibility of us experiencing it as part of the actual and empirical world. Then, by including the corporeal nature of subjectivity, we will see that this sense-bestowal is not only a recognition of possibilities in images but also an attempt to make such possibilities become actual. This will take us to explore various cases of interaction between images and bodies in different fields such as science, ethnology, art, entertainment, and others. This will allow us to observe that images constitute a subjectivity where body, action, and future are intertwined and set in motion.

Even though our initial approach to images will be more oriented towards a transcendental reflection, the examination of specific cases will show us that the constituted subjectivity does not occur precisely within the transcendental sphere, but rather within the spheres of the political, scientific, quotidian, artistic, and other cultural fields. This is why, in the third and final chapter, we will reinterpret body, action, and future (the three main features of the subjectivity that images constitute) in the light of Husserl's life-world ontology. By doing so, we will finally comprehend in a much more detailed fashion the kind of subjectivity that images constitute.

Any phenomenological reflection has as its backdrop a concern on our conditions of existence and coexistence. Thus, this inquiry on the constitution of subjectivity through images aims to be a contribution to this broader discussion. Hopefully, the conclusions to which we will arrive after embarking on this investigation will be answers to philosophical questionings regarding images, but also points of encounter and discussion with other attempts to better comprehend the ways in which we subjects produce not only our world and its sense but also ourselves.

CHAPTER 1: APPREHENDING IMAGES

In *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* Husserl claims: "This difference between the manner of being of an object in the world and that of the world itself obviously prescribes fundamentally different correlative types of consciousness for them." (1970, p. 143; HuaD VI, 146, 18-20[1]). Following this, a phenomenological study of images must be conducted according to a specific mode of consciousness, which is precisely what Husserl called "image consciousness".

Thus, the determination of the way in which images constitute subjectivity must begin by a detailed analysis of image consciousness. Naturally, this also means that we must study the particular mode of being of images. In order to better comprehend the particularities of both image consciousness and the mode of being of images, we will delineate in this first chapter the relationship between image consciousness and perception. If the most immediate feature of images is that they appeal to the sight, it seems that a study of images must be based upon a theory of perception. The validity of this idea will be the first thing to question, since the investigative path to follow in further phases depends on it.

We will conduct our query in three main stages. Before formulating a linkage between image consciousness and perception, we will sketch out first the image consciousness theory as such by pointing out its main components and the relationships between them. Second, as an initial attempt to bring image consciousness and perception closer together, we will study the work of German philosopher Gottfried Boehm, who formulates part of his image theory by making reference to one of the main Husserlian notions concerning perception: adumbration. Third, we will complete the junction of image consciousness and perception showing that, even though there is a perceptive side of images, apprehending an image is not reduced to perceiving it.

Returning to the initial quotation, it is the mode of being of an object which prescribes the mode of consciousness. Hence, instead of being an isolated task, the determination of

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[1] The citation of Husserl´s works will have first the reference to the consulted English version, followed by the reference to the *Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke* series, i.e. Husserl's complete works in German. If the consulted English version is part of the series *Edmund Husserl Collected Works*, the citation will have the abbreviation HuaE, followed by the volume, the page and the lines (in case the edition has numbered lines). This same structure will be used for making reference to the German edition, but the abbreviation HuaD will be used in order to differentiate it from the English version. In case that the consulted English version is not part of the series *Edmund Husserl Collected Works*, the citation will follow APA standards.

the mode of being of images to fulfill in this chapter responds to the main investigation problem, i.e. the constitution of subjectivity.

Image Consciousness

First of all, it is important to point out that image consciousness was not initially a main concern for Husserl. In *Phantasy and Image Consciousness* (1904), Husserl undertakes an investigation on physical images (photographs and paintings) with the purpose of developing a parallel model that would serve as an analogy for analyzing another mode of consciousness, i.e. phantasy. The writings pertaining image consciousness, phantasy, and memory date from 1898 to 1924 and it can be appreciated that in this period the author gradually detaches image consciousness from phantasy and memory. Brough (2005) claims that it is in 1910 when Husserl abandons image consciousness as an analogical model for the phenomenological approach to memory.

Besides memory, Husserl also pays attention to how is perception related to image consciousness. At the beginning, Husserl tried to establish a close relation between both of them. However, if one looks closely to the evolution of image consciousness in the author´s writings, it becomes evident that the links between these two modes of consciousness tend to diminish considerably. But, before going deeper into this, it is necessary to outline first the model of image consciousness.

Despite the changes introduced by Husserl during the period of 1904-1924, the model of image consciousness that he formulated in his first writing concerning the subject remains unmodified. It is a threefold model, explained by Husserl as follows:

> We have three objects: 1) the physical image, the physical thing made from canvas, marble, and so on; 2) the representing or depicting object; and 3) the represented or depicted object. For the latter, we prefer to say simply "image subject"; for the first object, we prefer "physical image"; for the second, "representing image" or "image object." (HuaE XI, 21, 7-12; HuaD XXIII, 19, 27-31).

In posterior texts, Husserl refers to the physical component of the image as "image-thing" (*Bildding*), while the names of the image subject and the image object remain unmodified.

There are three components very different between each other, but all of them equally partaking in that which we call 'image'. *Qua* object in the world, the image possesses the character of a thing having a corresponding materiality (paper, canvas, pigments, plaster or any other material). But, even though the material shows itself in an evident manner, that is not precisely what constitutes our experience of something *qua* image.

What we identify as an image is what the materials render visible, and not the materials themselves. A photograph of a person is an image not because it is ink printed on photographic paper, rather because that person becomes visible in it. It is precisely at this point where Husserl distinguishes the image object from the image subject. One speaks often about the thing depicted and rendered visible by the image as if it were the thing itself. For instance, when I look at the photograph of my first day of school, I say "This is me at age five", "That other one next to me is my father", "I am wearing gray pants and a white shirt" or "I have a bruise under my eye because three days ago I fell while skateboarding". Looking closely, it becomes evident that all those sentences refer to the things that become visible in the image[2,3], but not to the image as such. Instead of saying "That is the image of me and my father on my first day of school", I simply say "Those are me and my father on my first day of school". Hence, within the Husserlian model, the image object is what the image renders visible, which is not the same as the thing visualized, i.e. the image subject.

At this point, it is important to observe that Husserl refers to the image object and the image subject in terms of representative and represented or depictive and depicted, respectively. Both in this first writing and in other ones pertaining images, Husserl maintains this idea of the image as a depiction of something that exists outside of its margins. One cannot obviate what a great limitation this is for an image theory. Just as Ferrer Ortega (2008) points out, when dealing with artistic images, the Husserlian theory of image consciousness fails to account for cases such as abstract art. How does image consciousness cope with pictorial objects with no reference whatsoever to the world is something left unanswered by Husserl's theory. For now, let us just point out this deficiency and save its discussion to the third section of this chapter.

One remarkable feature of the Husserlian model of image consciousness is that its three components remain in a mutual conflict between each other, rather than being statically fixed. One first dimension of such conflict has been already laid out here: the

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[2] It is remarkable how Husserl gives a greater attention to things that become visible in the image. By doing so, the author leaves unattended all the other elements in the image that are not things. Regarding this, Ionescu (2014) stresses: "If the presentation of an image is figurative, one can identify an image-subject into the image-object (like the banal recognition of a palace in a photograph). However, this does not exclude the possibility of associating this image-subject to other, latently present, subjects like social status or architectural styles. These are not the actual image-subjects but potential relations that the structure of the image allows." (p. 101).

[3] Optical illusions are quite interesting in this respect. Images such as Kanizsa's Triangle make us realize that consciousness might see more things in an image than what it actually shows. When we look at Kanizsa's Triangle, we say that the image shows us two triangles, but in a strict sense there are not any triangles in the picture. We can find multiple examples of this also in the Gestalt Psychology experiments on reification and multistability.

existing tension between the perceptive apprehension of the image-thing and the phenomenal apparition[4] of the image object.

Besides the former conflict, there is another one of much greater complexity, i.e. that occurring between the image subject and the image object. Such conflict is exactly the one that takes place in the aforementioned situation of speaking about the image object as if it were the image subject. Regarding this, Husserl stresses: "If the appearing image were absolutely identical phenomenally with the object meant, or, better, if the image appearance showed no difference whatsoever from the perceptual appearance of the object itself, a depictive consciousness could scarcely come about." (HuaE XI, 22, 5-9; HuaD XXIII, 20, 25-30). The conflict between image object and image subject is thus a condition of possibility for the existence of an image. In other words, without conflict, that is to say, without a radical difference between the manners in which image object and image subject are apprehended, there would not be image consciousness, but solely perception.

The conflict between the components of the image consciousness leads Husserl to propose a separation of them, which has an interesting consequence in the way the image object is to be understood. For Husserl, "The "image" in the case of physical imaging — that is, the image object — is a figment, a perceptual object but also a semblance object." (HuaE XI, 59, 16-18; HuaD XXIII 54, 20-22). The image object should be regarded as a figment that, in spite of having a perceptible character (the image-thing), it has prominently an apparitional one. But this apparitional character of the image object does not belong so much to itself as to the image subject. Husserl does not deal with images in a Platonic way, that is, as a deceiving object trying to surpass as something truthful. Thus, by 'apparitional' we must understand the capability of the image object of rendering present the appearance of the image subject in its absence or, moreover, in the absence of its perception.

In accordance with the deficiency of the Husserlian model pointed out earlier, the author ascribes the capability that images have of rendering present the appearances of their absent image subjects to the resemblance between the image object and the image subject. In Husserl's own words: "The apprehension based on sensuous sensation is not a mere perceptual apprehension; it has an altered characteristic, the characteristic of representation by means of resemblance, the characteristic of seeing in an image." (HuaE XI, 28, 3-77; HuaD XXIII, 26, 35-40). Even though the term is not explicitly mentioned, it

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[4] We must remember that Husserl's opinion is not constant when it comes to treat image consciousness in analogy with phantasy and memory. As a consequence of this, the apparition of the image object is sometimes considered an imaginative act (Cf. HuaE XI, 561, 1-5; HuaD XXIII, 471-472, 27-2). This is why the expression "phenomenal apparition" is employed here.

seems that the old notion of *mimesis* makes its way in into the Husserlian theory of image. In order to evade this reading of Husserl, De Warren (2010) puts forward that the term '*mimesis*' is not to be considered as a synonym of 'resemblance', since the former consists on imitation and, instead, the latter is a condition for rendering an appearance present. It is certainly necessary to elaborate further on how an appearance of something absent becomes present in an image, however, this should not be a reason to disregard the limitations of understanding images via their resemblance to things.

How do images in which resemblance does not determine primarily the relation between image object and image subject fit into the image consciousness theory? Husserl does not answer directly to this question. Nevertheless, from 1918 onwards the author writes some pieces concerning what he calls "aesthetic images", i.e. artistic images. In one of the appendixes to *On the Theory of Intuitions and Their Modes* (specifically No. LIX), Husserl remarks that every art moves between two poles:

A) Image art: presenting in an image, depicting, mediating through image consciousness.

B) Art that is purely a matter of phantasy, producing phantasy formations in the modification of pure neutrality. At least producing no concrete depictive image. The "once upon a time" is still related to the actual now and the world, and conflict with it can indicate an imagery that nevertheless does not constitute a visible image object." (HuaE XI, 651, 21-28; HuaD XXXIII, 540, 20-28).

Husserl does not fail to conceive art as a fluctuation between the depictive and the fictional, but it is in the first pole where he posits image consciousness, while in the second one no image object is constituted whatsoever. Another remarkable feature of what Husserl calls "purely a matter of phantasy" is that therein the neutrality modification takes place[5]. Let us look for a second how is this notion explained in *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*

<The modification> does not cancel out, does not "effect" anything: it is the conscious counterpart of all producing: its neutralization. It is included in every abstaining-from-producing-something, putting-something-out-of-action, "parenthesizing-" it, "leaving-something-undecided" and then having-an-"undecided"-something, being-"immersed"-in-the-producing, or "merely conceiving" the something produced without "doing anything with it". (HuaE II, 258; HuaD III, 265, 8-19)[6].

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[5] In order to formulate a Husserlian aesthetic, Sepp (1996) adheres to this idea. The author speaks about an "aesthetic contemplation", which can be understood as the neutrality modification for the specific case of works of art.

[6] The neutrality modification, as Husserl points out, is not the negation of what appears to consciousness; it is instead a suspension of any acting therefrom. The neutrality modification and

Curiously, some paragraphs after the introduction of the notion of *neutrality modification*, Husserl refers to the relationship that such modification holds with phantasy and so he returns to images: "More precisely stated: universally phantasying is the neutrality modification of "positing" [re-presentation][7]..." (HuaE II, 260; HuaD III 268, 5-7). Comparing this to what Husserl said about the two poles in the midst of which art moves, it becomes clear that there is an inconsistency between both remarks: we are told that consciousness operates through the neutrality modification only when dealing with fantastic art, but in *Ideas* the neutrality modification is executed in every single apprehension of an image (whether it is a figurative or a fantastic one).

The aforesaid intensifies if one considers what Husserl says ahead in *Ideas*: "We can persuade ourselves by an example that the *neutrality modification of normal perception*, positing in unmodified certainty, is the *neutral [image object][8] consciousness* which we find as component in normally considering the perceptually presentive depictured world." (HuaE II, 261; HuaD III, 269, 16-21). Right after that, the author presents as an example Dürer's engraving *Knight, Death and the Devil*. Such an example gives us plenty to think about, since Husserl draws it to illustrate how does the image object show itself, but, out of the three characters in the engraving, two of them belong to fantastic art and, as such, lack of image subject.

This great complication within the Husserlian theory is the ultimate consequence of two movements here outlined: first, the positing of resemblance as the articulation between the image object and the image subject and, second, the assumption that the so-called aesthetic images are radically different from the rest. Husserl establishes a spectrum of images ranging from the absolutely figurative to the purely fantastic, in the midst of which there is a point where image consciousness disappears because there is no image subject in the world that resembles the image object.

Authors such as Ionescu (2014) limit Husserl's contributions to privileged cases in

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thus the attitude of the consciousness towards fantasy-oriented art are characterized then by passivity on Husserl's account. This is entirely arguable, especially if one takes into consideration investigations such as Belting's (2015) or Bredekamp's (2013), according to which images can function as starters for action. This will be in the center of discussion in the second and third chapters.

[7] In Rojcewicz and Schuwer's translation of *Ideas*, the German word ´Vergegenwärtigung´ is translated to ´presentation´. On the other hand, in his translation of *Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory*, Brough translates ´Vergegenwärtigung´ with the expression ´re-presentation´, which will be used here from now on.

[8] In the consulted English version, Kersten translates ´Bildobjekt´ with the expression "picture-object". In order to maintain Brough's translation, the expression "picture-object" was changed here to "image object".

which the relationship between image object and image subject is effectively determined by a mutual resemblance. Ionescu proposes a Husserlian phenomenology of photography, but even so he must deal with the possibility of intervention and modification of photographs, thusly jeopardizing the resemblance which Husserl refers to. If one follows Husserl in a strict fashion, the domain of images to work with would be overly reduced, achieving a partial theory of the image at best.

If one does not want this taxonomical eagerness towards images to invalidate the image consciousness model, it is necessary to identify whether the Husserlian theory is dependent on it or not. Better yet, it is necessary to find out if the image consciousness theory can dispense with the radical differentiation of aesthetic (artistic or fantastic) and non-aesthetic images. It is possible to find in Husserlian philosophy at least two reasons for answering negatively to this.

First, the texts in which Husserl insists with greater emphasis that image consciousness takes no place when dealing with aesthetic and fantastic images are appendixes that are preparatory writings, and not all-finished texts. Husserl was certainly getting close to the idea that art images have a radical different character to consciousness than other ones[9], however, he did not conclude such consideration. Let us return for one moment to Dürer's engraving. We find here once again that Husserl holds on to resemblance as mediator between image object and image subject, but then he claims:

> This depicturing [image object] is present to us neither as existing nor as not existing,
> nor in any other positional modality; or, rather, there is consciousness of it as existing,
> but quasi-existing in the neutrality modification of being.
> Likewise the depicted too, when we comport ourselves aesthetically… (HuaE II, 262;
> HuaD III, 269-270, 38-6).

Attending this passage, it becomes clear that resemblance is for Husserl not much of a determinant as the neutrality modification is. Whether it is something completely figurative or something purely fantastic, image consciousness operates equally by neutralizing what has been apprehended.

There is one more contribution to obtain from Dürer's engraving. There are three main attention foci: the knight, the Death and the Devil. The first one, as Husserl himself says, takes us to the flesh and bone knight. It might be true that we do not know the image subject corresponding to the knight, i.e. that we do not know the person depicted in the

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[9] For researches concerning Husserlian aesthetics and philosophy of art, see Katz (2016), Kurg (2014), Sepp (1996), Taminaux (2015), Uzelac (1998).

image, but we must also recognize that we find much less problematic admitting the existence of that image subject than the existence of the Death and the Devil. We do not have so many objections admitting that the knight existed in the world, unlike saying the same about the Death and the Devil (even within a mythical or religious frame, it can be easily doubted that the Death and the Devil have precisely that appearance). We have already established that consciousness stands aside from the attribution of existence to image object. Thus, more than coordinates in the spectrum ranging from figurative to fantastic, images are fields where both poles can coexist without any problem whatsoever. It is precisely because of this that, as Schulz (2005) mentions, images (and this becomes particularly accurate in the contemporary context) cannot be approached through a single discursive order, for they have some sort of own life that exceeds even space and time.

Neutrality modification does not have to occur once for every single appearing image object. Better yet, the existence of an image subject corresponding to every appearing image object does not have to be the first concern for consciousness. The neutralization that takes place in image consciousness occurs in respect of the image as a whole. Saying the former with Husserlian jargon, image consciousness performs a synthesis of fulfillment which bestows sense to its constituting multiplicity (whether it is figurative, fantastic or a mixture of both).

That being said, let us now continue with the second reason for rejecting the fact that the image consciousness theory depends on the differentiation of aesthetic and non-aesthetic images. Let us turn to the following excerpt *On the Theory of Intuitions and Their Modes*:

> The phantasies here are not freely produced by us (the creative artist alone has
> freedom here and exercises it only in union with aesthetic ideals). Rather, they have
> their objectivity; they are prescribed for us, forced upon us in a way analogous to
> that in which the things belonging to reality are forced upon us as things to which we
> must submit. In an analogous way — yet naturally not in quite the same way. (HuaE
> XI, 620, 23-29; HuaD XXIII, 519, 12-21).

One can certainly differentiate the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic or the figurative from the fantastic, but the objective character[10] of every single image is undeniable. But the

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[10] Needless to say, it is in a strictly phenomenological sense that we speak here of an objective character of images. When Husserl identifies an objectivity in images, it has to do with the fact that they are objects for consciousness, and not with a conception of images as source of objective or scientific knowledge. Of course, this does not mean that images have nothing to do with the pursuance of objective and scientific knowledge. In the second chapter, we will see cases in which

most remarkable thing in this passage is that the objectivity of the fantastic forces us to apprehend it in the exact same manner as if it were any other given thing in reality. There is, following Husserl, a violence of images, one concerning its way of giving to consciousness.

Summing up what we have found, it is possible to reformulate the Husserlian model of image consciousness. First of all, the distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic images must be eliminated and, instead, we should embrace the fact that every image (figurative or fantastic) imposes an objectivity to consciousness. According to this, we must place in the center of the image consciousness model two of its three components (of course, without this meaning the suppression of the third one[11]): the image object and the image-thing. Whereas these two components are both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an image, the image subject could simply not exist or not be part of an image whose other image objects do not have a correlate in the world.

What can never be left aside for constructing a Husserlian theory of image are the existing conflicts among the three components of the model, especially considering the particular way in which images impose themselves to consciousness as objectivities. If consciousness were to accept images without any resistance, i.e. without any conflict, there would be no reason to perform a neutrality modification. Conflict seems to be the nucleus of the Husserlian theory of images, since the articulation and tension of the three components rely upon it.

Let us return to the last cited excerpt. Husserl admits there that the image presents itself to us in a similar, but not identical manner as things in the world do. We can ask then in what way does this happen. We must remember that, in Husserlian philosophy, the primary mode of intuition is perception. In this sense, if images present to us similarly as things do, we must go back to the question concerning the perceptive aspect of things. More

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both domains intersect. Also, in the third chapter, we will see how does Husserl takes distance from a certain understanding of objectivity and how is this related to images.

[11] In his reflections on image consciousness, Husserl did not address the image-thing. This might be because, from a phenomenological perspective, the image-thing is to be studied from the perceptive structure of consciousness, rather than image consciousness. Nevertheless, since a conflict between the image-thing and the image object is always implicit in image consciousness, the materiality of an image can be studied without disregarding it *qua* image. Aspects such as the making of an image or its production technique can be of great importance and can be therefore integrated into the phenomenological reflection on images. The work of Gottfried Boehm (2006), to be discussed hereafter, can become an interesting point of departure if one wants to undertake such an investigation.

specifically, we must find out if Husserl´s theory of image consciousness depends on his theory of perception.

In pursuance of the aforesaid, we will now examine the work of a pioneering author in the field of image theory, the German philosopher Gottfried Boehm. Considering that the author refers to Husserlian philosophy of perception in order to elaborate his theory, we will examine his considerations in the light of what we obtained in this first section. By doing so, it will be possible to determine how dependent is image consciousness on perception.

Iconic Difference and Perception

Gottfried Boehm's thought is one of the pillars for the development of image theory not only in the German-speaking world but also in the global context. His notion of *iconic difference* has opened a wide range of researches concerning images. What characterizes Boehm´s philosophy of image the most is its hermeneutical scope, to the extent that the author conceives his work as an extrapolation of the *effective history* formulated by his mentor Hans Georg Gadamer in *Truth and Method* (Cf. 2006, p. 8). Not only does Boehm attempts to bind his philosophy of image with hermeneutics, but also he attempts to bind it with the great precursor of hermeneutics, i.e. phenomenology.

The notion of *iconic difference* is formulated by making reference to Edmund Husserl´s thought. Boehm utilizes some Husserlian considerations on perception in order to obtain an explanatory model of the sense produced by images. *Wie Bilder Sinn erzeugen* (*How images produce sense*) is perhaps the work in which Boehm better elaborates on his philosophy of image. As can be anticipated by reading the title of the book, the author is interested in explicating the mechanisms through which images produce sense and, moreover, a sense clearly differentiated from the one present in linguistic productions. With the purpose of delineating such difference, Boehm introduces his notion of iconic difference, which has basically to do not with formal logic, but with deixis.

In *Die Wiederkehr der Bilder* (*The return of images*), Boehm claims: "With the iconic difference we formulate a hypothesis whose validity is asserted to every single image. It claims: every iconic artifact organizes under the form of a visual, intelligent, and deictic, i.e. non-linguistic, difference." (2011, p. 171) [12, 13]. Boehm pursues the definition of an exclusive

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[12] Whenever a quotation belongs to a source that has not been translated into English, I will offer my own translation. The text in its original language will be quoted in a footnote.

[13] "Mit der ikonischen Differenz formulieren wir eine Hypothese, deren Geltung für jedes besondere Bildwerk behauptet wird. Sie lautet: Jedes ikonische Artefakt organisiert sich in der Form einer

logic of images, however he evades any theoretical comprehension of the word 'logic'[14]. A logic of images must not be contingent upon formal and propositional logic, because there is a radical difference between the means by which images and language produce sense (hence the iconic difference).

One of the keys to introduce the iconic difference as a means for the production of sense is, as can be adequately seen in the last excerpt, deixis. The meaning of a deictic word can be fully grasped only if one knows whom and in what context are they uttered. From a merely syntactic point of view, the subject in sentence "I am sleepy" is 'I'; however, from a semantic and pragmatic point of view, that 'I' changes every single time that a different person utters the sentence. Deixis involves personal elements ('I', 'you', 'they'), as well as spatial ('here', 'there') or temporal ones ('now', 'tomorrow').

Let us remind that Boehm is not interested in binding the linguistic logic with the pictorial one, thus it is necessary to clarify in what sense deixis is to be understood in the context of the iconic difference. There is a case of deixis in which the use of the body is a fundamental component of the context that provides sense to the comprehension of a sentence. In the command "Pass me that!", a gesture is required to specify to what thing does the pronoun 'that' precisely refers to. The utterance of such a command is usually accompanied by a corporeal pointing. If we look at the subtitle of *Wie Bilder Sinn erzeugen*, i.e. *Die Macht des Zeigens* (*The power of showing*), it will become clear that the production of sense in which Boehm is interested is highly related to pointing.

The deictic side of the iconic difference does not consist, as it is in our case, in a corporeal pointing. As Boehm (2015) claims, in deixis the body should not be understood as a sign to decipher, but as scenery for possible signs to happen. Hence, rather than the capability of images to produce sense by pointing to something outside themselves (that is,

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visuellen, intelligenten sowie deiktischen, und das heisst nicht-sprachlichen, Differenz." (Boehm, 2011, p. 171)

[14] We can see in this evasion on Boehm´s behalf concerning the theoretical domain of knowledge how influenced is the author by Heidegger and Gadamer. The defense of an iconic logic as in opposition to a predicative logic can be regarded analogously to the Gadamer's defense of human sciences in front of natural sciences.

the capability to refer or represent), the iconic difference consists in the comprehension of images as events[15] where sense is materially disclosed[16]. According to Boehm

> Whenever we speak of images (flat, plastic, technical, spatial, etc.), we reckon a difference in which one or more thematic focal points (foci) that catches our attention relate to a non-thematic field (…) This form of relationship (…) can be emphasized in two senses, no matter how much we read images as optic one-way streets from the proximity to the distance, from the things to their empty background fields. (Boehm, 2015, p. 49)[17,18]

It is by means of the visual mechanism of the figure-ground contrast that iconic difference stands as a sense disclosure exclusive of images. According to Boehm, a figure cannot be thought if it is not in terms of a background from which it becomes visible. Whilst the former is thematized, the latter remains as something indeterminate. The author considers the visualization processes as "one way streets", which means that looking at an image is always performed in a single direction from the figure to the background[19].

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[15] "So the iconic difference turns out to be not a twofold and visually turned figure of opposition, but rather it represents a threefold crossing conceiving the image as en event." [Denn die ikonische Differenz erweist sich nicht als zweigliedrige, visuell gewendete Oppositionsfigur, sondern sie repräsentiert einen dreigliedrigen *Übergang*, konzipiert das Bild als *Ereignis*.] (Boehm, 2011, p. 171).

[16] "…[it] opens to the eye a sight rooted in materialty, [it] opens sense." […sich dem Auge ein im Materiellen verwurzelter Anblick, ein Sinn eröffnet.] (Boehm, 2015, p. 37)

[17] "Wenn wir von Bildern reden (flachen, plastischen, technischen, räumlichen etc.), meinen wir eine Differenz, in der sich ein oder mehrere thematische Brennpunkte (Fokus), die unsere Aufmerksamkeit binden, auf ein unthematisches Feld beziehen (…) Diese Form der Beziehung kann (…) betont doppelsinnig sein, sosehr wir gewohnheitsmässig Bilder als optische Einbahnstrassen von der Nähe in der Ferne, von den Dingen hin zu ihren leeren Hintergrundfeldern lesen." (Boehm, 2015, p. 49).

[18] The idea of contrast as the origin of the iconic difference can be found in Boehm's earlier thought, however, it is in *Wie Bilder Sinn erzeugen* where it can be found in a more refined fashion. In the essay *Die Wiederkehr der Bilder*, included in the compendium *Was ist ein Bild?*, Boehm stresses: "What we encounter as an image is based upon a single ground contrast between the encompassed common surfaces and all that is related to [its] interior events. The relationship between the apparent whole and everything included in the singular determinations (the color, the form, the figure, etc.) becomes somehow optimized by the artist." [Was uns als Bild begegnet, beruht auf einem einzigen Grundkontrast, dem zwischen einer überschaubaren Gesamtfläche und allem was sie an Binnerereignissen einschließt. Das Verhältnis zwischen dem anschaulichen Ganzen und dem, was es an Einzelbestimmungen (der Farbe, der Form, der Figur, etc.) beinhaltet, wurde vom Künstler auf irgendeine Weise optimiert.] (Boehm, 2006, p. 30).

[19] Given the phenomenological perspective of Boehm, we do not find in his text a historical account of the figure-ground contrast. Besides, it is not the aim of this investigation to find out about it. However, it is important to point out that the study and development of perspective during Renaissance plays a fundamental role in the visual education of our civilization. Perspective gave us a more accurate sense of volumes and distances in two-dimensional images, enhancing thusly our notions of figure and background.

Before going deeper into the figure-ground contrast, Boehm brings up Husserlian philosophy as a theoretical background for his notion of iconic difference. What interests Boehm the most from Husserlian phenomenology is the following:

> The backside of the world is for us always invisible. And therefore we rightly claim that we do not exist in a scenery behind which there is nothing. In this regard, he rediscovers the role of the horizon. Things, as he shows, "adumbrate" (…) We want to hold on to two aspects which are immediately useful for the concept of a logic of images. The first one indicates that things in every perception are based upon a horizon. But both of them belong to completely different classifications: the thing is singular and given, the horizon is fluent, discontinuous and potential (…) The second aspect is that we move now within an argumentation in which the undetermined and potential is the bearing ground of the determined. (Boehm, 2015, p. 46)[20].

Husserl states that transcendental phenomenology (the ultimate ground of philosophy) must study "The Correlation between world (the world of which we always speak) and its subjective manners of givenness" (1970, p. 165; HuaD VI, 168, 19-20). One of such subjective manners of givenness of the world is precisely what Boehm employs in his formulation of the iconic difference, i.e. adumbration. This primary feature of perception corresponds to that which Boehm referred when he said that the backside of the world is unknown to us. According to Husserl, within the intuitive experience, things do not appear to us in their totality, but only by showing sides of them. It is exactly at this point where Boehm´s use of Husserlian phenomenology turns problematic.

Adumbration is something that occurs in the sphere of perception and in *Crisis* we find that "Perception is the primal mode of intuition [Anschauung]; it exhibits with primial originarity, that is, in the mode of self-presence." (Husserl, 1970, p. 105; HuaD VI, 107, 32-34). Perception is then the originative mode of intuition and, besides, it is directed to that which is present in itself. Husserl continues: "In addition, there are other modes of intuition which in themselves consciously have the character of [giving us] modifications of this "itself there" as themselves present. These are [re-presentations] modifications of presentations; they make us conscious of the modalities of time…" (1970, p. 105; HuaD VI, 107, 34-38).

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[20] "Der Rücken der Welt ist für uns stets unsichtbar. Und doch meinen wir zu Recht, dass wir nicht in Kulissen existieren, hinter denen nichts ist. In diesem Zusammenhang entdeckte er die Rolle des Horizontes neu. Jedes Ding, so zeigte er, »schattet sich ab« (…) Zwei Aspekte wollen wir festhalten, die für das Konzept einer Logik der Bilder unmittelbar fruchtbar werde. Der erste besagt, dass die Dinge in jeder Wahrnehmung einen Horizont berühen. Beide gehören aber zu völlig unterschiedlichen Klassifikationen: Das Ding ist einzeln und gegeben, der Horizont ist fliessend, unterbrochen und potentiell (…) Der zweite Aspekt ist, dass wir uns jetzt in einer Argumentation bewegen, in der das Unbestimmte und Potentielle der tragende Grund des Bestimmten ist." (Boehm, 2015, p. 46)

We have then, on the one hand, perception dealing with that which is present and, on the other hand, modes of intuition functioning via the re-presentation of things. Intuition takes the form of perception insofar as the intuited object is necessarily present or, better yet, in its physical presence. Moreover, as Husserl stresses in *Thing and Space*, the condition of an object of being present is essential to perception (Cf. HuaE VII, 16, 12-14; HuaD XVI, 19, 36-37). In contrast, re-presentation is not a condition of the intuited object, but an act of the intuiting consciousness. It must me pointed out right away that, instead of understanding it as a single species of act of consciousness, the word ´re-presentation´ encompasses a genre of acts such as memory, imagination and, among others, image consciousness.

As we can observe in the last cited excerpt from *Crisis*, re-presentations are eminently linked to temporal modalities. We have already seen that Husserl began by considering re-presentations in analogy with images, that is to say, treating memories and imaginations as if they were images. After dismissing this explicative path, the author concluded that the way in which re-presentations are experienced in time consciousness is what defines whether an object is present or re-represented (Carreño Cobos, 2010). For instance, a memory is not to be phenomenologically explained as an image, but as temporal past experience of something previously perceived. Hence, phenomena of the re-presenting kind are temporal modalities of perception.

It is in regard of the above-said that image consciousness constitutes a singularity within re-presentations. Unlike other acts, phenomena of image consciousness are, as its name clearly indicates, images. This confers image consciousness an intermediate status between present and re-presentation, since the object to be perceived (the image-thing) is present and, at the same time, the intuition of that object *qua* image (the image object) requires a re-presentation. Following Husserl, "[Phantasy] represents perception, while here in *image consciousness* perception is not represented, *but carried out in an inactual way.*" (HuaE XI, 360, 6-7; HuaD XXIII, 299, 20-23). There is a fulfilled perception in image consciousness, but the intuition of an image exceeds the mere act of perceiving it.

Given that perception and intuition of an image are not the same, Husserl conceives image consciousness as a non-actual perception, i.e. as an apprehension of something non-actual through something that is actual. The author chooses to use the German verb '*hineinsehen*' (commonly translated as "seeing-in") in order to describe the act of seeing something in another or, more specifically, the intuition of the image object via the perception of the image-thing. As Ferrer Ortega claims "Image consciousness "steals", "snatches", so

to speak, the sensuous contents to perception, making them function in a different way than the intuitive presentation of real properties." (2008, p. 79)[21].

It is possible then to point out in which sense Boehm´s theory betrays one of its own foundations. When it comes to images, consciousness re-presents its object, thus images are apprehended by a mode of consciousness other than perception (if not, Husserl would have referred to images as present objects and not as re-presented ones). Boehm's approach manages only to explain one phase of the apprehension of an image, but it does not deepen into the moment when consciousness truly constitutes the intuited object as an image.

The inconsistency with the sources that serve as a foundation for a theory is certainly not a desirable situation; nevertheless, it can still be argued that the utilization of an author's idea does not lead to a total engagement with her whole oeuvre. In other words, Boehm can be well defended arguing that, just because he sustains his iconic difference theory with the notion of adumbration, he is not forced to obey the Husserlian dictation to study images by means of other modes of consciousness rather than perception. In this sense, in order to complete the critique to Boehm´s theory, it is precise to explicate not only why it is incompatible with Husserlian thought, but also why the choice of adumbration as the conceptual foundation of a study of images is insufficient.

This will take us to the examination of some of the examples with which Boehm sustains his arguments about iconic difference. The next thing to study is the artistic practice to which we will continue referring as 'concealment' and corresponds to pictorial practices that include overpainting, crossing out, bleaching and others. Boehm analyzes painters such as Arnulf Reiner or Ad Reinhardt to identify in their works the functioning of the figure-ground contrast that he coordinates with adumbration. We will approach concealment with the purpose of culminating the critique to Boehm's theory and thus finally returning to Husserl in order to determine the relationship between images and perception.

Image and Perception

In *Wie Bilder Sinn erzeugen,* specifically in the chapter *Ikonoklasmus. Auslöschung-Aufhebung-Negation* (*Iconoclasm, Extinction-Sublation-Negation*), Boehm puts attention to

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[21] "La conciencia de imagen "roba", "arrebata", por así decirlo, los contenidos sensibles a la percepción, para hacerles ejercer una función distinta de la presentación intuitiva de propiedades reales." (Ferrer Ortega, 2008, p. 79)

the 20th Century avant-garde panorama and its defiance to the way that a painting was supposed to look. Boehm questions himself: "What authorizes the designation of this turn towards analysis, towards disclosure of assumptions, towards extinction, towards undifferentiation of respective totalizations as iconoclast? Moreover, in respect to which acts is it a *constructive destruction*?" (2015, p. 61)[22]. The first thing to observe is how, even though the author recognizes that need to clarify in what sense modern art is to be considered as iconoclast, right away we are told that such iconoclasm will be conceived as a constructive destruction. What is destroyed and what is constructed will be our first concern.

Fig. 1: Arnulf Rainer, Kreuz (1994). Baden, Arnulf Rainer Museum

Two of the artists that Boehm studies will be of particular interest here: Arnulf Rainer and Ad Reinhardt. Boehm turns to Rainer's works in which the artist conceals portraits by overpainting them with layers of color (Fig. 1), to which the author comments

> It is also here a matter of coming to a suitable image by means of a negation of another. He chooses for this purpose the procedure of *overpainting*, which *visibly conceals* the formerly visible. Moments of remembering, compression and also purification cease. The dense black overpaintings appear as sarcophagi of color, in which a formerly recognizable reality, whatever it is, was buried. The extinction of the visible *energizes* the image… (2015, p. 64)[23].

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[22] "Was aber rechtfertigt es, diese Wendung hin zur Analyse, zur Aufdeckung von Voraussetzungen, zur Auslöschung, Entdifferenzierung respektive Totalisierung »ikonoklastisch« zu nennen? Und näherhin, um welche Akte einer *aufbauenden* Destruktion handelt es sich?" (Boehm, 2015, p. 61).

[23] "Auch hier geht es darum, mittels Negation zu einem anderem, einem angemesseneren Bild zu kommen. Er wählt dafür das Verfahren der *Übermalung*, das alles vordem Sichtbare *sichtbar überdeckt.* Momente von Erinnerung, von Komprimierung, auch von Reinigung stellen sich ein. Die dichten schwarzen Übermalungen erscheinen wie Sarkophage aus Farbe, in denen eine ehedem erkennbare Realität, welche auch immer, begraben worden ist. Die Löschung des Sichtbaren *energetisiert* das Bild…" (Boehm, 2015, p. 64)

Taking into account the last two excerpts, it becomes clear that the author considers 'destruction' and 'negation' as homologous terms. Rainer's iconoclast drive consists, according to Boehm, in the negative nature of his overpainting procedures. The phase of negativity and thus of destruction is carried out by concealing with paint the "recognizable reality".

After the negative phase a second one occurs, which Boehm identifies as 'sublation'. Still in reference to Rainer, the author claims: "The disappeared appears sublated, translated into a pictorial physical state that negates the Christic iconography and, precisely by doing so, actualizes it." (Boehm, 2015, p. 65)[24]. Insofar as Rainer destroys by overpainting an image (the face), he produces a new image (the cross).

Fig. 2: Ad Reinhardt, Abstract Painting (1963). Private collection

Notwithstanding Rainer's crosses are useful for Boehm to illustrate the negation-sublation dialectic, the author considers Ad Reinhardt's *Black Paintings* (Fig. 2) as the epitome of sublation. Reinhardt applies layers of primary colors ones of top of each other until the painting turns into a practically great black surface. The phase of negation occurs clearly where the appliance of every color layer conceals the formerly applied one. Unlike Rainer's paintings, sublation is not fulfilled here precisely by creating a new image. Before the negation of something recognizable (the color), the spectators are no longer confronted with something presented by the image, but rather they interact with the image itself: "Reinhardt ventures into a limit where the image trespasses into a staged invisibility; it does not present, rather it interacts with the spectator…" (Boehm, 2015, p. 66)[25]. Whether it is a

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[24] "Das Verschwundene erscheint aufgehoben, in einen malerischen Aggregatzustand übersetzt, der die christliche Ikonographie negiert, um sie gerade dadurch zu aktualisieren." (Boehm, 2015, p. 65)
[25] "Reinhardt hat sich an eine Grenze vorgewagt, wo das Bild in eine inszenierte Unsichtbarkeit übertritt, es nicht mehr darstellt, sondern mit dem Betrachter interagiert…" (Boehm, 2015, p. 66)

production of a new image or the presentation of the image itself, negation and sublation are in Boehm's theory two constituting and mutually implicated phases.

Let us articulate the former with the figure-ground contrast mentioned in the previous section of this chapter. The first thing that becomes visible is the figure, but we also know that, even though it is not quite striking at first, there is also a background. This means that the figure conceals inevitably the background and therefrom Boehm affirms: "*Showing* presupposes therefore *concealing*." (2015, p. 69)[26]. The negation of the background is hence the inescapable step for the figure to show itself. Boehm takes this idea to the last consequences and identifies negation not only in relation to the process of visibilization, but also in relation to the process of production of images: "Already the first trace of color (…) every layer of the representation negates the ground of the image and, at the same time, brings it out again." (2006, p. 340)[27]. If what becomes visible in an image negates its own background, the image negates simultaneously the material background that functions as its material support.

It can be well guessed how does the Husserlian adumbration comes into play in Boehm's theory. First (and this will be not problematic at all), the image conceals part of its support, i.e. part of the image-thing. There is secondly the concealment inherent to the image object, which will be of our main interest from now on. In both cases, Boehm identifies a negated background and a shown figure: in Rainer's work the painting conceals the face and, in Reinhardt's case, the black surface conceals the color layers. Every figure is therefore the correlate of a thing in the world showed to image consciousness in a specific side, whilst the background corresponds to the non-appearing sides of that same thing. Following Boehm, the perceptive regime with which consciousness apprehends things in the world is the same one with which image consciousness apprehends the image object.

We must look closely at Boehm's examples for revising if the aforesaid can be properly defended. We must notice that, in both Rainer and Reinhardt's pieces, what Boehm identifies as the background of images does not take part in the image object. What these pictures render visible (their image objects) completely dispenses with what is materially behind them. Boehm makes his remarks only because he is aware of the procedure by virtue of which the images were produced. When addressing Reinhardt's work as the ultimate case of sublation, Boehm himself recognizes this saying: "That is only possible insofar as we

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[26] "*Zeigen* setzt mithin *Verbergen* voraus." (Boehm, 2015, p. 69).
[27] "Schon die erste Spur von Farbe (…) jede erste Schicht der Darstellung negiert den Bildgrund und bringt ihn zugleich neu hervor." (Boehm, 2006, p. 340).

characterize the procedure of the making." (2015, p. 65)[28]. The author elaborates a theory concerning how something becomes visible in an image, but now we find that his explanatory model depends on a process (the production of the image) which exceeds the phenomenal experience and, moreover, is not visible in the image.

Referring to Rainer and Reinhardt´s paintings in terms of a negation-sublation sequence is convenient insofar as one has knowledge about how the images were produced. But what about when we have no idea whatsoever of such procedures? Let us suppose that we do not know that one of the *Black Paintings* is the result of overlaying colors. It would be impossible for us to know when the image stopped being negation and began being sublation. What the image renders visible are all those black subtleties, but not the path followed for obtaining them. In the same manner, not knowing that photographs lie behind the color stains of Rainer´s crosses, what stands before our eyes is a chromatic composition, but not the artist placing photographed faces in the first place. This does not mean that the production of images is irrelevant to its study. What is to be noticed here is the necessity of distinguishing analytically the production of an image and its visualization. Since the former is not always apparent, known or registered, the latter does not depend necessarily upon it.

Thinking in such hypothetical scenarios (the case of someone who does not know how Rainer and Reinhardt's paintings were produced) leads us to a question that has not yet been of our interest: how are we certain that there is something behind the concealing element? Is there really a concealment? And finally, are images to be apprehended in the same manner as any other thing?

In order to answer these questions, let us turn to an example similar to the ones provided by Boehm, one in which there is something that we could consider tentatively as a case of concealment: *Episodio #1* of Costa Rican painter Fabrizio Arrieta (Fig. 3).

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[28] "Das ist nur möglich, indem wir die Folgeordnung des Machens charakterisieren." (2015, p. 65)

Fig. 3: Fabrizio Arrieta, Episodio #1 (2012). Private collection

In *Episodio #1* we find an image in which a big blue circle is apparently concealing part of a figure whose margins we can distinguish. In Boehm's terms, we would say that the blue circle conceals the background so it can show itself and that, by doing so, the circle adumbrates, thusly concealing its back side and the rest of the scene that we do not fully regard. We would say that there is something to see behind the circle.

Let us now shift to the Husserlian frame. We will say firstly that the image object is both the scene that we partially see (an arm of a person lying in the floor, her hair, a bag, some plants, a room) and that big blue circle[29]. We must then immediately recognize a conflict between image object and image subject.

Even though the painting does not give us much detail about the image subject corresponding to the image object, we could easily imagine a situation like the one that we can partially distinguish. We can easily imagine a long-haired person lying on the floor of a room while holding a bag, but what about the blue circle? For the sake of the argument, let us imagine that we open the door of that room and we strike immediately with a circular and blue surface, let us say, a big circular blue cardboard.

Where is it then the conflict between image object and image subject? Let us think about the image subject that we have just mentioned. As we open the door, we could put

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[29] With this example it becomes clear as well that in a same image figurative and non-figurative image objects can easily coexist.

aside the circular cardboard, pass beside or under it; we could even watch its reverse and check if it is also blue-colored. We could dodge it, look at the whole scene of the person lying on the floor. Let us think now of the image object that Arrieta's painting shows us. Nothing of the aforesaid applies to the image object. The blue circle is inevitable and impenetrable. There is absolutely nothing in the image object that guarantees us that there is something behind the circle or, better yet, that the circle is concealing something. We might get very close to the image and try to determine if the circle is embossed on the rest, but this would turn our attention to the image-thing and not to the image object. And even if we determine that the circle is raised over the rest of the scene, we would have to scratch its surface to be completely sure that there is something behind it, that is to say, we would have to destroy the image. Hence, there is nothing that allows us to say that the circle or anything else in the image object adumbrates.

In §41 of Ideas, Husserl sets the example of looking at a table while surrounding it. At every time, the table shows itself to the intuition in a different manner. With every single movement on our behalf, the table adumbrates differently and shows us a different side of its. But consciousness fulfills a synthesis of all those adumbrations, thusly considering that we always intend the same table. Husserl concludes:

> Of essential necessity there belongs to any "all-sided", continuously, unitary, and self-confirming experimental consciousness [Erfahrungsbewusstsein] of the same physical thing a multifarious system of continuous multiplicities of appearances and adumbrations in which all objective moments falling within perception with the characteristic of being themselves given "in person" are adumbrated by determined continuities. (HuaE II, 87; HuaD III, 93, 21-33).

A manifold of adumbrations is inherent to the perceptive experience. Therefore, a multiplicity of perceptive possibilities belongs to every single thing in the world. It is also by means of such perceptive multiplicity that it is possible to correct the momentary perception one is having of something. In the case of the table, if someone were squatting and having an edge view of it, she would see three stripes (the surface of the table and two of its legs), but she would always be capable of shifting her position and walking around in order to look the table in depth. As Husserl claims in *Crisis*:

> To the variety of appearances through which a body is perceivable as this one-and-the-same body correspond, in their own way, the kinestheses which belong to this body; as these kinestheses are allowed to run their course, the corresponding required appearances must show up in order to be appearances of this body at all, i.e., in order to be appearances which exhibit in themselves this body with its properties. (1970, p.

If kinaestheses would not cooperate with the multiple adumbrations of things, there would not be any possibility of perceptive correction and thus of a progressive knowledge of things.

Returning to Arrieta's painting, with the image subject we can certainly execute kinestheses and move through the space, removing somehow the blue circle and discovering what is behind it. *Qua* thing in the world, to the image subject belongs a perceptive regime determined by adumbrations and kinaestheses. Let us now pay attention to the image object. We have already seen that there is no guarantee that it adumbrates. Neither can we perform any kinesthesis with it; instead, a too pronounced kinesthesis might make the image object disappear. Looking at the reverse of the painting would make us look at the reverse of the image-thing, but never the one of the blue circle.

Fig. 4: Luis Buñuel, Los olvidados (1950) (stills from the motion picture). Ultramar Films

It is necessary to take at this point a slight detour, since the aforesaid about kinestheses might be refuted by making reference to images of cinema, animation and sculpture. We have already established that we cannot verify via kinaestheses a bidimensional image such as Arrieta's painting. But, if we think in the cases of cinema and animation, it could be argued that it is possible there to look at different sides of the image object. For instance, let us take a look at the initial sequence of Luis Buñuel's *Los Olvidados* (1950) (Fig. 4), in which we see several children playing to be in a bullfight. First we look at the child playing the bull, standing frontwards or, more precisely, we look at his face and his frontal torso. This image does not let us check that the child has a backside, that is to say, the image does not show us other side than the frontal one. In the next sequence, we look at other child frontwards, holding one of his garments that plays the cloak and towards which his friend is heading. Next, we look at the first child´s rear and, as he moves forward, part of his back reveals. At the same time, the kid playing the bullfighter turns his torso and we get a glance of his back as well. With this few seconds, we could say that we get to corroborate that these children have a backside. Moreover, we could claim that cinema

allows us what painting, photography and engraving do not, i.e. looking at the different sides of an image object.

We must examine this closely. In the first place, the fact that cinematic images show us various sides of the same thing must not be confused with a perceptive correction, since there is no actual kinesthesis in the lapse during which we stare at the sequence. What we must notice here is that the image possesses its own ways for doing what the body in front of it cannot. The succession of images in cinema gives us the illusion that the image performs the kinaestheses for us, but what really happens is that multiple image objects with the same image subject are presented continuously. In front of a cinematic image, a synthesis of identity is certainly fulfilled by consciousness, but this does not mean that it also performs kinestheses.

Besides a perceptual analysis, a phenomenology of cinematic images must necessarily contemplate their temporal dimension. A film is not the presentation of a singular image, but rather a constant flow of images which consciousness apprehends as a continuous whole. According to Shaw (2008), the acts of consciousness that bestow a temporal sense upon cinematic images are not different from the structure that Husserl describes in his studies on the consciousness of internal time. Shaw points out that watching a film leads to the fulfillment of both retentions and protentions, just as it happens within perceptive consciousness. When I perceive a thing and when I watch a film, I hold my past impressions and consider them as belonging to the same intuited object. Also, in both experiences I find myself constantly expecting impressions to come of what I am intuiting. That is to say, a viewer of a film experiences an overlapping of image consciousness, memory, expectation and time consciousness. Hence, cinema is a much more complex case of images.

Considering these particularities of cinema, Shaw stresses that film presents "…a duality of concrete reality and intuited image" (2008, p.89). However, it is important to point out that, just because the experience of cinema has the same temporal structure as the perceptive experience, cinematic image consciousness does not equate to perception[30]. As we have already established, the movements and the flux of time that we see in the image are not to be confused with kinestheses. We may experience the movement and the

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[30] Deleuze's studies on cinema are another attempt to differentiate the cinematic experience from perception. However, the Deleuzian conceptual frame is not entirely compatible with the Husserlian one. Hence, a further analysis on how Deleuze and Husserl could be coordinated is required. In his investigation, Shaw (2008) proposes such a coordination, to which he adds some of Walter Benjamin's ideas concerning images.

duration of images within a retention-protention structure, but neither is such movement nor such duration a product of the subjective action.

Fig. 5: Eiichiro Oda, One Piece, Episode 466 (2010) (still from the anime). Toei Animation

Another mechanism through which images give the illusion of a coincidence between image consciousness and perception can be identified in various animation pieces. In the still shown above (Fig. 5) from the Japanese anime *One Piece*, we see two human figures, one of them placed in what we could say is the foreground and the other one in the background. Looking closely, the figure in the front has a neat definition, whilst the one in the back looks somewhat blurred. This is precisely the experience we have when our gaze, concentrating on a determinate object, unfocus the surroundings, leaving them with a fuzzy look. It seems then as if the apprehension of the image object occurs in the exact same manner that we see things with our eyes[31]; but if we try to focus now the figure in the background and letting the one in the front to blur, we will find ourselves in an impossibility. There is no eye movement that can revert the focus, because it is the image that dictates what gets focused and what not. In this sense, the image is tyrannical to the eye.

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[31] This might be the ultimate expression of *mimesis*: not an imitation of the way in which things look, but an imitation of the way in which they appear to consciousness.

Fig. 6: Sara Mata, Haciendo un paisaje (2017). Private collection

Besides being able to dominate it, images can confuse our gaze and leave it in a state of ambiguity. Let us consider the digital and intervened photograph part of the series *Haciendo un paisaje* (Fig. 6) by Costa Rican artist Sara Mata. The demarcation of regions in the central part of the image (where the landscape is shown) might lead to think that some regions are in the foreground and some in the background. But any option seems as valid as the other one and there is no way to verify this because, once again, there is no possibility of kinestheses at all.

Fig. 7: Venus of Willendorf (ca. 28.000-25.000 B.C). Vienna, Naturhistorisches Museum

Two-dimensional images impede us to equate image consciousness to perception, but could we say the same thing of three-dimensional images? Unlike with a painting or a

movie, with a sculpture we can no longer deny the possibility of performing kinestheses and a corrected perception. Whether it is a figurine carved in bone from the Paleolithic or a Renaissance marble sculpture, tridimensional images do give us the possibility to surround them and perceptively verify them. If we visit the Natural History Museum in Vienna, locked inside a glass box, we will be able to see the Venus of Willendorf (Fig. 7) and walk around it to look at its sides. Better yet, having the opportunity to look at Chinese artist Cai Guo-Qiang´s *Head On* (Fig. 8), one could place under the wolves and stare at their abdomens, one could walk to the sides and get a side perspective. One could even go behind the glass and examine how the bodies of the wolves retract when hitting the surface.

Fig. 8: Cai Guo-Qiang, Head On (2006). Berlin, Deutsche Guggenheim

Sculptural examples avert us from thinking that there is no possibility at all of kinestheses with images. On the one hand, two-dimensional images do not allow us to perform kinestheses and, on the other hand, with three-dimensional ones the situation is the opposite. We have thus cases in which image consciousness sets aside from perception and others in which both of them converge. It can be then concluded that the coordination of image consciousness and perception is just one of the possibilities that images allow. Though, such a possibility is contingent.

The inquiry that motivated this first chapter concerned whether images are entities to be perceived as any other one thing in the world. *Qua* image-thing, the answer is evidently positive. But, with the aid of the Husserlian model, we know now that, *qua* image object, the question must be responded to negatively. Even though images are things, the image object does not behave necessarily under the same perceptive regime as the image-thing, the

image subject or any other thing in the world. In the next chapter, we will deepen into this by studying image objects as an ideal objects and, moreover, how does consciousness bestows sense upon them.

When we studied Husserl´s image consciousness model in order to judge Boehm's iconic difference theory, it seemed that perception was not to be considered as the center of an image theory. After this exhaustive revision, we must admit the contrary: perception is precisely what images bring into play. This happens not because perception is something given in the apprehension of images, but rather because it is something they set up. And maybe, more than setting up, images dictate their own perceptive regime, making thus possible the imposition of objectivity that every image carries out.

Fig. 9: Emanuel Rodríguez, Dominante cretinismo mecanicista (2013). Private collection

Let us look at yet another example from Costa Rican painting: the work of Emanuel Rodríguez. By studying Arrieta's painting we have settled that there is no guarantee whatsoever of a continuity in the recognizable background behind the blue circle. In Rodríguez´s *Dominante cretinismo mecanicista* (Fig. 9) we find a different situation. There we look a faceless human body and, where the face ought to be, the continuity of the background is revealed. If the body would have a face, we would not watch part of the ladder, we would see less of the fence and so the vegetation behind it and, furthermore, we would have no guarantee that all those things stand behind the face. But in this case the image reveals us that such things are actually in the background; it suggests to us (even though not completely) the guarantee that the perceptive regime of the image is somewhat

similar to that of our primary intuition.

This correlation of the modes of intuition of an image and perceptive intuition can only be executed via a modification that, in Husserlian terms, we might conceive as fantasizing. When kinestheses are not possible to perform, a fantasizing leap (to show a body without face) must be done if we want to guarantee the existence of the background. Thus arises the paradox that it is necessary to diminish the similarity of the image object with the image subject in order to augment the similarity between the specific perceptive regime of the image and general perceptive intuition.

Fig. 10: Emanuel Rodríguez, Desplazamiento (2013). Private collection

In Rodríguez's collage *Desplazamiento* (Fig. 10) we find a very similar case. Once again a faceless body is shown to us, but now what is revealed in the space behind of where the face "should" be is not the background of the image object, but rather the image-thing itself. This example helps us to realize that bringing the image object closer to the world (perceptually speaking) might end up by suppressing it and leaving the image-thing only. A reflection made from painting itself was made in the 17th century by Cornelius Norbertus Gijsbrechts. The artist painted three versions of a *Vanitas* (Fig. 11).

Fig. 11: Vanitas: (a) Cornelius Norbertus Gijsbrechts, Vanitas (1669), (b) Cornelius Norbertus Gijsbrechts, Vanitas (n.d.), (c) Cornelius Norbertus Gijsbrechts, Trompe-l´oeil With Atelier Wall and Vanitas (1668)

The first one looks like any other *Vanitas*, but in the second one we can see at the superior right corner that everything we are staring at (the skull, the violin, the straw and other elements) is a canvas fixed to a frame that supports it. Stoichita (2011) concentrates on the detail of this fallen corner of the canvas, pointing out that it is a sign of the destructive effect that time has on paintings (Cf. p. 445). In the third version, the artificial character of the *Vanitas* becomes even more evident by showing both the picture and the instruments that created it.

Stoichita comments on these three Gijsbrechts's paintings: "…they reveal themselves as simple matter (canvas, frame, colors, etc.), but its revelation is actually a lie and this revelation is (it is represented in) the picture" (Stoichita, 2011, p. 448)[32]. And thus what Stoichita calls "meta-painting" reaches its climax. The last three paintings allowed us to take a glance at the self-awareness of painting as an image produced by an artist, but in *The Reverse Side of a Painting* (Fig. 12) Gijsbrechts shows the painting as *simple matter* or, in words of Stoichita, "…all what the picture is: fabric and wood." (Stoichita, 2011, p. 453)[33].

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[32] "… *se revelan como simple materia (lienzo, bastidor, colores, etc.), pero en realidad su revelación es una mentira y esta revelación es (está representada en) el cuadro.*" (Stoichita, 2011, p. 448).
[33] "…*todo lo que es el cuadro: tela y madera.*" (Stoichita, 2011, p. 453).

Fig. 12: Cornelius Norbertus Gijsbrechts, The Reverse Side of a Painting (1670-1675). Copenhagen, Statens Museum for Kunst

Rodríguez's collage showed us how an excessive perceptive realism could end up suppressing the image object. Now we can see with Gijsbrechts that accomplishing this by pictorial means ends up producing always an image. Better yet, the Dutch painter shows masterfully that one of the pictorial possibilities is making the image object, the image subject and the image-thing to coincide. And that is only one example of many possible variants.

(a)   (b)

(c)   **(d)**   **(e)**

Fig. 13: Paintings by Emanuel Rodríguez (a) Emanuel Rodríguez, Sin título (2014). Private collection, (b) Emanuel Rodríguez, Chimera, Pintura I (2015). Private collection, (c) Emanuel Rodríguez, I, II, III (Variations from a child preacher) (2015). Private collection

Works of Rodríguez such as *Variations on a child preacher, Chimera* and the untitled painted showed above (Fig. 13) take the conclusions that we have obtained so far to its last consequences. All of these images set up a perceptive regime in which the notions of *figure*, *background* or *adumbration* fall into disuse. Before these images, it is not possible saying what is in the front and what stays in the background. Even by determining what is in the front side and what in the back side, it would still be very problematic having to identify the images subjects of the paintings.

The work of Rodríguez is key for observing that, since images impose their own perceptive regime, the engagement with an image subject is not a necessary condition. It is important, however, to notice that this does not put the image subject in a position of irrelevance. Throughout this first chapter, we have been focusing more on images than on subjects, which means that it is the former and not the latter that may dispense in occasions with the existence of an image subject. We will explore in the following chapter that, even though an image has a non-existent image subject, consciousness will always bestow a sense upon it. Better yet, we will explore how does such an interaction between image and consciousness constitutes a certain type of subjectivity.

To sum up, images are one of the few fields where there is no dependency on perceptive intuition, primary as it may be. No realism or fantasy can be accomplished if it is not because images allow to hold on to the given perception in experience or detach from

it. This is thus how the figment character that Husserl pointed out is to be understood. The image is a field where liberty is at stake.

One last adjustment to the Husserlian model concerns the notion of *conflict*. According to Husserl, the conflicts pertaining images are between the image object and the image-thing, and between the image subject and the image object. But now we have found a deeper level, i.e. a conflict between the perceptive regime of the image object and the one of the image-thing, the image subject and extensively any other thing in the world. If perception is on the base of intuition and images dictate their own perceptive regime, it is of no surprise that they constitute a differentiated mode of consciousness. Moreover, by dictating their own perceptive regime, images defy the intuitive given perception.

Fig. 14: Hans Holbein, The Ambassadors (1533). London, National Gallery

Finally, the conflict between perceptive regimes can even occur among the image objects of a same image. In Hans Holbein's *The Ambassadors* (Fig. 14) we find two different perceptive regimes. On the one hand, the ambassadors as such, on the other hand, the outstretched element that only reveals itself as a skull until we adopt a certain corporal position towards the painting. The neater the ambassadors appear, the less will the skull do and vice versa. The image objects demand from us different conditions in order to be apprehended by consciousness and such conditions, as it is the case with *The Ambassadors*, are eminently related to the body. In his seminar *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan studies Holbein's *The Ambassadors* in order to make

his remarks on the gaze and the image. The author claims: "This picture is simply what every picture is, a trap for the gaze." (Lacan, 1998, p. 89). One might add that, when falling in such trap, the gaze drags the whole body with it. But let us reserve this discussion for the forthcoming chapters.

When Husserl began outlining his adumbration theory in *Logical Investigations*, he claimed: "If percepts were always the actual, genuine self-presentations of objects that they pretend to be, there could be only a single percept of each object, since its peculiar essence would be exhausted in such self-presentation." (2001, pp. 220-221; HuaD XIX, 589, 21-25). After all that has been studied here, it seems that images manage to accomplish that which perception cannot, i.e. the absolute apprehension of what is seen. The image or, better yet, every image is absolute.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

Since the beginning we knew that, according to Husserl, different modes of being prescribe different modes of consciousness. The author's postulation of the existence of a mode of consciousness specifically pertaining images made us anticipate that images have a particular mode of being. After this first approach to Husserl's thought, we can finally conclude that the particularity that defines the existence of images is their possibility of detaching themselves from the dictations of perception.

In a world without images, every single experience would be necessarily subjected to adumbrations-kinaestheses combinations, but the existence of those particular entities that we call 'images' makes it possible for us to affirm that seeing is not always reduced to perceiving. Perception is not a set of rules that determines the apprehension of images; instead, there are images whose apprehension by image consciousness broadens the subjective experience.

It would certainly unfair to claim that image consciousness is the only mode of consciousness that widens the subjective experience, since all the other re-presentations (imagination, memory and so on) also do that in their own way. But what image consciousness accomplishes and no other re-presentation does is being able to broaden the subjective experience of the material world. By virtue of images a certain subjectivity is constituted whose intuition of the material world exceeds perception.

Our research acquires thus a first answer, however, in such answer we find a subject mainly oriented towards receptivity. We have managed to determine a constitution of

subjectivity going in the direction from images towards subjects, focusing thus in the way that the latter receives the visual contents of the former. It is necessary to remember that in Husserlian philosophy it would not suffice to determine an objective mode of being, since it must always be in correlation with the subjective pole.

We must also notice that our findings in this first chapter were obtained thanks to the comprehension of images *qua* phenomena. By following the phenomenological method, we reflected first on the manners of givenness of images, instead on approaching them immediately in terms of their representational, semantical or iconological contents. In other words, a phenomenological-transcendental scope has pervaded our queries in this first chapter. However, we must not overlook that, instead of being strictly phenomenal, our experience of images also encompasses their contextual features (cultural codes, history, uses, and others). Since the very beginning, we recognized the fluctuating character of images and our experience of them, which means that we must still complement the conclusions of this first chapter with a more contextual approach to images and, moreover, study the tensions between both approaches. In the following chapters, we will have the opportunity to discuss this.

Now that we have concentrated first on how images impose themselves to consciousness, let us now pay attention to the ways in which subjects react to such imposition.

CHAPTER 2: BESTOWING SENSE UPON IMAGES

According to Husserl, there are three things that consciousness apprehends before an image: the image-thing, the image object and the image subject. As we concluded in the last chapter, since images can prescribe their own perceptive regime, the engagement with the existence of an image subject is not a necessary condition. By contrast, the existence of an image does require necessarily the existence of both an image-thing and an image object.

Even though the image object is what becomes predominantly intuited, no image object could be apprehended if it is not by means of an image-thing (otherwise we would have a hovering and mentally produced image, such as a memory or an imagination). Thus, every single image can be apprehended under two different modes of consciousness (i.e. perception and image consciousness) or, in more general terms, images are entities that are both present and re-presented by consciousness. This feature of images places them in an intermediate stratum between two different modes of existence and, moreover, it places the apprehending subject in an ambiguous position. In this chapter, we will examine the implications that this fluctuation of images between ontological strata has on subjectivity.

Whereas the ontological status of the image-thing is clearly defined by its empirical character, the one of the image object needs further explication. This will be our main concern in the first section. By examining the way in which the subject bestows sense upon images, we will observe that the ontological status of the image object is that of ideality. Next, knowing that images place the subject in the midst of the empirical and the ideal spheres, we will address the Husserlian logic as a common ground where both modes of existence can converge. More specifically, in the second section we will approach Husserl´s logical notion of *possibility* and how it is to be understood in the context of images. Taking all of this into consideration, in the final section we will examine several consequences of the encounter of images and subjects.

At the end of the chapter, we will be able to take a glance at different ways in which images contribute to the constitution of subjectivity. In the third section, we will explore how images can have an impact in a wide range of domains, from epistemology (ways in which the subject acquires knowledge of things by means of images) to pragmatics (actions performed by the subject through images).

Bestowing Sense Upon Images

First, let us recapitulate briefly what we found in the last chapter about the mode of existence of the image-thing. The existence of the image-thing is mainly characterized by its physical presence. If consciousness were to apprehend the image-thing only, such apprehension will not be fulfilled by means of image consciousness, but rather through perception. This means that the image-thing manifests itself in a manifold of adumbrations. Hence, even though the image-thing functions as the necessary substrate for an image object to appear, its mode of appearance does not differ from that of any other thing to be found in the physical world.

Conversely, the appearance of the image object does not necessarily consist in a multiplicity of adumbrations. Image objects can have one and only side (as it is the case of a painting or any other two-dimensional image), but they may as well manifest through various sides (which is the case of three-dimensional images). The coincidence of the modes of appearance of the image object and things in the physical world is therefore contingent.

We know already that it is by means of image consciousness that the subject bestows sense upon images, but this sense as such has not yet been explicated. The first thing to determine is upon which one of the three components of an image is the sense prominently bestowed. The image subject is the first one to be discarded, since the existence and the apprehension of an image do not rely on the existence of its corresponding image subject.

In regard to the image-thing, we can speak about its sense in two levels. First, consciousness bestows sense upon the image-thing by a synthesis of identity, i.e. consciousness adjudicates all of the adumbrations to a singular and identical entity. Second, we have the image-thing *qua* physical object, but conceived through what Husserl calls a motivation on the subject's account, that is to say, conceived by the subject as an object serving a determinate purpose (Cf. HuaE III, 197, 6-18; HuaD IV, 187, 16-25). Hereby the meaning that the image-thing has for the subject is that of being the materiality which makes possible the apparition of an image object. This second level appears to be the closest that consciousness gets to intend an image via the image-thing; however, it must be noted that the image is taken as the purpose of the thing intended, but not as the thing intended as such. No matter how motivated a subject may be when directing her consciousness towards

the image-thing about its participation in an image, consciousness will always intend matter, instead of what that matter renders visible.

If sense is not bestowed upon an image neither via the image subject nor the image-thing, the only option left is that such sense relies upon the image object. This is not something unexpected, since most of the things that we mean when we speak about an image have to do with the image object. For instance, if I look at a colored photograph of two children, I can describe the colors of the clothes that they are wearing by saying "This boy is wearing a blue shirt and that girl's skirt is black". On the contrary, if I would say "This portion of the photographic paper has blue ink spread over it and this other one portion has black ink over it", I would be referring to the image-thing, regardless of what those paper and inks are showing me. It is in the first case that I am speaking directly about an image; in the second one I might do it tangentially at best. Consequently, the sense bestowed upon images is to be found first and foremost in the image object.

Now that we know where does the sense of images reside, we need to clarify what does it precisely mean to bestow sense upon an image. More specifically, we must explain how does the subject integrates an image into the conscious life. In order to achieve this, let us first attend to the following excerpt from *On the Theory of Intuitions and Their Modes* (1918). Referring to a painted landscape, Husserl claims: "We are, of course, actually experiencing, but we are not in the attitude of actual experience; we do not actually join in the experiential positing. The reality changes into reality as-if for us…" (HuaE XI, 615, 9-11; HuaD XIII, 513, 31-34). In just a few lines, the author confronts us with something of main interest for our purpose: images lead to an attitude shift in the subject from the actual experience to the as-if experience.

In the context of Husserlian thought, speaking of a change in the subject´s attitude makes one think immediately on the cornerstone of the phenomenological method: reduction (or *epoché*). This might become even more tempting if one equates the abandonment of the "attitude of actual experience" with the natural attitude, i.e. the consideration according to which the experienced remains as constant reality for us (Keßler & Staiti, 2010, p. 80). Such an interpretation has been carried out by authors interested in a phenomenological reading of visual arts and the formulation of a phenomenological aesthetics. Kurg (2014) and Taminiaux (2015) consider that, when contemplating a work of art, the subject adopts an attitude uninterested in the existence of what is seen and, instead, focuses on the seeing and appearing itself. Therefore, they consider that the neutrality

modification implicit in image consciousness is the artistic correlate of the phenomenological reduction.

Two things must be pointed out in reference to what these authors stress. First, they are referring exclusively to the case of works of art and, as we saw in the first chapter, the image consciousness theory is not dependent on the distinction between artistic and non-artistic images. Hence, in order to formulate a general theory of image consciousness, it does not suffice to speak of artistic images only. We must add to this that the authors leave unclear how does consciousness intends an image *qua* work of art. Having the experience of certain images *qua* works of art presupposes a classification of images prior to the experience as such, however, we find no explication whatsoever of the conditions and criteria under which this is carried out by consciousness.

Second, the reduction is a displacement from the life-world towards the phenomenal sphere (and, even further, towards the transcendental sphere), but this is not the case with the shift of attitude that Husserl refers to in the context of images. In spite of having a common point of departure (i.e. the natural attitude), image consciousness and phenomenological reduction do not necessarily share their points of arrival. Kurg and Taminiaux hurry to conclude that, because both image consciousness and reduction abandon the actual experience, entering the as-if experience is the same as entering the phenomenal and transcendental domains. But Husserl is clearly not interested in elaborating his image consciousness theory as an alternate path for gaining access to the world of phenomena; instead, he aims to describe the experience that a subject has when confronting an image.

What is to be understood then by *as-if experience*? Husserl puts it in a rather intricate way when he says that we actually experience, but not in the attitude of actual experience. The word 'actual' seems to be of great importance here, so let us elaborate on what 'actual' signifies within the Husserlian context. We find in *Ideas*

> …"perception" not only signifies universally that some physical thing or other *appears* "personally" *present* to the Ego, but that the Ego *attentively perceives* the appearing physical thing, seizing upon, positing it as actually existing. The actuality of positing factual experience is, according to what was elaborated before, neutralized in perceptual [image]-consciousness[34]. (HuaE II, 266; HuaD III, 274, 1-8).

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[34] In Rojcewicz and Schuwer´s translation of *Ideas*, the German word ´*Bild*´ is translated to ´picture´. On the other hand, in his translation of *Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory*, Brough translates ´*Bild*´ with the expression ´image ´, which is preferred in this investigation.

Husserl places the actual character of things side by side with perception, which leads us to conclude that actuality is a determination of physical objects. But actuality is not only a matter of the existence of objects, but also of acceptance on the subject's account or, as the author calls it, of "positing as actually existing". An entity may exist independently of consciousness, but, in phenomenological terms, it is constituted as an object inasmuch the perceiving consciousness posits its existence, i.e. inasmuch consciousness considers it a *positum* by means of perception.

The term 'actuality' is better understood in reference to its counterpart 'potentiality'. In the second of his *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl claims that "...*every actuality involves its potentialities*, which are not empty possibilities, but rather possibilities intentionally predelineated in respect of content (…) and, in addition, having the character of possibilities *[fulfilled]*[35] *by the Ego*." (Husserl, 1960, p. 44; HuaD I, 81-82, 35-2). Later on the text, the author specifies how are these possibilities to be understood in the context of perception. We know that objects appear to consciousness showing a certain side and hiding other ones. For instance, when I am typing in my laptop, I get to see the screen and the keyboard, but not its base and the case covering the screen. By choosing this position of my device in order to write with it, the screen and the keyboard constitute the actuality of my perception of the laptop, whilst anything else that stays out of my sight (but still belongs to it) constitute its potentiality.

Knowing that there cannot be an image without an image-thing and an image object, it becomes clear why an image is actually experienced, but not in the attitude of actual experience. On the one hand, it is actually experienced because there is an image-thing, appearing in its physicality and "*essentially individualized by its spatiotemporal position*" (Husserl, 1973, p. 265). On the other hand, the subject´s attitude is not that of actual experience because consciousness does not intend the actuality (nor the potentiality) of the image-thing, but rather it intends the image object.

Even though image objects appear through matter, they lack of a materiality of their own and, consequently, of actuality as well[36]. Nevertheless, this is obviated by the subject whenever she intends an image object, which is precisely what Husserl means by *as-if*. Thus, thee as-if experience consists in considering the image object as something actual,

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[35] Cairns translates the German verb ´*verwirklichen*´ into the English ´actualize´. As it can be appreciated, the verb used by Husserl refers to making something effective (*wirklich*), rather than making it actual (*aktuell*) (as Cairns´ translation suggests). This is why, instead of following Cairns´ translation, the word ´actualizable´ is changed here to ´fulfilled´.
[36] Cf. HuaE XI, 360, 6-7; HuaD XXIII, 299, 20-23.

but without fulfilling any positing of actuality[37]. This becomes particularly evident by paying attention once again to way in which one speaks about images. Let us take, for example, the installation *One and Three Shovels* (Fig. 15) of American artist Joseph Kosuth, where we are shown the photo of a shovel, the shovel and the definition of a shovel.

Fig. 15: Joseph Kosuth, One and Three Shovels (1965)

If one is asked to describe what the photograph renders visible and then to do the same with the thing next to it, the uttered sentences will be almost the same. One would say both of the image and the thing that the blade is wider than the shaft, that the blade has a trapezoidal shape, and so on. One might even say that both of the things we see can be used for removing material from the ground. Of course, in a somewhat Platonic fashion, we must admit that the shovel will give us more information than the photograph can do (weight, color, texture). But what is to be noted here is that describing the image of the shovel is performed in the same manner as it is done in respect to the shovel itself. The image is treated *as if* it were an actual thing, without having to posit such actuality. Let us imagine that one needs to dig a hole on the ground. If no *as if* would mediate when looking at the photograph, one would go straight ahead towards it to take it and start digging; but, since one does not posit any actuality of image objects, this is not the case (otherwise, no image consciousness is operating).

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[37] This is other reason why image consciousness is not to be equated to perception. Both perception and image consciousness are visualizations, but the former is accompanied by positing and the latter is not.

This last example helps us to understand that, just as it happens with actual entities, image objects are neither a collection of sense data nor indeterminate appearances, but rather objects. Of course, stating that an image object is an object might sound somewhat tautological, but all of what we have examined here can help us obtain a much more specific conclusion. We can say then that the sense bestowed upon an image object consists in considering it *as* an actual object, in spite of its lack of actuality.

There is still one thing that the aforesaid leaves unanswered, i.e. the kind of object that an image object is. Always concerned with the as if experience, Husserl questions himself:

> Is it the case that I am not interested in existence here? To what extent am I not interested in it? I am not interested in the existence of what is presented *per se*. But I am interested in the ideal presentation of what is presented… (HuaE XI, 647, 21-24; HuaD XXIII, 11-13).

When consciousness intends an image object, it is neither its existence nor its actuality that comes into focus. Instead, as Husserl foregrounds, it is the ideal character of the image object what comes into play. The underlying complexity in the sense bestowal upon images is a consequence of the particular ontological status of the image object, i.e. the status of ideal object.

In order to gain a deeper understanding of ideal objects, let us attend to §65 of *Experience and Judgement.* In this paragraph, Husserl begins by defining real[38] objects (empirical and perceptible) as "…substrates of individual qualities, particularities in relation to generalities, members of combination, parts of wholes, and so on." (Husserl 1973, pp. 264-265). Next, the author points out that there are two kinds of determinations that real objects can bear: material and of significance. The attributions "…which belong to objects as mere things" (Husserl 1973, p. 265) are called "material determinations", such as dimensions, weight, color, and so on. But there are other attributions that objects bear and do not refer to objects themselves, but "…to our evaluative and voluntary behavior (…) in relation to us, to our appraising and willing, according to what [they] signify for us" (Husserl 1973, p. 265); this is the case of the usefulness of a tool (a direct example given by Husserl).

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[38] Husserl uses three different German adjectives which can be easily translated to ´real´. First, Husserl employs the world ´*real*´ in the sense of an objective, empirical, concrete and perceivable reality. Second, ´*wirklich*´ (which is, in a strict sense, ´effective´) is reserved for things that, even though they are not *real*, exist. Mathematical objects are the clearest examples of effective objects, but under this category we find all sort of ideal objects (Soldinger, 2010). Third, the word ´*reel*´ denotes all pertaining to the transcendental sphere, that is to say, to the "…pure component[s] of the lived experience of *cogitatio* as such." (Patočka, 1989, p. 209).

These last attributions receive the name of "determinations of significance". Finally, the material determinations and the determinations of significance define two kinds of objectivities, i.e. the real and the irreal, respectively.

We must notice that the status of irreality is not the same as that of non-existent. An irreal objectivity is simply something that does not exist as a material or actual entity. Both real and irreal objectivities are rooted in concrete things, however an irreal objectivity is "…*every determination which, indeed, is founded with regard to its spatiotemporal appearance in a specifically real thing but which can appear in different realities as identical* —not merely as similar" (Husserl, 1973, pp. 265-266). This manifests quite clearly in mathematical and logical objects, since, although they are expressed materially in signs, its sense is independent of them and remains identical in every possible apparition. For instance, the sense of the number two is exactly the same whether it is written in a piece of paper, uttered by someone today in Costa Rica or tomorrow in Japan. Finally, Husserl calls the immutable sense of an irreal objectivity an "ideal" or, better yet, an "ideality".

Beside mathematical and logical entities, Husserl includes in the category of ideal objects what he calls "cultural objectivities", of which he gives three examples: Goethe´s *Faust*, Raphael´s *Madonna* and a civil constitution. Of course, an image is ontologically not the same as a number, even though both of them fall in the category of ideal objects. This why the author defines two sorts of idealities based on how dependent they are of a spatiotemporal individuation. What Husserl calls "free idealities" are those ideal objects which are not bound to any particular territory (such as logical and mathematical entities) and, moreover, are applicable to any possible world[39]. On the contrary, what he calls "bound idealities" are those ideal objects "…which in their being-sense carry reality with them and hence belong to the real world." (Husserl, 1973, p. 267).

Let us return to images. Evidently, image objects cannot be free idealities for the simple reason that they are always bound to the image-thing. In other words, the apparition of an image object requires necessarily a material substrate. Certainly, a material image can be reproduced by consciousness in its absence, but this would belong to other mode of consciousness than the one in which we are interested. For instance, I can reproduce in my inner consciousness Rembrandt´s *The Anatomy Lesson of Nicolaes Tulp* that appears on the cover of my Spanish edition of Husserl´s *Crisis*, but that image hovering in my mind is a

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[39] This does not mean that free idealities exist detached from the empirical and real world. As Husserl claims: "But free idealities are in fact also mundane: by their historical and territorial occurence, their "being discovered", and so on." (Husserl, 1973, p. 267).

memory, which is not the same as the actual image located in my book and in my library. This example also helps us to elucidate why, in spite of their materiality, images exceed their material composition. When I look at the cover of my book, I see Rembrandt´s *The Anatomy Lesson of Nicolaes Tulp*, but the original painting is the one located in Mauritshuis Museum in The Hague, not the one printed in my book. Whether it is the painting hanging in the wall of the museum or the print in my book, I intend in both cases a visual apparition or, moreover, an image object which I call "Rembrandt´s *The Anatomy Lesson of Nicolaes Tulp*". This means that an image object is inevitably bound to *a* material substrate, but not to *a one* in particular, which is why Husserl claims that consciousness focuses on the ideal presentation of images.

In an appendix of *On the Theory of Intuitions and Their Modes* (specifically in Appendix LVIII) Husserl speaks about the aesthetic valuation of objects as follows:

> The "beautiful" object, this mountain as seen from this specific location, always has its identical beauty as long as it offers precisely "this prospect." And as often as I go and look at it from there, I have the same prospect aesthetically. The same "image." This "image" is an ideal object (obviously not something real enduring in time). The mountain offers this image continuously, but the image itself is not something that endures. (HuaE XI, 648, 5-11; HuaD XXIII, 27-34).

This is a rather curious passage, since the author speaks about an image emerging from a thing that is not an image. Following his example, what Husserl calls 'image' is the mountain "as seen from this specific location", which makes us realize that here he uses the word 'image' in a different sense than he does when talking about paintings (hence the quotations marks). Nonetheless, it is remarkable that Husserl employed the word 'image' when he could have just as well used the words 'perspective', 'view' or some others. There is something in the act of consciousness that he describes that keeps a close relation to images and to which we must pay attention.

Husserl is formulating a situation in which a subject is attributing beauty to a mountain and such beauty consists in a certain way in which the mountain looks. By doing so, the subject is considering this specific view of the mountain as an immutable feature of its. Better yet, the subject is giving a determination of significance to a real and actual thing. In the determination of something as (visually) beautiful underlies an act of consciousness in which the subject considers an actual feature of a real thing as an ideality. By means of this act is that an actual thing becomes for us an "image".

The determination of idealities in actualities produces "images", however, it is images and not "images" in which we are interested. Although this may seem somewhat

problematic, the ideal status of both an "image" and an image dissolves immediately the problem. Let us imagine that we see the beautiful mountain and then we take a picture of it. The beauty that I determine in the actual object will be the same that I will get to see in the picture, since both of them share such ideality. This does not mean that one is the same as the other (perceptually they differ in great measure), but there is a specific ideality that is identical in both objects.

The same assertion that Husserl makes regarding the determination of beauty can be made of other determinations. Let us consider no longer a beautiful mountain, but now a frightening wolf. Consciousness can consider the fearsomeness of the animal as an ideality, that is to say, as an immutable feature of the wolf. And this is something that occurs both with determinations of significance and material determinations. Just as with the wolf's fearsomeness, I can consider the grayish color of its fur as an ideality and so its height or other material determinations. Hence, every kind of determination is susceptible of becoming an image.

At this point, it is necessary to foreground that there seems to be an underlying tension between Husserl's transcendental project and some of his aforementioned remarks. First, the author's oeuvre as a whole consists in a phenomenological-transcendental inquiry, that is to say, it is an attempt to explicate universal structures and acts of consciousness. But then we find that, in the midst of such an inquiry, there are certain things to which consciousness must address in a not so universal or transcendental fashion. When Husserl speaks about cultural objectivities or the consideration of a mountain as beautiful, transcendental subjectivity seems not to suffice. Instead, cultural and individual codes that do not belong precisely to the transcendental sphere may become more determinant in such apprehensions. This, of course, is something that concerns images directly; however, before going deeper into this matter, let us first complete our examination of some other Husserlian transcendental considerations. In the third and last chapter, we will return to this discussion.

With all of what we have examined so far, we reach the conclusion that images are visual apparitions that present idealities (image objects) by means of actualities (image-things). Correlatively, the apprehension of an image consists in visualizing an ideality (image object) *as if* it were an actuality (image subject). Under this definition, images are bearers of a great power, i.e. they allow visual features of an object (or various) to exceed its actuality or even its existence. Furthermore, images present idealities to subjects, so they take them as actualities and even realities.

After this inquiry on the way in which consciousness bestows sense upon images, one thing becomes evident: before images, subjects fluctuate between the spheres of the actual and the ideal. The question that arises subsequently concerns the existing relationship between both spheres within the domain of images. We found in the *as if* experience a certain linkage between the actual and the ideal, however, it is necessary to find out if this is the only mechanism through which the subject confronts the ideal with the actual.

With the purpose of answering to the aforementioned, it is necessary to determine a common ground where terms so apparently distant can converge. Husserl gives us an immediate answer to this.

> …the one who is phantasying lives in the fiction; that is, he lives in the carrying out if the *quasi*-experiences, the *quasi*-judgements, and so on (…) The *quasi*-judgements are modifications of actual judgements (…) In their modifications they have norms of correctness and falsity. All logical laws and also all normative laws apply to them: *Logic* does not privilege the given reality; it relates to every possible reality." (HuaE XI, 622-623, 33-10; HuaD XXIII, 521-522, 31-7).

There are three elements in this excerpt that will mark our route for what is left of this chapter: judgements, logic and possibility. Husserl is advising us to concentrate not only in the visual aspect of images, but also in the judgements that we make of them. This leads us to logic, which, according to the author, is applicable to every possible reality. Thus, whether we deal with images and judgements or idealities and actualities, logic is the common ground where different modes of existence can converge. Finally, Husserl uses the expression "possible reality". Of those two words, 'reality' is the one which better summarizes what we have been studying in this first section. In the second one, we will focus on the word 'possible'. As we will see right away, *possibility* is a very particular notion in Husserlian logic and, moreover, it is the one that Husserl employs when speaking about images from a logical point of view.

Possibility **As a Logical Value**

Let us begin with two excerpts. In the text *On the Theory of Intuitions and Their Modes* we find the following statement:

> To the questions—What will the phantasied centaur eat in the phantasy morning? With whom will he pass the time or do battle? — there are no answers. The assertions that I might arbitrarily offer as answers are neither true nor false." (HuaE XI, 624-625, 38-3; HuaD XXIII, 523, 36-39).

Then, on Appendix LVI of that same text (specifically in the section entitled *Figment and Possibility*) Husserl claims:

> But if the figment is not something real, it nonetheless exists as a possibility (…) We actually posit; we do not live in the as-if and are not subjects in the as-if of a quasi-experience. On the contrary, we live as actual subjects, perhaps have before us the real world and carry out an actual grasping, actually meet with something: not the centaurs, but the possibility of the centaurs." (HuaE XI, 633-634, 31-3; HuaD XXIII, 529, 36-43).

In this section, our main concern will be logics. Nonetheless, it is necessary to address first a difficulty that arises from the first cited excerpt. Let us observe that Husserl speaks about the "phantasied centaur" and the "phantasy morning", instead of a "depicted centaur" or a "depicted morning". In other words, the author refers to phantasies and not images. This may seem at first somewhat problematic, however, what we examined in the last section helps us to establish a strong link between phantasies and images.

It is undeniable that, within the Husserlian philosophy, there is no one-to-one correspondence between phantasy and image consciousness. Perhaps, the most significant feature of an image in contrast with a phantasy is its inevitable material character. But we must not forget that, in spite of such difference, it is the image object what image consciousness mainly intends. Given that image objects are ideal objects, image consciousness constitutes in the first place an apprehension of idealities, which is why there is a close proximity between images, phantasies and, we may add, memories. In both cases, consciousness copes with ideal objects whose ideal features may be easily shared by paintings, photographs, hovering mental images, accurate or distorted memories.

The centaur that I picture in my mind will never be the same object as my drawing of it on a piece of paper, but it is the possibility that images have of presenting idealities which allows me to translate my mental image into a physical one. Also, because images present idealities to consciousness, we are able to transform them into memories. It is absolutely important to identify the differences between images, phantasies and memories, but such differentiation should not lead us to think of these objects as enclosed and isolated spheres. Instead, the ideal character that all of them share allows us to understand that there are transits between different modes of consciousness. That being said, let us now turn our attention to the relationship between images and logic.

Judgements about an image are neither true nor false, but, since there is no escape from logic, we must admit that such judgements are possible. What does this mean? Moreover, how does the logical value of possibility contribute to the comprehension of

images? There is not much in the Husserlian works pertaining images that helps us to answer these questions, which is why we will have to consult now his works on logic. Our main source in this respect will be *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929).

The *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901) are undoubtedly a fundamental departure point for the Husserlian logic, however, it is a work that belongs to an early stage of the development of phenomenology as a philosophical method. On the other hand, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* was published almost thirty years after *Logical Investigations*; therefore, the logical considerations that Husserl presents us in this work are product of a more enhanced version of phenomenology. It is a treatise on logic, but in a rather atypical fashion. The very title announces a hard distinction between two kinds of logic: on the one hand, formal logic, which consists in the arrangement of propositions by means of operators and rules of combination; on the other hand, transcendental logic, that is to say, a logic relative to the transcendental experience of the subject.

The distinction delineated by Husserl is not to be interpreted as a denial of formal logic. On the contrary, the author is suggesting us that he will cope with a deeper stratum of logic that renders possible every formalization of it. In this work, Husserl deals with fundamental logical laws such as those of identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle. However, neither will we find an attempt of applying these laws to the assignment of veritative values, nor will we find in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* a refinement of symbolical systems in order to streamline the propositional calculus. Conversely, this work is an attempt to find a ground upon which all of those operations can be founded.

We will examine henceforth three fundamental elements, in order to find the deep stratum of logic upon which its formalization is settled: judgement, evidence and experience. It may seem somewhat odd that none of these elements corresponds to the main notion that we must examine, i.e. possibility. In this respect, it is necessary to point out that possibility does not appear fully thematized in the Husserlian oeuvre, but rather as something transversal to every thematization of logic. Hence, we will study the role of possibility in the articulation of judgement, evidence and experience.

Let us begin then with the notion of judgement. In §19 of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl warns us that his investigation responds to a cognitive attitude[40] and not to a theoretical one. The author is suggesting us that his reflection will not deal with mere

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[40] By "cognitive attitude" I am referring to what Husserl calls an "*Erkenntniseinstellung*" and Cairns translates this German term as "focusing on cognition". I find it preferable to translate ´Einstellung´ to ´attitude´, since ´Einstellung´ is the word that Husserl uses when speaking about the subject´s attitudes. Cf. Husserl, 1969, p. 65; HuaD XVII, 70, 32.

judgements, but rather with objective situations that are cognizable via judgements. This subtle remark helps us to better understand the distinction between formal and transcendental logic. Whereas the former considers the judgement as the basic unit of propositional calculus, the latter conceives it only in relation to an objectivity of which one aspires to gain knowledge. As a consequence, from the logic centered in judgements *qua* judgements, it results what Husserl calls a "formal apophantic"; whilst the logic centered in the objective and cognizable situations implicit in judgements is the base for what the author calls a "formal ontology" (Cf. §25).

It is important to remark that, instead of a discontinuity, the tasks of the formal apophantic and the ones of the formal ontology are to be considered as a continuum. In other words, the Husserlian logic is always intertwined with an ontological inquiry. Although the judgement "S is P" can be conceived regarding strictly its apophantic value, that is to say, its character of affirmation or negation of a state of affairs, its sense can be fully clarified only in reference to the way in which S and P exist objectively and in a certain relationship. Yet, we must be careful with the aforementioned. The fact that we are interested in the objective existence of what is mentioned in judgements does not mean necessarily that only the judgements about what in fact exists in the world are bearers of sense. As Husserl states

> …*all the forms of objects*, all the derivative formations of anything-whatever, do make
> their appearance *in formal apophantics itself*; since indeed, as a matter of essential
> necessity, determinations (properties and relative determinations), predicatively
> formed affair-complexes, combinations, relationships, wholes and parts, sets, cardinal
> numbers, and all the other modes of objectivity, *in concreto* and explicated originaliter,
> have being for us — as truly existent or possibly existent modes — only as making
> their appearance in judgments. (1969, p. 79; HuaD XVII, 83, 15-23)

With this we encounter a first delineation of how is possibility to be understood from a logical point of view. The act of judging is directed towards (and gives account of) objectivities, which has two modalities: true or possible or, as Husserl puts it, what exists for us truly or possibly. It would be far more expected if the author would speak about truth and falsity (instead of truth and possibility), but this is so because logic cannot be disconnected from ontology.

Truth or falsity can be easily predicated on a judgement, but what about an objective situation? One determines an objectivity as true without much ado, since it would be true insofar it is existent. In words of Nancy:

> …truth is also, essentially, self-manifestation. Truth cannot be simply ''being,'' and in
> a sense it is not at all, since its being is entirely in its manifestation. Truth shows or

> demonstrates itself (and, as in any demonstration, even in the logical sense, there
> must be the display and the "show of force"). (2005, p. 21).

Truth is thus the logical correlate of the ontologically existent, but predicating falsity on an objectivity is far more problematic. What does it mean a proposition such as "this entity is false"? To speak of such thing as a false existence would be an oxymoron and this is precisely the reason why Husserl refers to the true or possible existence of objective situations, and not to their true or false existence.

If truth is based upon existence, one might think that the veritative value of falsity is the logical correlate of inexistence, however, this is not the case. Let us consider the following example. The sentence "Polar bears roam in the Costa Rican rainforest" is certainly false, but such assignment of falsity can only be performed on the basis of the acknowledgement of our comprehension of the sentence as a true proposition. There is not even one polar bear inhabiting the Costa Rican rainforest, but that is a possibility (a minimal one, tending to zero) of every polar bear. It does not matter whether the sentence "Polar bears roam in the Costa Rican rainforest" is eternally false, we can always consider possible seeing a polar bear roaming through the rainforest. It is by virtue of this that judging and judgements fluctuate between truth and possibility, instead of truth and falsity. Falsity is already implied in truth, since it is its negative. Better yet, falsity is an intermediate case in the midst of the spectrum defined by the poles of truth and possibility.

We can now move on to the second element of interest, i.e. evidence. Since the opening section of the *Logical Investigations* (entitled *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*), it is evident that, for Husserl, logic has to do fundamentally with subjective life.

> And, as in the realm of perception, the unseen does not coincide with the nonexistent,
> so lack of inward evidence does not amount to untruth. *The experience of the
> agreement* between meaning and what is itself present, meant, between the actual
> *sense of an assertion* and the self-given *state of affairs*, is inward evidence: the *Idea*
> of this agreement is truth… (Husserl, 2001, p. 121; HuaD XVIII, 193-194, 24-4)

According to the author, evidence belongs neither to propositions nor to their role within argumentative structures; on the contrary, evidence is something that we live. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, we find this same idea, but in a much more elaborated fashion.

> …*evidence is a universal mode of intentionality, related to the whole life of
> consciousness*. Thanks to evidence the life of consciousness has an *all-pervasive
> teleological structure* (…) [a pervasive tendency] toward the discovery of correctness
> (and, at the same time, toward the lasting acquisition of correctness) and toward the
> cancelling of incorrectness… (Husserl, 1969, p. 160; HuaD XVII, 168-169, 35-4).

In the passage from *Logical Investigations*, Husserl speaks about logic in analogy with perception, which is not gratuitous at all. Since perception is the primal mode of intuition, evidence must necessarily rely upon perception. Therefore, the combination of correctness and incorrectness of evidence that we find in the passage from *Formal and Transcendental Logic* does not consist in a set of formal logical laws, but rather in activities of the perceptual life of consciousness. According to Husserl, "Category of objectivity and category of evidence are perfect correlates." (Husserl, 1969, p. 161; HuaD XVII, 169, 20-21). Thus, the objective character of a thing is not an inherent quality of its; instead, it is a status that the thing acquires for the subject that perceives it.

The fact that we consider subjectivity as a reservoir of evidence and objectivity should not lead us to think that these last two are limited to the sphere of individuality or privacy. Husserl´s foundational task of describing the subjective experience (i.e. phenomenology) has often been misunderstood as a philosophical endeavor concerning only the first-person point of view (Masís, 2019), however, it is crucial to underline that in Husserl's thought individuality and collectivity are of equal relevance. For Husserl, "Actuality becomes warranted, illusion rectified, in my concourse with others…" (1969, p. 233; HuaD XVII, 240, 25-26). *Qua* subjective activity, judging can be performed regardless of other subjects; nevertheless, the objectivity and truth of judgements are matters of the community of subjects.

Husserl deems the daily life of an individual as the same of her community, which he calls a common "situational horizon". Regarding this, the author claims that "One can explicate these horizons subsequently; but the constituting horizon-intentionality, without which the surrounding world of daily living would not be an experienced world, is always prior to its explication by someone who reflects." (1969, p. 199; HuaD XVII, 207, 18-22). And this takes us finally to the third element of interest: experience.

Taking judgements as our point of departure, we observed that the assignment of truth and falsity is performed in reference to objective situations. Then, we determined that the particular subjective and intersubjective encounter with evidence constitutes the objectivity of such situations. Finally, we find in the last cited excerpt that the two aforementioned conclusions are thematizations that we can enunciate only on the basis of an experienced world that precedes any reflection. Logic is not transcendental by itself, that is to say, it does not exceed the subject´s life and surrounding world. Instead, logic is to be understood as transcendental insofar as it is rooted where subjective experience and surrounding world are conditions of possibility for the activity of conscious life.

How does possibility come then into play with evidence and experience? Before the partiality of perceptions, consciousness fulfills synthesis that, as Husserl says, make us mention more than we see (Cfr. Husserl, 1970, p.158; HuaD VI, 160, 28). In his *Analysis Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, Husserl presents us various types of synthesis or, as they are also called, modalizations. Although this work is focused on passivity (acts that underlie in every active form of consciousness), we find that one of this modalizations is possibility.

Husserl identifies two sorts of possibility, i.e. open and enticing. Both of them take us back to perception. The open possibility is the one in which "…the general indeterminacy has a range of free variability…" (HuaE IX, 81, 23; HuaD XI, 41, 37-38). Let us think of this, just as the author does, in the light of adumbrations. Whenever we encounter the side of a thing (it is here where the passive character of perception can be better grasped), the sides not given to intuition are nothing else than indeterminacies whose possibilities of apparition are tremendously open. I see the red frontal façade of a building, but the posterior façade constitutes an indeterminacy for my consciousness, since it could easily be of a different color. On the other hand, the enticing possibility is that according to which consciousness inclines (or negatively, doubts) towards one of the indeterminations above others; it is a sort of impure certainty (Junglos, 2015). In the same case of the building, even though its posterior façade is not shown to me, I find myself tempted to believe that it is most likely to be red as well, which does not eliminate the inherent indeterminacy of possibility.

Let us summarize. Judgements are correlates of objective situations; hence, the possibility of what is mentioned is the possibility of its existence. Precisely because of this, evidence is founded upon experience and not upon the formal laws of logic. In conclusion, logical possibility is nothing else than the possibility of experience.

In regard to the judgements "This glass is transparent and it is not rectangular" and "This glass is transparent and it is not transparent", we can say that the former is possible and the latter is not. One might be tempted to justify this arguing that the first judgement does not violate the law of non-contradiction, while the second judgement does. This would be a shallow justification from a Husserlian point of view. In a deeper level, the justification should be: the first proposition mentions an objective situation that can be experienced in conscious life, whilst the objective situation mentioned in the second proposition is beyond what can be experienced in conscious life.

By the end of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, we find an annotation of exceptional pertinence to the broadening of the notion of *possibility*. In the last section of the book, Husserl speaks about "potential performances of consciousness", which are

> …[certainties] of "I can" or "I could" which is predelineated in the sphere itself of my consciousness starting from the actually present intentionality (…) In other words: no being nor being-thus for me, whether as actually or as possibility, but as accepted by me. (1969, p. 234; HuaD XVII, 241, 6-23).

Possibility possesses a logical value inasmuch as it is valid to my own consciousness. Husserlian phenomenology does not foreground the subject over the object or *vice versa*, since there is no gap between both of them in the first place. The objective and subjective spheres are mutually entwined; one cannot be thought of without the other. Hence, that something is logically possible means that it can be valid to the experience of a subject's conscious life and, let us not forget, the life of her community.

Now that we have laid out how is possibility to be comprehended as a logical value, we can finally return to images. We will go back to what Husserl said about images and possibility, with the purpose of examining how does this concern the constitution of subjectivity.

Image and Possibility

The first thing to consider is that, although images are figments, consciousness still experience them properly. A remarkable feature of Husserl´s image consciousness model is that, in spite of the fictitious character of images, consciousness does not suspend its capability of having apprehensive and judicative experiences. This was already suggested in the notion of *as if experience*, of which we know now that it consists in the experience qua *possibility*. Before the image of the centaur, Husserl stresses, consciousness may not apprehend the centaur, but it does apprehend the possibility of the centaur. Generally speaking, an image object is for consciousness the possibility of its respective image subject. Let us develop this more extensively.

The judgements about an image whose image subject exists objectively in the world are transferable to the image subject. Looking at a photograph of the National Theater of Costa Rica, we can utter the true proposition "Three sculptures are placed above the pediment". If we utter the same proposition in reference not to the photograph, but to the theater itself, the veritative value remains the same (and, of course, the same applies for the value of falsity). Besides, following Shum (2015), we must admit that this turns the image

object into something intersubjectively verifiable. Let us clarify this with another example: Albrecht Dürer´s painting *Martyrdom of the Ten Thousand* (Fig. 16).

Fig. 16: Albrecht Dürer, Martyrdom of the Ten Thousand (1508) and detail. Kunsthistorisches Musem, Viena

Considering the image object, we can utter the judgment "Dürer was present in the crucifixion of ten thousand soldiers commanded by King Saphur II in Mount Ararat during the Third Century AD". In the context of the image, the judgement is true. Yet, since the image object has an image subject of whose existence there is complete certainty, the judgement about the image subject can also be uttered in reference to the image subject. Nonetheless, in such case the veritative value must be corrected. Whereas the image object shows us Dürer present in an episode of the Third Century AD, we know that the actual Dürer (the image subject) lived between the Fifteenth and the Sixteenth Centuries. Thus, the judgement about the image object can also be uttered properly about the image subject, of course, with the value of truth in the first case and of falsity in the second one.

The analyzed cases still oscillate between the values true and false, however, Husserl suggested us a much more radical example, i.e. the centaur. The image subject disappears completely in this case, which forces us to abandon the truth-falsity polarity and move towards the notion of possibility. De Warren (2010) claims that the image subject is for consciousness always something not-appearing, by virtue of which we can say that the cases that we are about to study give us a deeper account of image consciousness.

Speaking about what the centaur has for breakfast in the morning does not refer to any objective situation whatsoever, that is to say, there is no objectivity in the world that adjusts to what is mentioned in the judgement. But, given that such a judgement refers to

the possibility of what is mentioned, we must consider it as an experience that, albeit inexistent, could be rendered possible for conscious life. No human being has seen in the mundane experience a centaur having its breakfast; even so, we know under what circumstances we could consider valid the evidence, perception and experience of the situation mentioned in the judgement. An image of a centaur having French toasts for breakfast may not possess an image subject, but we could enunciate multiple judgements about it, because it is a situation that we could possibly incorporate into our experience.

Before mentioning the centaur, Husserl points out that

…[the cognizing subject] knows, however, that in the world, the real world, nothing reamins open in itself, that everything individually, is completely determined in itself. The world behind the most distant stars that we have reached in our experience to this point is unknown, but is actually cognizable … (HuaE XI, 624, 24-28; HuaD XXIII, 523, 21-25).

Image objects are ideal objects, unlike the stars mentioned by Husserl, which are unknown for us, yet cognizable because of their empirical character. On the one hand, the empirical is cognizable and, on the other hand, the ideal is barely possible of being cognized empirically. Once again, we find ourselves in the midst of the spheres of ideality and actuality or, as we have just stated it, of the ideal and the empirical. Moreover, we face once again the question of how does the subject react to this intermediate position. Our first answer had to do with the as if experience, but now we know that possibility also comes into play. For what we have studied so far, the notion of *possibility* is not that different from that of the *as if experience*. It seems like the only outcome of possibility is that of conjecture, that is to say, that recognizing an image as possible consists only in guessing what would it be like that the idealities seen in an image were empirical actualities. But is that so or does possibility offer us something else than mere conjecture?

Let us examine first the relationship between the empirical and the ideal. At the beginning of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl indicates that, since the Aristotelian logic, there has been a difficulty in comprehending "…the judgement-sphere theoretically as a specific Objective field of a priori ideality, just as geometer regards the sphere of pure geometrical shapes and the arithmetician regards the sphere of numbers." (1969, p. 81; HuaD XVII, 85, 20-24). Husserl points out afterwards that logical formations or, in our terms, ideal formations oscillate between objectivity and subjectivity, since they are given in conscious life. However, we consider this formations as already existing, we hark back to them, we apply them in praxes and even produce new formations. Husserl states:

…sciences that nevertheless appear as relating quite indubitably to *Object*-spheres of

their own, to geometrical shapes, cardinal or ordinal numbers, and so forth; though these objectivities likewise accrue to the investigators in subjective actions by the drawing of lines, by a geometrical generation of surfaces, and so forth, or, on the other hand, by collecting, counting ordering, or mathematical combining. (Husserl, 1969, p. 82; HuaD XVII, 86, 22-28).

No matter how ideal a formation in consciousness may be, the interconnectedness of objectivity and subjectivity will always render possible a transition towards the empirical. The ideal right triangle of the Pythagorean theorem can always be materialized in a piece of paper, using ink, graphite or any other material. What is more, the subject whose consciousness is able to deal with merely ideal objects is not some sort of phantasmagorical ego, since subjects are also active bodies who draw the ideal into the empirical.

One might think that the ontological region of the ideal-mathematical suffices for the fulfillment of mathematical knowledge. Certainly the Pythagorean theorem possess an ideal sense of its own, but how is it incorporated into the subjective and intersubjective life? Only by means of drawing the ideal into the empirical, the mathematical knowledge has been installed as part of our culture. The proposition "$a^2 + b^2 = c^2$" is always true when ´a´ and ´b´ are catheti of a right triangle and ´c´ its hypotenuse. That truth is independent of all subjects, however, it will not be empirically cognizable and communicable unless a, b and c are sized with strokes drawn by a subject's body. In the same manner, the proposition "2 + 2 = 5" is perennially false, but such falsity will be empirically determined every time that we, let us say, count with our fingers that the calculation is four and not five. In sum, the corporeal character of the subject is the key (or, at least, one key) to understand how can the interchanges between the ideal and the empirical occur.

Moving from mathematical idealities to those of images, we find interesting results. A subject faces an image and an image object is rendered visible, that is to say, she faces an ideal object that points at the possibility of its respective image subject. In order to achieve that judgements about the image object become either true or false (and not possible), a corporeal action must draw the image object into the empirical domain. At this point, we must admit that the extension of the term 'image' is so numerous that is impossible to speak of a unique way in which subjects draw idealities from images into the empirical world. Regarding this condition, we will divide images into two main groups based on the status of their image subjects and thusly explicate the interchanges between the ideal and the empirical in each case. These groups are: images with a real image subject and images without a real image subject.

Existent Image Subjects

For an image to be part of the first group, it must meet the condition that its image subject exists as an objective, concrete and physical entity in the world, that is to say, it must have (or have had) a spatiotemporal position in the world. The sources that let us affirm the existence of an image subject can be either our own experience, the experience of others or both of them. I know, for instance, that raccoons exist because I have seen them with my own eyes; but, even though I have never seen a rhinoceros, I know that they exist because others have seen one and affirmed it in conversations with me, in books, in T.V. shows, and in other intersubjective interchanges. This images allow subjects to perform a variety of actions in a wide range of fields.

From an epistemological point of view, images of this first group become means for proving, evidencing, verifying or refuting hypotheses. Sir Frank Watson Dyson's photographs of the solar eclipse that took place May 29th, 1919 are a paradigmatic case. In 1915, Albert Einstein presented before the Prussian Academy of Science the field equations of his General Theory of Relativity. The theory was consistent within the boundaries of physics and mathematics, however, Einstein did not accompany his equations with empirical evidence. It was not until two years later that Dyson was able to offer to the scientific community the empirical evidence that Einstein's presentation lacked. Dyson directed two simultaneous expeditions to Brazil and the Prince Islands in the Gulf of Guinea, with the purpose of photographing the aforementioned eclipse (Fig. 17).

Fig. 17: Sir Frank Watson Dyson. Photographs of the solar eclipse of May 29th, 1919 (1919)

Einstein's theory predicted that the straight path of light deflects when it passes near a gravitational field. Based on this prediction, Dyson's objective was to determine if the light of the Hyades (a star cluster) would deflect when passing near the sun. Thanks to the eclipse, the path of the Hyades' light could be observed and photographed. The taken pictures captured satisfactorily the curvature of light, which finally proved Einstein's theory.

Let us consider first the very content of Dyson's pictures (the Sun, the Moon, the stars) and Husserl's statement that the world behind the most distant stars is unknown for us, yet empirically cognizable. Through images, what Husserl conceived as unknown and empirically cognizable things can be transformed into known and empirically cognized objectivities. Neither our very corporeal capabilities nor our current transportation technologies allow us to have a complete perceptive experience of the Hyades, that is to say, we cannot visit them, feel their warmth or texture, and so on. Nevertheless, images allow us to experience at least a portion of what may seem inaccessible phenomena.

We must admit that Dyson's photographs are images of the path of light, but not a direct observation (perception) of light itself, which might arise the discussion of whether this can be considered as sufficient evidence or not. However, since images are visualizations of idealities, Dyson's pictures are proofs of Einstein's theory insofar as their image objects render visible the geometrical configuration of light that confirms what the equations predict. Of course, this does not vanish the inherent conflict between the image object and the image subject. The white line that we see in the photograph is obviously not of the same length as the distance traveled by the beam in space, but still both of them can be described in terms of the exact same mathematical function (that is, an ideality that they both share). The determination of this mathematical function requires measurements, calculations, and other procedures, which are precisely the kind of corporeal actions that mediate between ideality and actuality[41].

Observing the progression of visual representations of the universe throughout history, it becomes evident that our concept of universe changed from being all that we *can* see to all that *could* be seen. However imprecise it may be, the cosmological model of

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[41] Even though this investigation is not focused on the production of images, it must be added that the very action of producing images (traveling to the destinations, setting up the camera equipment, leaning on the ground to get the right angle) is a way in which the body of the subject mediates between idealities and actualities.

Celestial Spheres (Fig. 18a) is a conception of the universe that responds to our direct experience. If we compare the Celestial Spheres model to the image that contemporary science has given us of the observable universe (Fig. 18b), the difference in size is gigantic. Just to have an idea, let us consider that Saturn (once considered the most distant planet from Earth) is distanced around $1,3x10^{12}$ meters from us. If we take that distance as the radius of a sphere, the resulting volume has a magnitude of $9,2x10^{36}$ m^3. On the other hand, the visible universe has a volume of $1,1x10^{79}$ m^3. This means that, since the days in which the universe was for our culture composed by Celestial Spheres until today, what we consider as the space of possible experience has gotten approximately $1,2x10^{42}$ times bigger.

(a)   (b)

Fig. 18: Representations of the universe: (a) Michael Wolgemuth and Wilhelm Pleydenwurff, Celestial Spheres (1493). Illustration for Hartmann Schedel´s Nuremberg Chronicle, (b) NASA, Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation (2011). Image created from Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe´s (WMAP) data

The image of the observable universe has been obtained with the measurements of the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) of NASA. WMAP is not some sort of photographic device, but rather an instrument for measuring temperatures throughout the universe. Since temperature is related to wavelengths and, consequentially, to colors of the visible spectrum, WMAP's scientists have translated the myriad of numerical data obtained with the space probe to a colored map. Thus, instead of being speculative invention, our image of the visible universe is an accurate and quantifiable source of information or, better yet, an object of investigation itself (Henning, 2008).

Fig. 19: NASA, Portion of Messier 11 (also known as the Wild Duck Cluster). Image captured by Hubble Telescope

The image object of the WMAP's results is for consciousness certainly a possibility. However, as Bruhn (2008) remarks, science coordinates images, words and numbers, which makes visuality inseparable from concepts and *mathesis*. Therefore, in the context of scientific praxis, images are bearers of not only the veritative value of possibility, but also of truth or falsity. For example, looking at one of the pictures of the Wild Duck Cluster captured by Hubble Telescope (Fig. 19), one might call ´A´ one of the blue stars and ´B´ one of the red ones and say "B is hotter than A". Taking the image out of its context, the uttered judgement is only possible; but, knowing that the image belongs to the astronomical field of knowledge, the judgment is necessarily false. The light emitted by hotter bodies has smaller wavelengths than those of cooler bodies and, in visual terms, this results into bluest colors for hotter bodies and redder colors for cooler ones. Hence, a blue star is necessarily hotter than a red one, which makes the sentence "B is hotter than A" a false proposition.

Fig. 20: Microscopic images: (a) Wim van Egmond, Amoeba proteus. (2001). Image taken with a stereo-microscope, (b) IBM, Pentacene molecule (2009). Image taken with an atomic force microscope, (c) Fermilab, Neutrino event (1975). Image taken in a Bubble Chamber

Not only have images made us gain knowledge of the universe in a large scale, but also they have allowed us to know what happens in the most minuscule portion of the world. Thanks to images, we are aware of a vast variety of events that take place in regions unreachable by means of our bare eyes. Visualization technologies have given us very detailed pictures of microorganisms (Fig. 20a), molecular structures (Fig. 20b), trajectories of elemental particles (Fig. 20c) and a plethora of microscopic objects and events. And once again, we find that these images are both visualizations and sources of evidence and further investigation. In all of these cases, images become an extension of our corporeal capabilities, thus enhancing the field of subjective experience (a conclusion to which we arrived at the end of the first chapter) and also of objective knowledge.

(a)   (b)

Fig. 21: Human skeletons: (a) Pieter Claesz, Vanitas (1630). Mauritshuis Pinacotecha, The Hague, (b) Wilhelm Röntgen, Hand of the Anatomist Albert von Kölliker (1896). Physikalischen Institut der Universität Würzburg

We also find in our very own scale examples of how images are fundamental sources of evidence. Through visualizations of the human body, medical sciences are able to observe it on the inside without having to practice a dissection. Thanks to Wilhelm Röntgen's research on imagery, X-rays gave us access to the whole human skeleton while it is still inside the flesh. As Dünkel (2008) claims, X-rays even changed the cultural signification of human bones, which were firstly associated with death (Fig. 21a) and then with living bodies (Fig. 21b).

Fig. 22: Medicine and images: (a) Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn, The Anatomy Lesson of Nicolaes Tulp (1632). Mauritshuis Pinacotecha, The Hague, (b) Australian Pancreatic Centre, Laparoscopy (2016)

A very interesting case of medical use of images is the laparoscopy technique. By introducing a recording device and fine chirurgical instruments inside the patient´s abdominal cavity, surgeons perform operations by looking at the transmission of the camera on a monitor. Laparoscopy reminds somehow to Rembrandt's *The Anatomy Lesson of Nicolaes Tulp*. In both cases doctors have an actual body right next to them, but they are looking at something that represents it. In Rembrandt's painting, doctors are staring at a book (Fig. 22a) and in laparoscopy doctors stare at a monitor (Fig. 22b). The difference is that, unlike Rembrandt's characters, laparoscopy surgeons do not just contemplate the image of the body, but rather they perform interventions (displacements, incisions, sutures) in it.

During a surgery of this kind, the veritative value of judgements about what is displayed in the monitor seems to be of secondary importance. Notions such as *figment*, *as if experience* or *possibility* are minor concerns for subjects when images enable actions more than observations. As Werner (2008) stresses, within natural sciences, images disengage from the idea of an already settled perceiving subject and, instead, they produce active subjectivities.

Fig. 23: Illustrations of New Spain in the English version of Gemelli Careri's A Voyage Round the World (1699): (a) Aguacate, Black Zapote, Maghei, Cacao, Vainilla, (b) An Hidrographical Draught of Mexico, (c) Quauhtimoc X King, (d) Mexican Soldier, (e) Tlaloc, the God of Rain

We must not think that images of this first group are only those of experimental sciences. Let us abandon modern scientific imagery and move back in history. After the European colonization of the Americas, drawings were the best way for letting the European public to take a glance at the New World. In 1699, Gemelli Careri published his book *A Voyage Round the World* in six volumes, the last of which was dedicated to New Spain. Careri illustrated his book with part of the American landscape, showing native botanical species (Fig. 23a) and also some geographical features of the visited lands (Fig. 23b). Traveling to the American continent was a rather complicate thing to do, which made books like Careri's the closest one could get to the New World. Hence, much of what people back then knew about America was knowledge obtained via images.

Translated to Husserlian jargon, cases like the aforementioned consist in apprehensions of image objects fulfilled prior to the intuition of their respective image subjects. This condition is a clear example of how images can prefigure experiences of that which is unknown for subjects, since idealities become intuited before the actualities they are rooted in. Let us remember that idealities borne by images consist in visual determinations and that they are meant to be considered by subjects as actualities. Thus, if a subject sees an image of something that she has not actually experienced, when she gets to experience the actual thing, her apprehension of it will be mediated by the image. She will expect in the actual thing a fulfillment of the ideality presented in the image.

Let us imagine an Eighteenth Century European that had never seen an avocado in his life, but saw Careri's illustrations. Suddenly, he travels to Mexico and takes botanical exploration hikes with a local guide. In one of his missions, he sees a green pear-shaped fruit or vegetable with indentations in its longitudinal extremes. With Careri's illustrations of Mexico at hand, our traveler compares the image and the thing, sees that they are a perfect match and says "I have found an avocado". However, his guide tells him that what he found is not an avocado, but a *chayote* (a mirliton squash). The illustration gave him a predetermined idea of how is an avocado supposed to look, which restricted his empirical experience of avocados and any other botanical specimen with a similar shape.

Perhaps the example of avocados has consequences that concern the knowledge of the natural world only, but in other cases the prefiguration of experience via images has much broader effects. Besides the natural environment of America, Careri gave account in his book of political leaders (Fig. 23c), soldiers (Fig. 23d) and deities (Fig. 23e), also by means of illustrations. Whereas the ideality presented in the images of avocados and wildlife specimens were material determinations (basically size and shape), these other illustrations present determinations of significance, that is to say, determinations concerning what things signify for us.

Taking a close look at the illustration of the Mexican soldier, we see that he is depicted with a severed head hanging on his side and with a belt of what seems to be ears. According to Ventura (2016), representations of the American cultures were not impartial descriptions, but rather attempts to determine a cultural essence of these populations. On this account, Careri's illustrations were certainly sources of evidence of the existence of other cultures, but such evidence was inevitably accompanied by a certain meaning and sense to be bestowed upon the actual image subjects. By visual means, determinations such as *violent* or *savage* were immediately assigned to American indigenous cultures,

thusly predetermining an ethical and political experience or, in our case, a historical experience.

Fig. 24: Chinese communist propaganda: (a) Central Academy of Industrial Arts of the People's Republic of China, Poster (1968), (b) Central Academy of Industrial Arts of the People's Republic of China, Poster (1968), (c) Liaoning Union, Poster (1967)

Presenting image objects according to determinations of significance is one of the main reasons why images play a fundamental role in politics. The visual exhibition of a personality is politically effective insofar as it produces an association of the image subject with the set of ideals and values that a movement, party or any other kind of collective stands for. Political propaganda is perhaps the most evident example of how this principle is put into practice. In Chinese communist propaganda, Mao Zedong was constantly depicted as a shiny and enlightening sun (Fig. 24a,b), which has solely a profound cultural significance of intelligence, hopefulness and prosperity. It was also common to find Mao drawn in a larger scale than the rest of the human figures depicted in the posters, reinforcing his leadership of the people. His body posture showed steadiness, yet his gestures denoted a peaceful character (Fig. 24a). The circulation of these image objects within the public space produced a very specific and orientated determination of the image subject, leading to a powerful predetermination of the experience that subjects had of the political leader.

Another peculiarity of political propaganda is the convergence of historical political figures in a same image. Communist propaganda often showed their current leaders side by side with the intellectual and political precursors of the movement, creating a lineage of thought and action that both justified and projected politics. Mao was born ten years after Marx's death, but in the field of images both presences can coexist along with some others (Fig. 24c), thusly creating a mutual feedback of significances. Hence, the underlying

possibility in images allows an experience of what Didi-Huberman (2015) refers to as 'anachronism' of images, that is to say, the coexistence of heterogeneous temporalities.

Propangandist images certainly seek to predetermine the experiences that subjects may have of a personality, however, therein lies a much broader aim: political adherence. This means that the political use of images aims not only to gain the sympathy of subjects, but also to inscribe them within a much more complex structure of power, ideals, motivations, hopes, desires, prohibitions, and so on. Of course, this does not mean that adherence and obedience are the only consequence of images in political contexts. Images can also be used for practicing dissent and resistance, whereof iconoclast episodes are paradigmatic.

Fig. 25: 2018 Nicaraguan Protests: (a) La Prensa (2018). Destruction of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo's billboards in Managua, (b) EFE (2018). Burning of Daniel Ortega's picture during a vigil in commemoration of the murdered protesters against Nicaraguan G Government, (c) AP (2018). Burning of Árboles de la vida (Trees of Life) in Managua

Last year, thousands of Nicaraguan citizens began a series of massive protests against Daniel Ortega's government. As it is usual in demonstrations like these, protesters destroyed images of the political leaders against whom they go out to streets (Fig. 25a,b). Iconoclasm is a species of what Bredekamp (2003) calls a "substitutive image act", that is to say, acts performed when images function as substitutes of bodies. Taking this into account, the as if experience has a rather interesting effect: the consideration of idealities as actualities makes subjects perform in the sphere of actuality.

Images do not have to necessarily depict someone to unleash an iconoclast action. During Nicaraguan protests, the so-called *Árboles de la vida* or Trees of Life were also destroyed (Fig. 25c). These sculptures were placed in Managua for the 34th Anniversary of the Sandinist Revolution by initiative of Vice President Rosario Murillo (who is also Ortega's wife). It is interesting how, in spite of having an image subject that has nothing to do with politics, the very origin and history of an image suffices to integrating it into political scenarios.

Fig. 26: Sex Pistols' God Save The Queen: (a) Jamie Reid, Cover of the single God Save the Queen (1977), (b) Jamie Reid, God Save The Queen (1977)

Besides destruction, other way in which images are part of political dissent is the production of images as such. The use of determinations of significance in images has been used not only to exalt and magnify image subjects, but also to ridicule them. Since the correlation of image object and image subject is contingent, there is absolute freedom of assigning any ideality to any image object. We can find in the Rock and Roll counterculture many examples of the abovementioned, for instance, British punk band Sex Pistols' artwork for their single *God Save the Queen*. In the cover of their top-selling record, Sex Pistols used a collage by Jamie Reid, in which the artist intervened a portrait of Queen Elizabeth II by placing the name of the band and of the song over her eyes and mouth (Fig. 26a). Reid had also produced other collages where Queen Elizabeth II appears with swastikas in her eyes and a safety pin across her mouth, a common item in punk fashion (Fig. 26b).

There are two things to be pointed out regarding this last example. First, let us consider Reid's collage. With his image, Reid managed to give the Queen determinations of significance completely opposite to the ones that the Queen herself has demonstrated in public. Whereas the image subject shows a moderate and refined behavior, the image object is presented with signs of radicalism and violence. It does not matter what the image subject is like, it can always be depicted in many other ways, which might not be actual, but still absolutely possible. On the other hand, we must observe Reid's action of taking the Queen's portrait and, motivated by his political dissent, intervening it. Looking at Reid's work, we can see clearly how, in spite of having a contemplative character, the apprehension of images leads also to subjective actions within the sphere of images themselves. In cases like these, the clash of images and subjects produces cycles where idealities and actualities are in

continuous circulation by means of the conscious apprehension and the corporeal production of images.

Fig. 27: Images of images: (a) Diego Velázquez, Portrait of Innocent X (1650). Doria Pamphilj Gallery, Rome, (b) Francis Bacon, Study After Velazquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X (1953). Des Moines Art Center, Iowa, (c) Wassily Kandinsky, Dance Curves: On The The Dances of Palucca (1926). Published in the magazine Das Kunstblatt

In the same manner as Reid did, many other artists have produced images of images throughout history. In some cases, artists interpret other artworks as pictorial exercises, just as Bacon own version of a Velasquez's painting (Fig. 27 a,b). In some others, artists use images as raw material for their pictorial productions, which is the case of Kandisky's drawings of ballerinas (Fig 27c). Artistic productions like these show us that what once was an image object may as well become the image subject of other image and enter into the same dynamics that we have been studying here.

With this last set of examples, we seem to have reached the limit of images with existing image subjects. Bacon was not painting Pope Innocence X, but the image that Velázquez had painted of him, that is to say, he was painting some idealities to be found in Velázquez's work. In the same manner, Kandinsky's drawings depicted geometrical idealities rendered visible by photographic captures. Certainly, this means that idealities are able to circulate within their own boundaries (just as it happens with mathematics and logics), but still the mediation of the corporeal activity is absolutely necessary to put such idealities into circulation. There can be infinite versions of a same ideality, but still a subject must produce bodily and materially such versions. The number 2 can be expressed as 8/4, $\left(\sqrt{2}\right)^2$, $\ln e^2$ and in a plethora of forms, but I must move my hands and hit my keyboard with my fingers to produce these ideal objects, even though its existence becomes independent of my body. Exactly the same happens with images.

Let us abandon then the domain of images with existing image subjects. We are going to examine now images with image subjects that do not exist in the actual world and, just as we did with this first group, find out how does the ideal becomes empirical and the possible true or false.

Non-Existent Image Subjects

Fig. 28: Anonymous, Scene of William Scott's Ivanhoe (1863)

Let us begin the study of this second group of images by locating ourselves in the Nineteenth Century. With the birth of photography, a form of entertainment called "*tableaux*

vivants" (living pictures) was born as well. *Tableaux vivants* consisted in the recreation of scenes from different art pieces, whereof a photograph was taken. For instance, groups of actors were photographed enacting scenes of William Scott's novel *Ivanhoe* (Fig. 28).

Fig. 29: Oscar Gustav Rejlander, The Two Ways of Life (1857)

Not only was this technique used for recreating scenes, but it was also applied for creating new images. With the historical referent of painting, photographers started taking pictures with the style of easel painting. A clear example of this is Rejlander's *The Two Ways of Life* (Fig. 29), which has a close resemblance to Raphael's *The School of Athens.*

Fig. 30: Raft of the Medusa: (a) Théodore Géricault, Raft of the Medusa (1819). Louvre Museum, Paris, (b) Adad Hannah, Raft of the Medusa (100 Mile House) No. 1 (2009)

A third variant of *tableaux vivants* is constituted by those produced from preexistent images. Let us now take a leap from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-first Century, in order to observe Adad Hannah's work. In 2009, Hannah produced a video where bodies and objects

are displayed exactly as Gericault's *Raft of the Medusa* (Fig. 30a,b). Since it is a video, the scene captures the body movements of the actors, showing us that we are looking at living bodies and not images.

For our investigative purposes, we must pay more attention to the actions executed for producing the image (in this case, the video) than to the image itself. The process starts with an image, which unleashes an action and culminates with another image. Let us focus on the first and second stages. Looking at Géricault's painting we can say "Under the sail of the raft there is a man with a red cloak, holding his head with his right hand and a man's body with his left hand", which has the logical value of possibility. Now let us imagine that we are in front of the group of people performing for Hannah's *tableau vivant*. In this case, it is no longer an image which appears to consciousness, but rather an objective situation. Hence, we are no longer in the realm of idealities, but instead in the realm of actualities and empirical events, which transforms possible judgements into true or false ones.

Remembering that logic is closely related to perception, we can broaden our analysis even further. Whereas the image object of Géricault's painting has only one side (or, in other words, it has no adumbrations), Hannah's *tableau vivant* appears to us as any other perceptive experience. Just by looking at *Raft of the Medusa* we cannot obtain evidence of whether the cloak of the man under the sail is red allover or not; on the contrary, the *tableau vivant* allows us to perform kinaestheses throughout space that confirm or refute our perceptive synthesis.

In the first chapter we saw that Husserl refers to image consciousness as an inactual perception (Cf. HuaE XI, 360, 6-7; HuaD XXIII, 299, 20-23), but practices such as *tableaux vivants* allow us to observe how, through corporeal mediation, such perception can become actual. The term 'actual' encompasses all of the notions that we have related to possibility, i.e. *empirical*, *experience*, *evidence*. Therefore, we can finally conclude that the possibility of images consists in the possibility of their actualization[42].

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[42] In *Anywhere or Not At All* by Peter Osborne (2013), we find a very similar use of the term 'actualization'. By studying LeWitt's *Sentences on Contemporary Art*, Osborne rescues the notion of *series*, pointing out how it implies the instauration of a rule that sets out a virtually infinite process. In terms of the work of art, the former means a change of its status from object to project. While an object supposes a closed unit, a project is a combination of ideas (the rule of the series) and modes of actualization. In order to better explicate the notion of *actualization*, the author refers to artist Robert Smithson's non-sites — i.e, interventions on the physical landscape and drawings and objects modelling such interventions. From these sets of materialities, Osborne foregrounds how objects are mediated through a relation of fictionalization and actualization. This is how Osborne concludes that the space of the contemporary work of art is not characterized by a punctual location, rather by the relations among its many materializations. The title *Anywhere or Not at All* is precisely the answer to the question: where is the (contemporary) work of art?

Fig. 31: Unknown, Photograph (2019). Man recreating a Pablo Suárez's painting at MALBA in Buenos Aires

Actualizing an image does not mean necessarily to reproduce it exactly and literally. Instead of enacting all of the idealities borne by an image object, a subject might actualize only one or some of them. Subjects can choose which of the determinations appeared in an image to actualize. For instance, taking an image of a human body as reference, a subject can actualize the body posture that the image renders visible (Fig. 31). It may seem at first that the objective of such practices is sheer entertainment, however, actualization can be performed for very specific purposes.

(a)   (b)

Fig. 32: Marine Corps Martial Arts. Field Manual: (a) U.S Marine Corps, Forward Slash Technique (1999), (b) U.S Marine Corps, Vertical Thrust (1999)

However similar Osborne's notion of actualization may be to the one presented here, it is important to differentiate them. First of all, even though Osborne employs some phenomenological sources, his notion of actualization has not a direct relationship with Husserlian considerations on perception. Second, it must be pointed out that Osborne aims to develop a philosophy of contemporary art, and not a philosophy of image. It is certainly possible to extend the author's notion of actualization to images outside the artistic domain, however, this is not a task that Osborne engages with.

Images from military field manuals (Fig. 32) are a very clear example of how the actualization of an image produces an experience that goes beyond evidence. Soldiers are given these manuals as part of their training for actual warfare, therefore, the effect of actualizing these images is no other than violence. The experience predetermined by images has in this specific case a major ethical consequence for other subjects, i.e. murder. Prior to actual warfare, images are also utilized for predetermining who the enemy is and how is he to be conceived. In a similar fashion as Careri's images examined in the last section, we can find in war propaganda that, through the presentation of image objects according to certain determinations, a very specific idea of the enemy is build up. In Nazi propaganda, Jews appeared often as fat, large-nosed, thick-eyebrowed financier men controlling silently the power (Fig. 33a). After the Pearl Harbor attack, Japanese were depicted in the United States propaganda in an uptight and hostile manner (Fig. 33b). According to Carl Schmitt (2007), the political enemy must not be aesthetically ugly. Certainly, ugliness is not a necessary condition for an individual or a group to be considered a political enemy, however, depicting him as such has been a common practice for reinforcing his political status and thusly defining how is he to be treated.

Fig. 33: Images of the enemy: (a) Hanisch, Untitled (ca. 1942). In the poster the caption reads "Behind the enemy powers: the Jew", (b) Miguel Covarrubias, Untitled (1942). Illustration for Fortune magazine, September Issue of 1942. Title reads "The Japanese. T heir God-Emperor Medievalism Must Be Destroyed"

The examples that we have seen so far of this second group of images lead us to conclude that the absence of an image subject is nothing else but an open position to be

occupied by subjects. In other words, when a subjects actualize an image, they become its very own image subject. It is important to point out that becoming an image subject is not only a result of volition, but also of imposition. Looking at examples such as *tableaux vivants* or other kinds of reproductions of images, one might think that becoming an image subject is always a matter of choice, but cases like the depiction of the enemy make us realize that others can become image subjects in spite of their will.

Fig. 34: European Refugee Crisis: (a) EPA, Untitled (2015). Death of Aylan Kurdi, (b) Rohit Chawla, Untitled (2016). Ai Weiwei posing as Aylan Kurdi

At this point, it is of great relevance to ask ourselves whether only images with non-existent image subjects are, as we have just called them, open positions to be occupied by subjects. There are premises to be taken into consideration here. First, we have that images present idealities; second, even though idealities manifest through actualities, their existence is not dependent upon actual entities. Therefore, the ideality presented by the image object can always be detached from the particular image subject and be adopted by any other subject. This was what Chinese artist Ai Weiwei made in the light of the harrowing images of the death of Aylan Kurdi, the infant Syrian migrant who drowned while trying to flee from his country with his family (Fig. 34a). As part of his work concerning the European Refugee Crisis, Ai Weiwei posed in a shore of Lesbos Island adopting the exact position in which Kurdi died at the shore of a beach in Turkey (Fig. 34b).

Ai Weiwei's performance is a clear example of how images with existing image subjects can be actualized by any other subject. Even though a subject is not depicted in an image, she can always participate in the determinations of significance therein presented. Hence, the distinction between images with existing image subjects and those with non-existent image subjects will be always provisional. In the strictest sense, we must not speak about images with *non-existent* image subjects, but rather of images with image subjects

yet to exist. In this particular case, such participation has the character of empathy, but there are other effects that actualizations of this kind may have, such as irony, sarcasm, nostalgia, and many others.

The aforesaid makes us turn back to a small detail of the Husserlian lexicon pertaining images. Throughout his oeuvre, the author utilizes the German word '*Subjekt*' (subject); however, the word that he uses for referring to the image subject is '*Bildsujet*', not '*Bildsubjekt*'. '*Sujet*' is a German word used for referring to the theme of an artistic composition, however, it is a French word adopted by the German language during the Eighteenth Century (Kluge, 2002). In French, '*sujet*' has a double meaning: on the one hand, it means 'subject' and, on the other one, it means 'vassal'. Philosophically speaking, the former meaning can be understood in a metaphysical context as *that which lies beneath*, that is to say, as the direct translation to the Latin word '*subiectum*' or the Greek 'ὑποκείμενον'. The latter meaning has a rather political sense, according to which subjects are nothing else but the results of subjection. Let us observe that, whereas the first acceptation of '*sujet*' presupposes an already constituted entity, the second one denotes a process of constitution.

Certainly, every image holds a theme or a content, but, for what we have been examining all along, it cannot be denied that representing their themes is not the only thing images can do. Besides having a *subject* matter, images are able to *subject* individuals and collectivities to its own dictations. Given that images and mathematical entities are both ideal objects, what Tieszen (2005) says about geometrical essences could be easily said of images as well: "They are thereby capable of prescribing rules to any empirical particulars that might fall under them (…) they prescribe rules for any possible application or experience..." (p. 164).

There are two last cases of images with nonexistent image subjects that we must not overlook. We have analyzed cases of subjects performing corporeal emulations of images, but this is not the only way in which actualization can be fulfilled. In the first chapter we discovered that two-dimensional images are entities that show us only one side, offering us no possibility of correcting our perception of them at all. This is certainly an ineludible condition of this kind of images, but it is not an impediment to actualize them. Our accumulated knowledge of the actual world allows us to formulate how would an ideal image object look like if it were an object of perception. Moreover, it is thanks to such formulation that the actualization of any image is always possible.

Fig. 35: Coop Himmelb(l)au's Busan Cinema Center. Busan, South Korea: Coop Himmelb(l)au, Façade (2005), (b) Coop Himmelb(l)au, Floor plan (2005), (c), (d) Duccio Malagamba, Photographs of Busan Cinema Center (2012)

The architectural use of images is perhaps the most paradigmatic case of actualization of image objects into non-corporeal actualities. Whether they are architectural (Fig. 35a,b), structural, electrical or mechanical, plans are images produced with the purpose of actualizing them by technical procedures (Fig. 35c,d). Unlike the previous examples, in this case subjective corporeal actions are not the material support of actualization, but rather its means. In a construction site, the bodies and actions of architects, engineers, construction workers and machine operators are all subjected to the actualization of images.

Fig. 36: Structural analysis: (a) SCIA Engineer Software, Stress distribution in slabs, (b) RSTAB Software, Deformations of towers

In a similar way, images are widely used in the engineering field. Structural analysis software generate computerized images for both determining stresses and loads distributions in the elements of a structure (Fig. 36a) and simulating the deformations that such distributions will provoke (Fig. 36b). These examples are somewhat similar to the scientific images that we examined in the last section, inasmuch judgements with the logical value of possibility can become true or false. But the main difference here is that these images are often produced prior to the construction of their image subjects (which is why they are in this second group of images). This is a rather particular case of actualization, since it depends not only on the intervention of subjects, but also on forces of nature. Whereas the plans show how are objects supposed to look, these computerized simulations show how are they supposed to behave, which might as well be said of subjects in other cases.

Fig. 37: Guillermo Boehler's Nos escondieron los árboles (We Were Hidden by the Trees): (a) Guillermo Boehler, Collage (2016). Private collection, (b), (c), (d) Guillermo Boehler, Nos escondieron los árboles (2018). Views of the installation at Nos Vemos in San José, Costa Rica

One might think that only technical images are susceptible of being actualized into objects, but that is not the case. Every single image can be actualized in the same manner as it is performed with architectural plans. This was exactly what Brazilian-Costa Rican artist Guillermo Boehler did in his work *Nos escondieron los árboles* (*We Were Hidden by the Trees*). In 2016, Boehler produced a collage (Fig. 37a) where two human figures appear between a light blue background and some vegetation. Two years later, the artist converted his two-dimensional collage into an installation, that is to say, he actualized his own image.

It is rather interesting how Boehler's actualization of his collage does not consist in showing more than what the image does. In the collage we do not see the characters' legs, but only their torsos and that is exactly what we find in the installation. Neither do we see in the collage the back side of the characters and the vegetation, which Boehler maintained in his installation. When we go behind the characters, instead of finding their backsides, we get to see the cardboard and the pieces of wood that make these images stand (Fig. 37d). The artist actualized his image objects in the strictest way possible, giving them a spatio-temporal and perceptive existence without modifying the very image objects. Therefore, here the image subject is still an image.

Whereas the actualization of an architectural plan intends to produce an architecturally functioning object, Boehler's actualization produces yet another image. In spite of this difference, there is a very clear similarity between them: in both cases the

actualization produces a space where subjects are able to gather. Architectural plans are actualized with the purpose of creating spaces of public and private gathering (Fig. 35d), which is also a result in Boehler's installation (Fig. 37c,d). Thus, we find a new way in which images take us from ideality to actuality. Actualizations that consist in spatializing image objects have the effect of allowing subjects to exist and coexist, that is to say, they enable a space of intersubjective interaction. Instead of isolating images from the actual world, these practices incorporate them to the world of actual experience.

(a) **(b)**

Fig. 38: Malevich's Suprematism: (a) Kazimir Malevich, Black Square (1915). Tetryakov Gallery, Moscow, (b) Unknown, Photograph (1915). Part of Malevich's pieces at the exhibition 0,10 in Petrograd

The last case of images that we will examine in this second group are those of abstract art. For this, let us turn to Malevich's iconic *Black Square* (Fig. 38a). Looking at this piece, we can easily identify that the image-thing is canvas and oil painting and that the image object is a black square, but what about the image subject? Is there a square in the world that Malevich depicted in his painting or is the image subject some sort of archetypical and Platonic square? If so, can it be considered an image subject if it cannot be perceived?

The first public apparition of the *Black Square* happened during the exhibition *0,10* in Petrograd along with other thirty-eight of his geometrical compositions (Fig. 38b). Hanging images from walls in galleries is a very instituted practice, which tacitly gives the audience the command of looking at the pieces *qua* works of art. This intensifies considering that Malevich's painting has nowadays 104 years of constant interpretation behind it. An implicit necessity of interpreting Malevich's *Black Square* in the light of his writings can be easily detected in the myriad of art historical investigations on the subject, which has placed the artist's mystical concerns in the center of the interpretation.

Even though the aforementioned point of view is of little relevance for a phenomenological investigation, it is notable how the interpretation of a painting like the

Black Square seems to always force us to seek for references outside the image itself. The lack of a narrative structure in the image object triggers interpretations according to which Malevich's painting is a gesture of iconoclasm (Besançon, 2000), of mathematical mysticism (Sarriugarte Gómez, 2014), of anti-visuality (Hernández Navarro, 2008), and others. However accurate or informed such elaborations on the painting may be, it must be recognized that there is not much in the phenomenal apparition of the image alone that directs us towards such thing as iconoclasm or mysticism. This does not mean that it is impossible or irrelevant to conduct an investigation on how the *Black Square* is linked to intellectual discourses, but we must not overlook that this cannot be fulfilled by phenomenological means only[43]. Let us then stay within the frame of the phenomenal apparition of the *Black Square*.

Whereas the interpretative path leads to quite complex results, the phenomenal approach turns much simpler. What does Malevich's image render visible? The very title of the painting answers the question: a black square. We meet not an abstract square, but a rather concrete one, with very specific dimensions and color. Let us not forget that the very production of the *Black Square* is already a transition from ideality to actuality by corporeal means. The ideal object that we call 'square' has been drawn into the actual and empirical world by Malevich's craftsmanship, just as we do when we draw with a pen on a piece of paper four lines united by four straight angles. Hence, the *Black Square* is already an actuality or, better yet, it is an *actual image*.

According to Sepp (1996), the most profound conflict between an image and its image subject relies on the fact that the image *per se* will never fulfill its pretension of being. Actual images are the only case in which the conflict pointed out by the author seems to dissolve. The area of black paint is not smaller or bigger than the one of the image object, and the black paint is not lighter or obscurer than the color of the image object. There is thus a perfect coincidence of image-thing and image object. On the other hand, given that the image is an actuality, we must recognize that it is not a re-presentation of something, but rather a presence itself. Hence, these images have the particularity of being their own image subjects, that is to say, what they render visible is their own presence. In a somewhat tautological manner, image-thing, image object and image subject coalesce in actual images.

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[43] At the same time, this does not mean that phenomenology has nothing to say about it. Let us not forget that phenomenology has a whole field of investigation dedicated to interpretation, i.e. hermeneutics.

The subjects who entered to the *0,10* exhibition room where Malevich's works were displayed (Fig. 38b) did nothing but entering a space full of geometrical actualities[44]. In the third book of *Ideas*, Husserl claims that "…in geometry we posit spatial formations in general (…) as truly existent, but existent in eidetic truth and not existent in the world of experience." (HuaE I, 70; HuaD V, 82, 16-18). Malevich's paintings seem to offer subjects a double possibility of apprehension: on the one hand, they might be taken as eidetic truths, that is to say, as geometrical essences (Webb, 2017); on the other hand, they might be considered as artistic actual objects, regardless of their relationship with mathematical truths.

(a)   (b)

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[44] As Malevich himself once said, the artist is freed from the pictorial plane and able to transpose the compositions from the canvas towards the space (Malevich in Sarriugarte Gómez, 2014).

(c)

Fig. 39: Abstract Expressionism: (a) Mark Rothko, Light Red Over Black (1957). Tate Modern, London, (b) Robert Motherwell, In Black and White (1960). Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art, Edinburgh, (c) Jackson Pollock, Number 31 (1950). The Museum of Modern Art, New York City

The geometrical nature of examples like Malevich's *Black Square* (and other works of artists such as Mondrian or Kandinsky) tends to deviate our attention towards mathematical entities. However, abstract art pieces do not always consist in geometrical compositions. We have, for instance, painters like Mark Rothko, whose images seem to be in the midst of geometrical shapes and irregular surfaces (Fig. 39a). Other artists decided to get completely rid of geometry and, instead, painted a kind of abstraction oriented towards irregularity and randomness. This is the case of abstract expressionists such as Robert Motherwell (Fig. 39b) or Jackson Pollock (Fig. 39c).

It is possible to find further variants of abstract art. However, regardless of how many variants we can identify, what we already said about the *Black Square* will be valid for all of them, i.e. the painting is its own image subject. We can find drips of paint spread over surfaces in a plethora of places in the world, but only in Pollock's *Number 31* we find that exact disposition of drips, tones and sizes (Fig. 39c). And this is even more evident in the case of abstract sculptures, such as Calder's or Serra's pieces (Fig. 40a,b).

Fig. 40: Abstract Sculpture: (a) Alexander Calder, Triumphant Red (1959-1963). Private Collection, (b) Richard Serra, Berlin Junction (1987). Berliner Philarmoniker, Berlin

It is remarkable that, from a Husserlian standpoint, abstract art is the most concrete case of images. This may sound somewhat oxymoronic ('abstract' and 'concrete' appear sometimes as opposite terms), but it is a result of a tremendous closeness between image-thing, image object and image subject.

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One of the main conclusion that we reached in the first chapter concerns the possibility that images have of detaching image consciousness from perception. This feature vests them with a great power, which may give a first impression that images render subjects powerless. After examining how do possibility and the transition from ideality to actuality come into play, it is evident that, instead of leaving subjects in a passive condition, images set subjectivity in motion. If one would have to describe in one word the kind of subjectivity that images constitute, there would be no better attribute than 'active'. Images enable a subjective life full of acts and activities in the most various fields[45].

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[45] This is something that authors with non-phenomenological scopes have also pointed out. Bredekamp's (2013) theory of image acts is perhaps the most significant investigation on this subject of the recent years. Interested in enaction and embodiment, Bredekamp coined the expression "image act". Evidently inspired in Austin's speech acts, the author shows that images are vehicles for action and even agents themselves, that is to say, he develops a pragmatic approach to images. Studying Husserl's considerations on images, it is possible to establish a strong linkage between Husserlian phenomenology and Bredekamp's theory of image acts. The relationship between both theories provides, on the one hand, a phenomenological basis to the image act theory and, on the other hand, helps us to visualize how contemporary Husserlian phenomenology of image can be.

All of the actions that we described throughout this second chapter are enabled not only by images, but also by a fundamental aspect of subjectivity, i.e. corporality. Within the Husserlian frame, conscious life is inseparable from the corporeal activity, which is why Husserl's extensive exploration of the multiple structures of consciousness is not to be understood as a mentalist or internalist approach[46]. When we examined perceptive consciousness, corporeal actions consisted in kinaesthetic movements; but, after looking specifically at the corporeal actions performed through images, we realize that the kind of activity that images produce exceeds sheer perception.

The active subjectivity that we encountered in this second chapter covers a wide spectrum of possibilities, ranging from scientific research to war and violence, politics, pop culture, quotidian life, art, religion, and so on. Taking a glance at all of the fields in which images intervene, we must not only speak about the constitution of an active subjectivity, but also of an active and convulse intersubjectivity. Images facilitate encounters and interchanges between subjects, contributing thus to the construction of both private and public lives.

Let us also remember from the first chapter that image consciousness is a specific type of the temporal modalities of perception called 're-presentations'. If one conceives images exclusively as objects for representation[47], that is to say, as visual reproductions of already existent entities, the only kind of temporality related to them would be that of the past. But now that we are aware that images can predetermine actual experiences, delineate multiple actions and become actualized, it is evident that they also are, so to speak, bearers of future. Moreover, this temporal dimension of images towards the future constitutes a projective kind of subjectivity or, as Brand (1995) puts it, a future-being.

Action, *body* and *future*. These are the three notions that can better summarize the kind of subjectivity and intersubjectivity constituted by images. It was thanks to the appliance of Husserlian logic to the image consciousness theory that we could relate images to subjectivity. However, we must also recognize that we obtained the three aforementioned notions mostly from the array of presented examples, and not so much from Husserl's own consideration on images. Let us then go back to Husserlian philosophy with the purpose of better explicating the subjectivity that we have just outlined.

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[46] For a mentalist interpretation of Husserl´s image consciousness theory, see Lotz (2017).
[47] Cf. Footnote 7 for the distinction of ´representation´ and ´re-presentation´.

CHAPTER 3: CONSTITUTING SUBJECTIVITIES

Let us contemplate what we have reached in this investigation so far. Our leading question is: how do images constitute subjectivity? In order to answer this, we started by addressing the question about how does consciousness apprehend images. Working within the Husserlian frame, there is no other way of answering to such inquiry than through the phenomenological reduction, that is to say, by bracketing what Husserl refers to as our "natural attitude" (i.e. our daily, non-philosophical attitude) and turning our attention to the world of phenomena. By doing so, we gained knowledge of a fundamental feature of images: because of their ability to detach themselves from the perceptual scheme (arrays of adumbrations and kinaestheses), the sense that we bestow upon them is not necessarily that of actuality. Instead, consciousness apprehends images as ideal objects and bestows sense upon them in terms of possibility or, more accurately, possibility of experience.

After determining this particular status of images, we addressed the question concerning the things that we do with images. In order to answer this, we gave account of how does the transition from the ideal and possible to the empirical and actual occur. We found that it is by corporeal means that subjects fulfill such a transition, to which we gave the name of 'actualization'. Finally, we studied a considerable number of cases in which actualizations of images are performed in various fields: science, politics, art, ethnology, architecture, among others.

If one looks carefully, there is a certain asymmetry between the input and the output of our investigation. Our first approach to images was based upon the phenomenological reduction or, as we have just stated, the operation of bracketing all activities that belong to the natural attitude. This took us to the realm of image consciousness, perception, ideality and logic. However, when we took our next step into the study of actualization, we were expelled from the transcendental domain and thrown back to what we were supposed to bracket in the first place. Paradoxically as it may seem, the deeper we went into the transcendental depths, the closer we approached to the natural attitude. Our study of images implies, so to speak, a reverse phenomenological reduction.

There is no doubt that there is a strong link between images and transcendental subjectivity. As we concluded in the first chapter, the existence of images broadens the material experience that the transcendental subject has of the world or, as we also phrased it, images make us realize that seeing is a much broader experience than the act of

perceiving. Also, in the second chapter, we determined that the sense bestowed upon images performed by subjects is deeply rooted in transcendental logical structures. In this sense, the constitution of subjectivity that images allow consists in the activation of certain transcendental structures through acts of consciousness that have images as intended objects. However, it must be noticed that this is not so much a constitution of subjectivity as the fulfillment of an already constituted subjectivity. Hence, even though the transcendental approach led us to a wide understanding of images, we must admit that the subjectivity that images constitute is not precisely the transcendental one.

It is necessary then to follow the same direction of the reverse phenomenological reduction that we have just mentioned. Thus, in order to better explicate the subjectivity that images constitute, we must understand it not as a part of transcendental life, but as part of the life where we live in the natural attitude. Now, the fact that we are about to abandon the transcendental scope of phenomenology should not be understood as a complete abandonment of phenomenology as such and, moreover, it does not mean that we are going to discard Husserlian thought. Not only did Husserl dealt with transcendentality, but he also included the non-transcendental life as part of his philosophical project. This became particularly evident in his last published work of 1936, *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, where Husserl emphasizes one of the most relevant and innovative notions of his late period: the life-world. With this expression, the author refers to the stratum of existence where we live in the natural attitude and that, not because of it, should be left aside from the philosophical questioning. Therefore, our last investigative effort will be focused in this peculiar world.

That being said, in this third and final chapter we will examine the subjectivity constituted by images in terms of the life-world. First, we must delineate the various ways in which the life-world is introduced by Husserl in *Crisis* as part of his philosophical endeavor. Also, in this first section we will observe that, for our purposes, we must follow what the author refers to as an "ontology of the life-world". Next, in order to have a better understanding of the fundamental elements of the life-world ontology, we will address both *Crisis* and Husserl's recently published manuscripts on the subject, which are gathered in volume XXXIX of *Husserliana*. We find in this volume an enormous amount of considerations, but not all of them are related to the things that we have been discussing and concluding in this investigation. Taking this into consideration, in the second section we will schematize some Husserlian remarks that will help us to better comprehend how do images and subjectivity manifest in the life-world. In the last section, we will return to

actualization and describe it as a part of the life-world experience, which will enable us finally to comprehend what is it exactly that images constitute in terms of subjectivity.

The Life-World As a Philosophical Theme

Crisis is often recognized as the work in which Husserl introduced the life-world as a subject of philosophical investigation *per se*. However, it is important not to obviate that the author's first remarks on the subject can be traced about sixteen years prior to the publication of *Crisis.* During the winter semester between 1910 and 1911, Husserl gave his lectures at the University of Göttingen on the fundamental problems of phenomenology. The introductory lessons are titled *The Natural Attitude and the Natural Concept of the World* and, as Føllesdall (2010) claims, in such lessons we can find for the first time the considerations that Husserl will sum up later by using the term "life-world". But, for our first approach to the problematic of the life-world, let us first explore the way in which it appears in *Crisis*.

Husserl's last published work aimed to denunciate the intellectual decadence that Europe was going through as a product of privileging the scientific enterprise in order to understand the world and the human being. More specifically, the denunciated crisis consisted in the separation of science from a cultural project and the subsequent formation of the prejudice according to which only objective sciences are valid forms of knowledge. This takes Husserl to a retrospective investigation on Western science, for which he goes back to the origins of the scientific way of thinking. Moving thereafter, he tries to locate where exactly was it that science began progressing as an isolated and self-enclosed task.

The decisive moment for this particular path that science took was none other than Galileo's arithmetization of geometry, that is to say, his reduction of all direct intuitions to ideal and abstract unities and symbols (Cf. 1970, p. 44; HuaD VI, 44, 2-7). Husserl finds in geometry a much more transparent modeling of the world, since it is certainly an idealization, but one that is evidently rooted in one of the main features of things, i.e. spatiality. It is not difficult to accept, for example, that the geometrical shape of the cone was originated through the surveying of objects such as volcanoes, mountains or stacks of sand; but, if one thinks the cone as a volume of $\frac{\pi}{3} \cdot r^2 \cdot h$, the intuitional grounding of this arithmetic representation is not so evident. Certainly, thinking the geometrical entities in terms of arithmetic saves us the task of having to recur over and over to graphical models and descriptions of the world, by just replacing them with abstract symbols. However, Husserl

claims that this led to a forgetfulness of the things that such symbols represented in the first place. The Galilean enterprise had no other outcome than the predominance in the scientific field of the combination and manipulation of abstract symbols, rather than its original purpose of grasping the world that those symbols seek to idealize.

Having identified the arithmetization of geometry and its consequences, Husserl moves on to the examination of some modern philosophical presuppositions that reinforced this pathway that science took. We can foreground to this respect especially the considerations made on Descartes and Kant. In reference to the former, Husserl points out the following problem in his philosophy. On the one hand, Descartes grounded all possible knowledge in the *cogito*, but, on the other hand, he was not willing to renounce to objective sciences as the ultimate form of knowledge. As a result, Descartes ended up by subsuming the *cogito* into the objective sciences under the form of psychology, instead of engaging with a pure egological investigation. (Cf. 1970, p. 81; HuaD VI, 83, 28-35).

> In regard to Kantian transcendental philosophy, Husserl points out that Kant
> ...makes an approach to a direct grounding, one which descends to the original sources, only to break off again almost at once without arriving at the genuine problems of foundation which are to be opened up from this supposedly psychological side. (1970, p. 104; HuaD VI, 106, 14-18).

Kant was moving in the right direction by exploring the subjective experience as the ultimate, i.e. transcendental, ground of knowledge. The problem arose when he got so deeply involved with the subjective faculties of reason that he missed the fact that the intellect is not the only transcendental condition of experience. According to Husserl, Kantian philosophical inquiry on transcendental subjectivity is grounded upon a presupposition that he never addressed properly, i.e. the existence of a world. The "break off" mentioned in the last quote consists then in this void that Kantian philosophy left uninvestigated. Husserl takes this as a departure point for introducing the tasks of the transcendental phenomenological philosophy and it is precisely at this point where the author begins his reflections on the life-world.

Before continuing with Husserl's path towards the life-world, it is important to point out the relationship that the aforesaid has with images. As Didi-Huberman (2015) stresses, with the adoption that art historian Erwin Panofsky made of Kantian critical philosophy as part of his iconological program "...the moment had really arrived to celebrate the marriage between cognition and the intuition that produces art objects." (p. 111). According to Didi-Huberman, Panofsky managed to culminate a long tradition of understanding art history as

a knowledge that conceives images as sources of purely objective and even scientific knowledge. In other words, the Kantian scope of the history of art leads to a comprehension of images based exclusively on the knowledge that subjects may gain about them. Given that art history was placed during centuries as the official discourse on images, much of the popular comprehension of images that still nowadays operates comes from this field of knowledge. Hence, the strong influence of the objectivist and scientificist thought in art history had as a consequence the prejudice according to which the relationship between images and subjects reduces to the identification that the latter make of the representational contents in the former.

Let us return to Husserl's critique of Kant and, better yet, to its connection with the life-world. The author claims:

> Naturally, from the very start in the Kantian manner of posing questions, the everyday surrounding world of life is presupposed as existing—the surrounding world in which all of us (even I who am now philosophizing) consciously have our existence; here are also the sciences, as cultural facts in this world, with their scientists and theories. In this world we are objects among objects in the sense of the life-world, namely, as being here and there, in the plain certainty of experience, before anything that is established scientifically, whether in physiology, psychology, or sociology. On the other hand, we are subjects for this world, namely, as the ego-subjects experiencing it, contemplating it, valuing it, related to it purposefully; for us this surrounding world has only the ontic meaning given to it by our experiencings, our thoughts, our valuations, etc. (1970, pp. 104-105; HuaD VI, 106-107, 38-7).

In this last excerpt, Husserl mentions some of the most fundamental features of the life-world, so let us foreground some points of interest. First of all, we have that, more than a philosophical or scientific concern, the existence of the life-world is something presupposed in any philosophical or scientific activity. Husserl himself accepts that, even when he is philosophizing about the life-world, it still acts as an ever-existing condition. Unlike Descartes, Husserl finds no necessity of doubting whether our surroundings are truly existent or just an illusion cast upon us.

It is also important to point out that, when Husserl pictures the life-world as a presupposition, we must not understand the term 'presupposition' in the sense of a non-valid or a non-questioned premise. Presuppositions take the form of a non-valid premise when, for instance, I spend the night at my parents' house and, waking up the next morning, I think that I am at my apartment. On the other hand, I might presuppose something in the form of a postulate that helps me to go through with a particular task; for example, I

presuppose that the shortest distance between two points is the straight line that joins them, in order to solve a geometrical problem in an Euclidean space. But the presupposition that the life-world exists has the form of neither a false belief nor an axiom. I presuppose it because it is obvious for me, I live my life always taking it for granted. Husserl sums up this character of the life-world by calling it "the self-evident" or, in a more strict fashion, "the self-understood"[48]. (Cf. 1970, p. 110; HuaD VI, 116, 31-33).

The next thing to notice about this first enunciation of the life-world is the scope under which the scientific labour is regarded. For Husserl, science and scientific theories take place in the life-world as part of the cultural life. This should be no surprise for us, since, as we already stated, one of the main purposes of *Crisis* is to reinstall science in the broader picture of an European cultural project. But right away Husserl introduces two standpoints that we assume living in the life-world: on the one hand, we are objects among objects and, on the other hand, we are subjects for the world.

From both modes of existence, the first one appears to be more problematic than the second one. Being a subject for the world and having a purposefully and meaningful relation with it is one of the most fundamental features of phenomenology; however, stating that we are objects among objects seems somewhat problematic from a phenomenological point of view. This might give a first impression that Husserl is willing to admit that existence can be reduced to an objective fact. Nonetheless, the author remarks that we are objects but in a life-worldly fashion, being here and there. But what does it mean to be here and there? Let us elucidate this.

In order to better understand the assertion that we are objects among objects, we must pay attention to two aspects. First, we have that this mode of existence has to do eminently with the certainty of experience, that is to say, with the aforementioned presupposition of the existence of the life-world and, now we must add, of our experience of it. Second, there is the fact that this being here and there is previous to any theoretical statement that we might formulate about it. With both remarks, Husserl is indicating that, even though it is possible to understand a human being as an object, such an understanding will never suppress our primary subject condition. The doctor may conceive my body as a mechanism of organs and fluids, and even manipulate and modify it in the same way as a mechanic fixes a car, but there is nothing in this objectivist approach that makes my subjectivity disappear. While examining me, the doctor considers that I am an object

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[48] The German word that Husserl uses is '*Selbstverständlichkeit*'.

amongst objects. I even recognize my condition of being here and there as an object in the examination room, but all of this happens for me within the certainty of experience and my purposefully relationship with the world. It is in this sense that we must understand Husserl's claim.

Now that we have introduced in the past discussion the objectivist comprehension of the subject and the world, we can move on to the fundamental relationship that the life-world has with natural sciences. Just as in any objectively conceived human body underlies a subject, Husserl considers that all objective scientific knowledge is grounded upon the life-world. In the author's own words, the life-world is "...the constant ground of validity, an ever available source of what is taken for granted, to which we, whether as practical men or as scientists, lay claim as a matter of course." (Husserl 1970, p. 122; HuaD VI, 124, 26-28). Let us notice that Husserl thinks of the life-world not as the totality of cognizable objects or the place in which such objects reside; instead, the life-world consists in a ground of validity. This means that the life-world does not need an external explanation or justification, because it is there where explanations and justifications of things of any kind might be formulated with (or without) sense.

The relationship between the life-world and natural sciences does not consist only in the fact that the former is the source of validity and evidence for the latter. Not only does Husserl observe science as a *corpus* of articulated propositions, laws, and principles that have to do with the life-world, but also he observes it as an activity that takes place *in* the life-world. As we determined earlier, the Galilean turn had as a consequence the forgetfulness of natural sciences as part of a cultural project, which led to the understanding of science as a mere manipulation of abstract symbols. But it was not only science as a body of knowledge that began being conceived as something abstract, but also science as an activity. In other words, abstraction became something associated to both the objects of the scientific discourse and the actions that scientists execute in order to deal with their objects.

One thinks of scientists as individuals who dedicate their efforts in solving equations, building mathematical models, writing scientific reports and other actions often characterized as abstract, mental, intellectual, and so on. One even tends to differentiate the work of a scientist from the work of an artisan, by claiming that the scientist works with the mind and the artisan with the hands. But, no matter how much of an intellectual task science may be, this does not mean that it is developed just as any other life-word activity. As Husserl reminds us,

> ...for the physicist it is the world in which he sees his measuring instruments, hears
> timebeats, estimates visible magnitudes, etc.— the world in which, furthermore, he
> knows himself to be included with all his activity and all his theoretical ideas. (1970,
> p. 121; HuaD VI, 123-124, 32-2).

Thus, even though science arrives finally to highly formalized conclusions and formulations, the necessary procedures to reach them have an absolute mundane character. Husserl concludes then that the life-world is "...a realm of original evidences…" (1970, p. 127; HuaD VI, 130, 17). As we have just determined, this should be understood in reference to both the objects and the methods with which science works.

It is evident that all of the remarks concerning the life-world that we have been studying so far originate among Husserl's considerations on objective science. This might give us the impression that the philosophical inquiry on the life-world is subordinated to the reflection on science, however, for Husserl

> ...the problem of the life-world, or rather of the manner in which it functions and must
> function for scientists, is only a partial subject within the above-designated whole of
> objective science (namely, in the service of its full grounding) (...) The life-world was
> always there for mankind before science, then, just as it continues its manner of
> being in the epoch of science. Thus one can put forward by itself the problem of the
> manner of being of the life-world; one can place oneself completely upon the ground
> of this straightforwardly intuited world, putting out of play all objective-scientific
> opinions and cognitions. (1970, pp. 122-123; HuaD VI, 125, 20-39).

One cannot deny the strong linkage that there is between objective science and the life-world, but this does not mean that a philosophical approach to the life-world has the only task of elucidating it as the source of validity and evidence for science. The existence of the life-world is completely independent of science and that is why the life-world is a philosophical problem on its own.

For our purposes, this has a particular relevance. In the last chapter, we arrived to the actualization of images thanks to Husserl's consideration in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* according to which even the most abstract mathematical operations demand corporeal actions in order to draw the ideal into the empirical world. Transposing this to images, we found out that subjects render actuality to the idealities presented in images by means of such corporeal actions. Therefore, just as the life-world is the source of validity and evidence for sciences, it is also the ground upon which our apprehension, understanding, employement, and actualization of images takes place.

We must also notice Husserl's introduction to the fundamental operation of the phenomenological method, i.e. reduction. But here we find the phenomenological reduction not as it usually appears in other regions of the Husserlian oeuvre. What is put out of play is not the natural attitude, but the "objective-scientific opinions and cognitions". In prior versions of the reduction, the natural attitude was something almost self-evident, that is to say, a fully apparent condition for the philosopher. But, after his reflections on objective science, Husserl recognizes that the natural attitude is not the first set of prejudices to be bracketed for initiating a philosophical inquiry. What should be set aside in the first place is the idea according to which objective, formal, and abstract science is the only valid discourse. It is only after fulfilling this first reduction that the philosopher faces the life-world and the natural attitude.

It is important to point out that, in spite of taking distance from objective science, Husserl does not abandon scientificity as part of his philosophical project. In other words, the fact that he puts objective science apart from philosophy is no reason for substracting rigor and formality from the philosophical study of the life-world. The first reduction for the formulation of a philosophy of the life-world is thus a negative one, that is to say, it tells us what is not to be done. The world will not be understood as a conglomerate of entities reducible to atomic or subatomic particles, arrays of chemical elements and molecules, point or distributed masses with coordinates in a three-dimensional Cartesian plane, and so on. Instead, the scientific approach to the life-world defended by Husserl has to do with "...its ultimate and deepest source of verification in experience which is "pure" in the sense designated above, in all its modes of perception, memory, etc. These words, however, must be understood actually as prescientific life understands them…" (1970, pp. 124-125; HuaD VI, 25-29). Hence, the kind of scientificity that Husserl pursues is grounded upon experience.

As we already know from previous chapters, within the Husserlian frame, the term 'experience' is a matter of the subjective life. So, if the scientificity of the life-world philosophy has to do with experience, this means that Husserl is proposing a science based on subjectivity. This might strike immediately as a huge contradiction, since science is commonly understood as a form of knowledge where subjective considerations take no place. This is why, as Zahavi (2017) points out, Husserlian phenomenology is wrongly conceived as some sort of introspectionism.

How should we understand then the project of a life-world philosophy in terms of a science of subjective experience? Husserl does not obviate the fact that the life-world is the place where the most various kinds of human activities take place. At this very moment, my

subjective experience in the life-world is that of a philosophy student writing his thesis in bed, but I see outside the window other people whose subjective experiences are that of an office worker in his desk or that of a child playing in the park. How can all these experiences be scientifically studied if they are extremely different from each other and, even further, experienced radically different in the first person? To this Husserl replies: "...the life-world does have, in all its relative features, a general structure. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative." (1970, p. 139, HuaD VI, 17-20). For Husserl, the fact that the life-world is the ultimate realm of relativities (personal, cultural, spatio-temporal) does not make it lack of a stable structure. Moreover, it is precisely this general structure of the life-world that philosophy must take into consideration.

Regardless of how variant personal lives and cultures may be, there is an invariant structure of the life-world. Husserl identifies a first task for a philosophy of the life-world as follows:

> ...what alone determines for us in life the sense of talking about the world: the world is the universe of things, which are distributed within the world-form of space-time and are "positional" in two senses (according to spatial position and temporal position) —the spatiotemporal *onta*. Here would thus be found the task of a life-world ontology, understood as a concretely general doctrine of essence for these *onta*. For our interest in the present context it suffices to have indicated this. (1970, p. 142, HuaD VI, 145, 5-12).

The author opens up in this passage a huge philosophical endeavor, but immediately indicates that he will not engage with it. The life-world ontology, which consists in the study of the essences that underlie mundane *onta*, is thus an incomplete task in *Crisis*.

In order to understand why does Husserl exclude the task of a life-world ontology from *Crisis*, we must remember its main purposes. With this treatise, Husserl sought, on the one hand, to give back to science its cultural meaning and, on the other hand, to present subjective experience as the ultimate scientific foundation. Of course, this last purpose could hardly be completed by making reference to a type of experience that encompasses all sort of relativities and variances. This is also why Husserl finds philosophically insufficient to bracket objective science only. We find certainly in *Crisis* a new type of reduction, but this does not mean that the phenomenological reduction developed by Husserl in previous works is unnecessary. Putting aside the objective science is just a first step for entering the natural attitude which phenomenology must also overcome anyway. In the light of this, the first reduction might seem a bit superfluous, but we must not forget that it is by virtue of it that Husserl inaugurates the life-world as a new philosophical problem.

The next step that Husserl takes consists in the distinction between two forms of what he calls the "waking life", that is to say, being in the life-world. The first one is the "...straightforward living toward whatever objects are given, [which] indicates that all our interests have their goals in objects." (Husserl, 1970, p. 144; HuaD VI, 146-147, 32-1). This is perhaps the closest that Husserl gets in *Crisis* to a remark on the life-world ontology. Interest and goal seem to be two fundamental notions for the description of the *onta* in the life-world experience, since it is according to them that we bestow meaning upon things in our mundane experience. The second form of waking life is

> ...a consistent universal interest in the "how" of the manners of givenness and in the *onta* themselves, not straightforwardly but rather as objects in respect to their "how"—that is, with our interest exclusively and constantly directed toward how, throughout the alteration of relative validities, subjective appearances, and opinions, the coherent, universal validity world—the world—comes into being for us…
> (Husserl, 1970, p. 144; HuaD VI, 26-32).

As Rabaneque (2011) claims, Husserl finds that the natural attitude is not sufficient for studying the life-world and, we may add, for reaching the most solid foundation of all possible knowledge and experience. There is still in the natural attitude too many presupposed and unquestioned things that need to be elucidated. This leads us immediately to the second reduction in *Crisis*, i.e. the transcendental reduction.

Whilst the first reduction puts out of play the objective science, the transcendental one puts out of action "...the field of all acquired and newly established life-interests." (Husserl, 1970, p. 150; HuaD VI, 154, 30-31). By performing the transcendental reduction, we must stop regarding things as the objects towards which our interests direct. Better yet, our attention needs to be directed not towards objects as such, but to their manners of givenness. And here we meet finally with the philosophical remarks that Husserl had developed in previous works. After having described both reductions, the author continues with an exposition of themes such as adumbrations, kinaestheses, retentions, protentions, apperceptions, intersubjectivity and other foundational topics of phenomenology.

Husserl goes on with a transcendental inquiry, which, for our purposes, does not require further examination. Let us then sum up what we have found about the life-world as it appears in *Crisis*. First, Husserl introduces the life-world as that which science presupposes, but constitutes at the same time the source of its validities and evidences. Second, there is the life-world as the ever-existent condition for subjective and intersubjective purposeful experience. Third, there is the life-world as that which needs to be bracketed in order to reach the transcendental stratum of philosophical thought. We have

also that all three conceptions of the life-world have an associated task: the first one leads to a retrospective questioning of science and a reformulation of its foundation, the second one to an ontology of the life-world and the third one to the most strict version of phenomenology.

Returning to our investigation, we must ask ourselves in which of this three levels of the life-world should we locate the constitution of subjectivity that images carry out. Given that the first one pertains to the scientific activity only, it is not this level what should concern us the most. Nevertheless, since we examined in the last chapter some cases of images in the scientific field, we must not overlook that images belong to those life-word *onta* with which scientists work and even consider a source of evidence. If one investigates scientific images only, this first level of understanding of the life-world seems to be an interesting field to explore.

Next, we have the life-world *qua* region of existence or, more specifically, *qua* region where the mundane life takes place. At this level, the subjective intentions and goals are of main interest, which seems to be closer to our investigation. Looking back at the various cases of actualization, the impossibility to ascribe a single intention or goal to images becomes apparent. And this happens not only because images are used in a wide variety of fields of knowledge and human actions, but also because one single image may be utilized for very different purposes. It seems then that a life-world ontology might give us the appropriate conceptual tools to describe the subjectivity constituted by images in the most general terms. Since Husserl does not offer us in *Crisis* an ontological development of the life-world, we will have to seek it in his posthumously published writings on the subject.

Before deepening into the life-world ontology, we must still argue why the third level of reflection on the life-world is not suitable for our investigation from now on. As a matter of fact, during the whole first chapter and a big portion of the second one, we were moving within this third level of reflection. Our considerations on the relationship between image consciousness, perception and logic had to do with the different modes of givenness of images and the corresponding structures of consciousness involved, that is to say, they belong to the transcendental side of phenomenology. And, what is more, it was such a transcendental scope that showed us the necessity to explore the life-world as the region of existence where subjectivity is constituted by images. That being said, let us now examine the Husserlian life-world ontology.

The Life-World Ontology

As we remarked in the past section, even though Husserl introduced in *Crisis* the necessity of a life-world ontology, he excludes the possibility of completing such a task in this same book. The Husserlian texts in which we can find an extensive development on the subject have been gathered in Volume XXXIX of the German edition of his complete works. The texts in this volume were written between 1916 and 1937. This means that, when Husserl introduced the life-world ontology in *Crisis*, he was already involved with its development. By the time *Crisis* was published, Husserl had about twenty years of work on what was barely announced in his last publication.

Let us not to forget that we are about to address Husserl's life-world ontology in order to describe more precisely how do images constitute subjectivity. Thus, our main concern is not the life-ontology as such, but the elements of the life-world ontology that relate to our conclusions so far. It is for this reason that our approach to Volume XXXIX of *Husserliana* will have the following two main stages. First, we will examine the dual structure by means of which Husserl understands the life-world, i.e. the familiar-alien binomial. Thence, we will finally determine in a second stage how do body, action and future (the three main notions of the subjectivity constituted by images that we found at the end of the second chapter) manifest in the life-world.

If one reads all of the life-world texts gathered in volume XXXIX of *Husserliana*, it becomes evident how important it is for Husserl the understanding of the life-world in terms of two fundamental notions: the familiar[49] and the alien. In many passages, Husserl speaks about a "surrounding world" before even mentioning such a thing as the life-world. In these manuscripts, the author is not concerned with the world as considered by philosophers, but rather the world as considered by us in the natural attitude.

> "Surrounding world" is the "world" inside of which human beings live consciously (...)
> The most basic level is the human being at home in the narrowest sense, however
> primitive or "cultivated" it might be. What does 'home' designate? His "house" (...) his
> country…
> All persons that that count as belonging to my home have in a way the same familiar
> world (...) the familiar world has a structure by virtue of which different persons in it

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[49] Hereafter, I will translate the German adjective '*heim*' as 'familiar' and the name '*Heim*' as 'home'. The name 'Heim' is sometimes used to refer to one's homeland, but it might as well be used for designating simply one's home. In even more general terms, '*Heim*' can be used for naming any place or situation in which I find a certain familiarity. Thus, 'home' is not restricted here to a specific type of space in particular.

are together "functionaries": father-function, mother-function. But on the other hand, everyone has mood differences in their moods; for some [this world] is viewed with humour, for others it has the face of freedom and servitude, of happiness and unhappiness... (HuaD XXXIX, 154-155, 24-19).[50],[51]

First of all, let us observe that Husserl does not exclude consciousness from the life-world. That is to say, conscious life is still part of the mundane experience, but here the world does not appear to consciousness as a general or universal concept. The author mentions a basic level of how we understand the world, which consists in our identification of that which surrounds us and makes us feel at home. It is not strange that the most immediate world that we recognize is that linked to the place in which we typically live in (house, apartment) or the geographical region to which we belong (town, province, country). There is also the fact that the familiarity of the surrounding world assigns certain statutes to the others that are around me. In my familiar world, I do not have mere subjects by my side, but rather I coexist with relatives, friends, fellow citizens, and so on.

The other feature of the life-world that we can identify from the last excerpt is the affectivity through which we experience it. At the end of the quoted passage, we find quite contrasting examples of the feelings that we may experience towards the life-world (freedom and servitude, happiness and unhappiness). This unveils the fact that, just because the world that I am experiencing results familiar to me, I do not feel necessarily comfortable with it or agree with its current state of affairs. Thus, the active character of subjectivity in the life-world can be a product of either an inertial reproduction of that which I find familiar or of a certain affective discomfort with the world. In both cases, this will end up by determining behaviors and values (Vongher, 2011).

It is however not always the case that we find ourselves in a familiar environment. For instance, when I visit an unknown city, I do not call home any of the places that I visit and I cannot recognize people under the relative, friends or compatriot functions. This is

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[50] Since *Husserliana XXXIX* has not yet been translated to English, all quoted passages are translations of my own.

[51] "„Umwelt" ist die „Welt", in die der Mensch bewusst hineinlebt (…) Die niederste Stufe ist der Mensch in seinem Heim im engsten Sinne, wie primitiv oder „kultiviert" es auch sein mag. Was besagt da „Heim"? Sein „Haus" (…), sein Land…
Alle Personen, die zu meinem Heim als Angehörige zählen, haben in einer Weise dieselbe Heimwelt (…) die Heimwelt eine Struktur hat, vermöge deren die verschiedenen Personen in ihr zugleich „Funktionäre" sind: Vater-Funktion, Mutter-Funktion etc. Andererseits aber auch darin, dass dieseWelt für jeden Unterschiede der Stimmung hat, sich vom Gemüt her für jeden anders ansieht, für jeden andere Gesichte der Freiheit und Unfreiheit, des Glücks und Unglücks hat." (HuaD XXXIX, 154-155, 24-19)

precisely the opposite to the familiar world, which Husserl calls an "alien world". How is then the alien world experienced? To this Husserl replies: "...when I want to get acquainted with a foreign country, a foreign culture and people (...) I do not apperceive the alien cultural objects and the alien persons in a familiar typicalness. I understand them analogically…" (HuaD XXXIX, 168, 17-20)[52]. The experience of the alien world is carried out through an analogy with what I consider familiar.

Husserl does the exercise of imagining that he is in China. He says: "I know that there is a typicalness, but I do not know it...." (HuaD XXXIX, 159, 24)[53]. These reflections on the familiar and the alien world might seem somewhat obvious, however, it is important to examine them in order to understand that in the life-world there is not really space for a total experience of the alien. However strange the world may appear to me, I will always try to apprehend it based upon my already known structures. This is exactly what Blumenberg (2010) means when he claims that the life-world is a sphere where there is no such thing as bewilderment, a place where we all know perhaps too well how things are and what is to be done. Blumenberg describes the life-world as the sum of achievements to stabilize life or, better yet, of its self-preservation. For now, suffice it to say that the life-world experience seeks always a state of familiarity[54] or, at least, of a familiar apprehension of the alien. Let us pass now to our second stage of exposition of the Husserlian life-world philosophy. Having described the notions of familiar and alien, we will now determine how do body, action and future manifest in the life-world.

Let us begin with the notion of body. Since the first chapter, we were able to determine that the body plays a fundamental role in perception. If it were not for their corporality, subjects would just passively receive sense-data. But this is not the case. Subjects have their own bodies, which enables them to construct actively their objects of perception by moving throughout the space, that is to say, by performing kinaestheses. Husserl claims that, in terms of the life-world, kinaestheses are not "..."associated as mere immanent data, but as practical capabilities (…) of practical systems and as systems of motivation for corresponding effective and possible appearances." (HuaD XXXIX, 12, 14-

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[52] "…wenn ich im fremden Land fremde Kultur und ⟨fremde⟩ Menschen kennenlernen (…) Denn die fremden Kulturobjekte und die fremden Menschen apperzipiere ich nicht in heimatlicher Typik. Sie sind für mich analogisch verstanden…" (HuaD XXXIX, 168, 17-20).

[53] "Ich weiß, dass er eine Typik hat, aber ich kenne sie nicht…" (HuaD XXXIX, 159, 24)

[54] According to Friedman (2010), familiarity is an achievement of transcendental subjectivity. But more than a deliberate subjective decision of making the world a familiar place, we must understand familiarity as a result of the sedimentation of experience that takes place in the sphere of passivity (Pulkkinen, 2013).

17)[55]. Husserl clearly emphasizes the practical and motivated aspect of all corporeal movements, but this is not something that differs substantially from the transcendental description of the body and its movements.

How are then the life-world motivations different from the transcendental ones? We must remember that in *Crisis* Husserl pointed out that all of our interests have their goals in objects. In the life-world, we do not direct ourselves towards objects just for perceiving them or gaining intuitional knowledge of them, but rather to fulfill our particular interests. We find in *Ideas II* a very illustrative example in this regard: "...I see coal as heating material; I recognize it and recognize it as useful and used for heating, as appropriate for and as destined to produce warmth." (HuaE III, 197, 16-18; HuaD IV, 187, 25-28). In this passage, Husserl calls things "use-Objects", which unveils quite clearly the main difference between transcendental and life-world motivations, i.e. use. In the life-world, I focus on things inasmuch I may use them for my concrete needs and purposes; thus, my body and its movements are the means by virtue of which I get to accomplish such goals.

The example of the coal apprehended as heating material, appears in §50 of *Ideas II*, which is titled *The Person as Center of the Surrounding World*. As Perrau (2013) claims, the subject lives in the social world always as a person both for himself and the others. Moreover, the author defines the person as "...an identity made from the coalescence of diverse properties product of the history of a subject." (Perreau, 2013, p. 221)[56]. Hence, more than subjects or bodies, what we have in the life-world are persons with histories and motivations.

We must not forget that intersubjectivity is a primary feature within Husserlian thought, which extends also to the life-world. As Husserl remarks: "Everyone has his own interests, but the interests of someone are not detached from those of the other, they are interests intertwined in harmony and disharmony, in consent and dissent…" (HuaD XXXIX, 58-59, 34-1)[57]. The mundane manifestation of intersubjectivity has as an inevitable

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[55] "…nicht als bloße immanente Daten, sondern als praktische Vermögen (…) zu einem praktischen System „assoziieren" und als ein Motivationssystem für zugehörige wirkliche und mögliche Erscheinungen." (HuaD XXXIX, 12, 14-17)

[56] "…une identité qui est faite d'une coalescence de propriétés diverses qui sont les produits de l'histoire du sujet". (Perreau, 2013, p. 221)

[57] "Jeder hat seine Interessen, aber die Interessen des einen sind nicht getrennt von denen der anderen; sie sind sich verflechtende Interessen im Harmonieren und Disharmonieren, in Einstimmigkeit und Streit…" (HuaD XXXIX, 58-59, 34-1)

consequence the birth of an ethical and political space. Persons[58] do not pursue their individual or shared interests and purposes without having to meet others in the way and it is of such a clash that ethics and politics arise.

Even though Husserl does not deepen in this regard, he mentions consent and dissent as part of this interconnectedness of interests. Establishing communicative events (Gross, 2010) in terms of agreements and disagreements is thus a feature of personhood. In words of Moran, "Husserl's characterization of persons stresses (...) [the] ability to enter into normative social and moral relations (...) to weave meanings that are socially recognized. The recognition of and from others is crucial to personhood." (2012, p. 159). But we may add that it is not only normative relations in which persons enter in the life-world. Since dissent is a possibility, we must also admit that coexistence in the life-world may result in violent and non-regulative relations.

If we go back to our examination of Husserl's notion of the familiar world, it is possible to establish a link between the body and what Husserl refers to as "functions". On the one hand, the body of the others mediates in the process of me rendering them present *qua* persons (Herra, 1972) and lives (Dodd, 1997). On the other hand, in the life-world the others have the significance for me of being relatives (mother, father, sister), friends (my friend from high school, my friends from the university), neighbors (the man in the apartment next to mine, the woman from across the street), and other functions. Thus, the corporeal existence of each person is what enables me to bestow this meanings upon others.

In the life-world, the body is not a generic feature of subjects, but rather it is what defines specific persons with specific functions. For instance, when I go to visit my parents, I do not take their bodies as a common feature of them. Instead, their own bodies are what make me realize that one of them is my father and the other one is my mother. The functions that they have for my conscious life are the products of the familiarity that I have developed with their bodies. In the opposite way, someone turns alien for me when, in spite of being a person, I do not have any kind of familiarity with his body.

For what we have seen heretofore, that the body manifests in the life-world *qua* person means at least three things. First, from an individual perspective, my body is my

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[58] I will use hereafter the term 'persons' and not 'people' as the plural form of 'person'. The name 'people' is often associated with a national or regional identity, which might not give the more general and phenomenological sense pursued in this chapter. For this same reason, I will use the term 'personhood' and not 'personality' to speak about the condition that a subject has of being a person in the life-world. While 'personality' designates the collection of sentimental and behavioral or, better yet, psychological features of someone, 'personhood' has a much more philosophical sense.

connection with the world of things that help me to achieve my goals and motivations. Second, from a collective perspective, the body opens a space of ethical and political coexistence. Third, the familiarity (or the lack of it) that we have with bodies causes the ascription of personal functions. Evidently, these three remarks are mutually interconnected. In the context of individual and social pursuance of goals, persons associate and dissociate in various ways, thusly formulating and reformulating the meanings that ones bestow upon others. This reveals that the body cannot be thought of in the life-world outside contexts of action, which takes us to our second feature of subjectivity, i.e. action.

After exploring actualizations, we arrived to the conclusion that action is a feature of the particular subjectivity that images constitute. In the light of this, by 'action' we must understand not something that stays within the boundaries of a subject, but rather as something that subjects display outside themselves (in their surroundings, things and other subjects as well). Thus, in the life-world, action is not something that subjects contemplate or perceive; instead, it is something that subjects produce. As Husserl remarks: "...it is certain that the title 'World' (...) is a title for effective and possible I-acts…" (HuaD XXXIX, 4, 5-7)[59]. As we can see, more than action, the life-world subject performs acts.

There is a recurring word not only in the life-world manuscripts, but also in *Crisis*, which might help us to better delineate acts in a life-worldly fashion. Husserl makes the following statement: "The actual life takes course in acts (...) For every personality, the surrounding world is (...) reckoned once and again as the universal field of its entire praxis (in the most wide sense)..." (HuaD XXXIX, 164, 11-15)[60]. As we examined previously, the movements of the body in the life-world are more than mere kinestheses, since they are products of practical motivations and purposes, that is to say, they always belong to a particular praxis. In *Crisis*, Husserl utilizes the word 'praxis' for deeming science as just one of many activities that humans carry out in the life-world, which allow us to see that praxis is the life-world manifestation of action.

According to Husserl, subjective acts in the life-world

...go from what is for me (and thus for us) already existent and real to what "ought to be". Naturally, not ethically speaking, but rather purely pertaining to will, from which the intended stands for intended, as wanted, that is to say, as something that ought

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[59] "...sicher ist, ⟨dass⟩ der Titel „Welt" (…) ein Titel ist für wirkliche und mögliche Ichakte…" (HuaD XXXIX, 4, 5-7)

[60] "Das aktuelle Leben verläuft in Akten (…) Für jede Personalität ist die Umwelt (…) geltend und fortgeltend ⟨als⟩ das Universalfeld ihrer gesamten Praxis (im weitesten Sinne)…" (HuaD XXXIX, 164, 11-15)

to be, in the transition from the apprehension of practical possibilities towards the movements of the will (the *fiat*). (HuaD XXXIX, 324, 17-21)[61].

Husserl speaks about a non-ethical "ought to be" pertaining subjective acts, which means that in the life-world actions are performed neither under normative or prescriptive orders nor with the purpose of defining such orders. We must not overlook that acts in the life-world are always engaged in a praxis, which indicates that the "ought to be" is an "ought to be in this particular praxis". Thus, "In every situation there is a factual true or false, a practical right and a practical wrong…" (Hua XXXIX, 197, 30-31)[62] or, as Nenon (2013) puts it, we experience and classify things not in an uninterested perceptual fashion[63], but rather in terms of the relevance that they have for us.

There is still one thing to foreground from Husserl's notion of *ought to be*. The author speaks about a transition from possibilities to movements of the will (which is exactly what we have already identified as the actualization of images), which he calls "the *fiat*". This expression somewhat reminisces the Biblical "let there be". *Fiat* is a Latin transitive verb, that is to say, it sense is not complete until one accompanies it with an object. In Genesis, God did not said just "fiat" ("let there be"), but he said "*fiat lux*" ("let there be light"). Consequently, acts in the life-world are neither performed involuntarily nor not knowing what is it that they will produce. I do not act passively in the life-world, but rather in an active way, however redundant this may sound. As De Monticelli (2011) claims, it is the act of eating and not the act of digestion that constitutes me as a subject or, in other words, I am a subject inasmuch I act by means of my agency. And all of this has a strong linkage with the body, since the body acts as the organ of the will (Herra, 1972) that allows persons to convert an *ought* into an *is* in the context of a given praxis. It is in this sense that we must understand body as a *res temporalis* (Dodd, 1997).

Let us now examine our final feature of subjectivity: future. Looking closely at our considerations on body and action, it is not hard to observe that future is the temporality that better suits what has been hereby described. Future is implied in the very notion of purpose that we have been referring to since the beginning of this life-world ontology examination. I

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[61] "…geht von dem für mich (bzw. für uns) schon Seienden, schonWirklichen auf das „Seinsol lende". So natürlich nicht ethisch gesprochen, sondern rein vom Willen her gesprochen, vor dem im Übergang von dem Erfassen der praktischen Möglichkeit zur Willensbewegung (dem *fiat*)…" (HuaD XXXIX, 324, 17-21)

[62] "In jeder Situation gibt es ein sachliches Wahr und Falsch, ein praktisches Richtig und praktisches Unrichtig…" (Hua XXXIX, 197, 30-31)

[63] Zelic (2008) even defends that perceptual meaning is derivable from practical interests and activities.

aim at purposes and goals inasmuch I still have not fulfilled them, which means that such fulfillment can only occur as a future event. This is what Schütz (1983) refers to in his investigations on the life-world in terms of the future perfect tense as follows:

> This reaching-forward is quite concrete; the future is determinate, predetermined by me as future, but it is Utopian: it concerns something that has not yet happened. What has not yet happened, although it will happen if it depends on me, is now at present only imagined. The time perspective of this representation can be designated most graphically by the term *futurum exactum* borrowed from Scholastic grammar. (1983, p. 14)

But still, how does future manifest in the life-world? Let us go back to the passage quoted above where Husserl speaks of the I-acts. The author distinguishes therein two kinds of acts, i.e. the effective and the possible ones, after which he claims: "...and here possibility refers sometimes to past originations throughout I-acts in this specific sense, and some other times to a free activity of horizons disclosure, to the capability of subjects…" (HuaD XXXIX, 4, 7-10)[64]. Remembering that the life-world experience fluctuates between the poles of the familiar and the alien, it seems that these two kinds of possibility enunciated by Husserl correspond to such poles. I may act on the basis of possibilities whose fulfillment I already anticipate and with which I am familiarized. But there are also occasions in which my acts open me unknown, new, and one might say alien situations and events.

Actualities and possibilities define in the most general sense what Husserl calls a "proto-historicity":

> It is clear that [by] a priori [we mean]: I have world in my world-horizon. Thus I have not only the factual, final and horizonless world, but also my *in infinitum* feasible world as a world of possible experience, within the scope of endless possibilities about how my world could be (...) *in infinitum* unknown. (HuaD XXXIX, 56-57, 31-3)[65].

Needless to say, Husserl is thinking here in the conditions of possibility for historicity, for which he postulates actuality and possibility. This is still a philosophical and, moreover, transcendental description of time[66], but is not what we are after. In the life-world, persons meet neither the essences of actualities and possibilities nor proto-historicity itself. One must

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[64] "…und die Möglichkeit verweist hier einerseits auf frühere Stiftung durch Ich-Akte in diesem spezifischen Sinn, andererseits auf eine freie Aktivität der Enthüllung der Horizonte, auf das Vermögen der Subjekte…" (HuaD XXXIX, 4, 7-10)

[65] "*A priori* ist klar: Habe ich Welt in meinem Welthorizont, so habe ich nicht nur die faktische, endliche und mit Horizont behafteteWelt, sondern auch meine *in infinitum* konstruierbare Welt als Welt möglicher Erfahrungen im Spielraum einer Unendlichkeit von Möglichkeiten, wie meineWelt sein könnte (…) *in infinitum* unbekannt". (HuaD XXXIX, 56-57, 31-3)

[66] Even further, Husserl speaks also about an aprioristic anthropology (Cf. HuaD XXXIX, 57, 28-33).

perform the phenomenological reduction in order to do so, which is by definition the bracketing of the life-world itself. It is then not proto-historicity what concerns us, but rather historicity as such. But we may take a step further and claim that, more than historicity, it is history what persons experience in the life-world. In words of Husserl: "History is thus not an arbitrary part of the cultural world, but rather a part of the growing and constitutive action of humanity…" (HuaD XXXIX, 539, 12-14)[67].

We reach then to the conclusion that future is, in the context of the life-world, strongly linked to history. As Landgrebe stresses, "...the life-world is nothing else but the concrete historical world with all of its traditions and, among them, its changing representations..."[68] (1975, p. 182). Landgrebe refers to tradition, which is not an extraneous term in Husserlian jargon, however, he offers us a rather interesting way of considering it. Husserl often relates tradition with habituality (Cf. HuaD XXXIX, 58, 28-30), which might give the impression that tradition has to do only with whIch we are familiarized. But Landgrebe reminds us that change is another form of tradition, thusly avoiding a conservative comprehension of it[69]. Following Landgrebe, we encounter once again the poles of the familiar and the alien. In the future we might either contribute to a perpetuation of what is already known for us or we might produce a rather different scenario. Future history might reproduce the already existent state of affairs, but it might as well produce something completely new, whether it is at a personal or a collective level.

It is of the utmost importance to foreground here the productive character in which the future is to be understood. We have been talking along this section of motivations, goals, praxes, *fiat* and oughts, and there is no reason to exclude future and history from this conceptual constellation. After all, as Melle (2014) stresses, acts are always the fulfillment of volitive intentions. This may seem somewhat unnecessary to point out, however, we must insist in this respect, in order to specify how is the subjectivity of our investigation constituted. When Husserl says that possibility (and hence future and history) is a disclosure of horizons, we must be careful not to think of these horizons as preset states of affairs to which we must

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[67] "Die Historie ist also nicht ein beliebiges Stück der Kulturwelt, sondern ist eine in der Menschheit erwachsende konstitutive Leistung…" (HuaD XXXIX, 539, 12-14)

[68] "El mundo de la vida no es sino el mundo histórico con todas sus tradiciones y, entre ellas, sus representaciones cambiantes…" (Landgrebe, 1975, p. 182)

[69] Landgrebe's remark is not adverse to Husserl's account of tradition and history, but rather it helps us to clarify it. We must not forget that Husserl conceives the life-world as the place where infinite possibilities are feasible.

somehow gain access. Future and history is not something that is awaiting us, it is not a fate or a promise, but rather something that we produce in the process of acting in the life-world.

From a logical standpoint, Zhok (2016) remarks that "...the truism, that if something is *real* (actual) then it must be *possible*, should be indisputably granted only a posteriori." (p. 231). After this examination of the life-world ontology, we may paraphrase him by concluding that, more than a temporal condition for action, future is what results out of action. Better yet, history is not the condition for the praxes and performances with which persons engage, but rather history is the result of the engagement of persons with praxial and performative lives.

Now that we have exhausted that body, action, and future manifest in the life-world as person, praxis and history, let us go back to images. In the following and last section, we will examine the constitution of subjectivity that images enable in the light of what we have found in this chapter.

Subjects of Images

In the last two sections of the second chapter we divided images into two groups, depending on whether they have or not an existing image subject. We also determined that such a distinction is always provisional, since a non-existent image subject is not the same as an ever-non-existent one. More than fixed and unique entities, image subjects are empty positions that anyone (or anything) can occupy. As we have already put it, a non-existent image subject is really an image subject yet to exist. It is important, however, not to think that such a distinction is superfluous. In this last section, we will return to some remarks that we obtained by making the already stated distinction (of course, without ignoring its provisionality) and obtain therefrom some final conclusions.

As part of the first group of images, we saw examples coming from four main praxes: science, anthropology, politics and art. Let us begin by referring to the scientific uses of images. From what we examined, the three main uses that images have in science are evidence, prediction and intervention. All of these functions are mutually related. Having something as evidence of the repetition of a natural event is what allows me to establish it under the form of a law or a principle, which ultimately helps us to predict the course of future events of the same kind. And it is thanks to this that I am able to intervene in nature with an anticipated knowledge of the results.

What we must observe here is that, within the scientific praxis, the existence of image subjects is frequently taken for granted. If we translate this into the terms that we developed in the last section, it becomes evident that the scientific use of images tends to be more on the familiar side than on the alien one. Evidence and prediction of natural events presuppose the existence of the things involved in such evidenced and predicted events, that is to say, it presupposes some degree of familiarity with such things. When Dyson demonstrated Einstein's theory by photographing the eclipse (Fig. 17), things such as the Moon, the Sun, the Earth, a beam of light formed already part of his familiar world. Moreover, when such familiarity reaches a maximum degree, images of natural things are taken directly as things themselves. This is precisely the case of surgeries performed by looking not at the body, but at its image (Fig. 22b).

The aforesaid, however, does not exclude the possibility of an alien character of images in their scientific usage. Discoveries of entities that were never postulated by theory are always a possibility, which is nothing more than the experience of the alien by means of images. This is better illustrated with the cases that we examined of Careri's explorations to the American continent (Fig. 23). For the European reader of Careri's books, the visualization of new cultures was a confrontation with the *par excellence* alien version of others. But it is important to take into account that these images circulate in contexts where the existence of their corresponding image subjects is more or less presupposed. If we see an image of something completely unknown for us in a scientific journal or in an ethnologic study, we will see certainly something alien, yet within the boundaries of what we may consider familiar. The same familiarity applies for those cases that we studied concerning politics. The depiction of political leaders as enlightened personalities and as continuities of past political discourses (Fig. 24) is an effective mechanism insofar as one identifies such leaders as existing persons. And such presupposition of existence is even more necessary when people destroy images of political figures in order to protest against them (Fig. 25, 26).

Let us not forget the other praxis involved in this first group, i.e. art. Specifically, we studied examples in which artists produced images of images, which is yet another case of a praxis carried out within the context of familiarity. The fact that Francis Bacon painted his own version of Velazquez's painting of Pope Innocent X (Fig. 27a) indicates that the former was succeeding the artistic lineage of the latter. No matter how much did Bacon defied Velazquez's artistic canons, he worked in a millennial tradition of human praxis that we call 'art'. In other words, whenever an artist makes images of past images, the pictorial praxis is

being perpetuated as a tradition in the life-world. Of course, art does much more than this, but let us hold this discussion for our reexamination of the second group of images.

Evidently, images from the first group contribute to the life-world subjectivity insofar they enable praxes belonging to the familiar world. Even when an image introduces an alien element within a given praxis, such element is immediately incorporated into a context of familiarity. In these cases, images set and preset the way in which persons bestow sense upon those things rendered visible by images, which has epistemological and ethical consequences. Every image of the most distant regions of universe pushes the boundaries of familiarity and its "...intentional sense *qua* limit of the alien…" (HuaD XXXIX, 188, 22-23)[70], and exactly the same happens with images of the most minuscule regions of nature. Ethically speaking, images lead to the assignment of functions to both familiar and alien. Through "...family documents, inherited family "memories", the public monuments…" (HuaD XXXIX, 177, 25-26)[71] persons create the sense of belonging to a family, a society, a nation, and so on. Public and private images define who I am for others and who the others are for me, even those who I do not know personally. Both the family photo album and the monuments in the city build up an idea of my personal, ethnic, political and national origins. On the other hand, images of those who do not participate in my familiar world reinforce my belonging to a group and may as well form prejudices about them (Fig. 32).

There is obviously a myriad of examples that we can analyze in this respect, but in all of them one thing becomes evident: the tendency towards familiarity. It is crucial not to think that this tendency implies a praxial stagnation. On the contrary, the ongoing effort to make the alien become familiar is what set praxes in motion or, in even more general terms, what enables such thing as a natural attitude (Sepp, 2004). Images are not a mere archive of what is both known and unknown for us, rather they are objects throughout which we find ourselves performing "...motivated activities that address the given from the horizon of its questionability; more, these activities are meaningful only as responses to the questionability of the given." (Dodd, 2004, p.155). In this sense, images of this first group unveil that familiarity does not exclude the creation of new states of affairs. Moreover, these images are constituents of praxes through which persons raise new questions and bestow new meanings upon the world, questions and meanings that do not cease of being produced, reproduced, reformulated, denied, and, finally, defining paths for history.

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[70] "…seinen intentionalen Sinn als Limes der Ferne…" (HuaD XXXIX, 188, 22-23)

[71] "…Familiendokumente, ererbte Familien-„Andenken", die öffentlichen Denkmäler…" (HuaD XXXIX, 177, 25-26)

Before passing to the second group of images, it is important to remark something that we have been observing since the last chapter. Regardless of the dependance of the apprehension of images upon transcendental structures, the subjectivity that they constitute is not equally transcendental. After exploring some ontological structures of the life-world, not only do we know that the constitution of subjectivity enabled by images does not occur at a transcendental level, but also that we cannot speak of a single and universal constituted subjectivity. Whilst the transcendental subject has well-defined structures and sense bestowals, the life-world person is deeply characterized by a wide diversity of particularities. Moreover, personhood is a composite of a multitude of non-reducible to each other features (praxes, interests, expectations, histories, relationships). Besides, persons always belong to a specific culture, which inscribes them in historical, traditional and ethical systems. Hence, every single example of images that we can draw is inevitably linked to cultural variables that determine their causes and consequences in the life-world experience. Even though it is not the aim of this investigation to develop a history, anthropology or sociology of images, we must not obviate the tremendous relevance that cultural codes have in further analyses of specific praxes and images. This being said, let us continue with the second group of images.

Our examination of images with non-existent image subjects began with *tableaux vivants*, which led us immediately to identify the most evident expression of the way in which images conduct subjective actions, i.e. actualization. Actualizing an image is nothing else than becoming its image subject or, furthermore, is becoming subjected to the image. As a consequence of this, we determined that images project subjects towards the future.

Let us now think the aforesaid in the same terms with which we approached the first group of images. Actualization can be performed both with images with already existent image subjects and images with image subjects yet to exist. In the first case, the actualization places the subject in the position of alterity, just as we saw with Ai Weiwei's actualization of the photograph of the dead infant Syrian migrant Aylan Kurdi (Fig. 34). Given that it is through the body that I encounter the other not as a re-presentation, but as a presence (Herra, 1972), actualizing an image is a way for persons to abandon their self-familiarity and embrace (at least partially) an alien existence. On the other hand, when the actualization is performed on the basis of an image with a non-existing image subject, the alien is not something that persons adopt, but rather something they produce. This was precisely the case of the actualization of architectural and engineering plans (Fig. 35, 35) or the installation that artist Guillermo Boehler made from his very own collage (Fig. 37).

In general terms, whilst images from the first group orient persons towards familiarity, images from the second group are a way for persons to get in touch with the alien side of world and experience. This is yet another mechanism by means of which the subjectivity constituted by images contributes to the course or, better yet, to the production of history. By actualizing images, persons incorporate to the actual world things that at some point existed only as idealities. This intensifies in those cases when something completely inexistent in the life-world becomes actualized. By 1927 Fritz Lang's images of a living humanoid machine were nothing but sheer phantasies (Fig. 41a). Ninety years later, United Nations Deputy Secretary Amina J. Mohammed asked Sophia the robot at a UN meeting what could the organization do to help people with limited access to internet and electricity around the world (Fig. 41b), to which Sophia replied

> "...the future is already here. It's just not very evenly distributed [...]," quoting renowned science fiction writer William Gibson. "If we are smarter and focused on win-win type of results, A.I. [artificial intelligence] could help proficiently distribute the world's existing resources like food and energy." (UN News, 2017).

Fig. 41: Artificial intelligence: (a) Fritz Lang. Metropolis (1927) (stills from the motion picture). Universum Films, (b) UN Photo/Elias Manuel. Photographs of The Future of Everything UN meeting (2017)

Nobody typed an answer for Sophia to respond after hearing the question, neither did someone activated her movements. Everything was accomplished by the most careful and state of the art algorithms and engineering procedures, which was precisely how Lang foresaw it possible in *Metropolis*. What once was only a part of the history of art and cinema became part of human history overall. Better yet, by actualizing images, possibilities were transformed into history.

Holding a conversation with an embodied machine is something that still seems somewhat odd or, in Husserlian terms, it introduces an alien event into our life-world

experience. After decades, we are still struggling to accommodate the interaction with robots as part of our familiar world, which shows how images and their corresponding actualizations can have a disruptive presence in the life-world.

At this point we must return to Blumenberg's conception of the life-world as the place where no bewilderment takes place. According to the author

> The uncanny and unusual that appears in the life-world, precisely because it appears and presents itself in such medium, turns strange; it creates the distance whose conversion into attitude provokes what is not desired: the neutralization [of the uncanny and unusual] as an object of contemplation, of the mere spectator, of problematization, doubt, discussion.[72] (Blumenberg, 2013, p. 75).

However the life-world experience consists in making the alien become familiar, there are things and events that cannot be so easily assimilated *qua* familiar. It is in such cases when persons cease to operate inertially with their life-world praxes and are forced to assume a bewildered position towards that which appears so uncanny and unusual. To put it in the most general terms, Blumenberg refers to a confrontation of the experience of sameness (the life-world) with the experience of otherness (what bewilder us) or, better yet, with the experience of difference.

Following Blumenberg, we meet the ultimate relationship between images and subjectivity, i.e. the rupture of experience. Images and actualizations are produced within the life-world, that is to say, they are a product of personal and collective praxes; nonetheless, they can occasionally turn against the life-world familiarity itself. In these scenarios, subjectivity turns into an evaluation of past and present experience and history, which also turns us inevitably to questions regarding what will become of them.

Of course, not every single image puts us in a destabilizing situation, however, disruptive images have never ceased to appear throughout history. Some of the most improbable imaginations have been actualized and seeing that happening always results a mesmerizing event. But images do not have to necessarily depict fantastic scenarios in order to make us experience difference. Pictures from concrete and actual reality can also halt our life-world experience and force us to question and assess it. This is the case of images that depict cruel and violent events. Every time wars, military occupations, violent protests,

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[72] "Lo insólito e inusual que aparece en el mundo de la vida, precisamente porque aparece y se presenta en ese medio, lo torna extraño, genera la distancia cuya conversión en actitud provoca lo no deseado: la neutralización como objeto de contemplación, del mero espectador, de problematización, de duda, de discusión." (Blumenberg, 2013, p. 75).

massacres and events of this kind are broadcasted, there is little of transcendental subjectivity or of life-world personhood that can assign a complete familiarity to them.

In reference to the images of the 9/11 Attacks, Mondzain stresses: "The violence of the visible has no other foundation than the abolition, intentional or not, of thought and judgement."[73] (2016, pp. 45-46). Such lack of thought and judgement is what brakes our experience when we meet violence in images, which at the same time arises our questioning of the world that we as persons integrate. Moreover, they also arise the question of whether these are the images whose actualization we desire. And the same holds for the fictionalization of violence. Movies, series, photographs, works of art, and videogames[74] render us visible on a daily basis episodes of violence that might result somewhat disturbing and even out of this world. This opens an enormous debate on whether this images are to be so easily and widely spread in the public space. Therein underlies a great social fear concerning nothing else than the actualization of these images, albeit most of them have been already actualized without us even noticing it.

On the other side, the dislocation of experience that some images provoke can be utilized as an opportunity for visiting history under an alternative scope and thusly renovating our relationships between past, present and future. With the invention of photography, history became visibly transmittable, which has provided us with an extensive amount of documentations of the most traumatic events in recent human history. Regarding four photographs of Auschwitz that an anonymous prisoner took of the human annihilation that therein took place, Georges Didi-Hubeman claims: "And this is precisely how the image touches time: by deconstructing the narratives, the "historicist" chronicles, it becomes capable of a "critical realism", that is, a power to judge history, to bring to surface what survives a hidden time…" (2012, p.176). Therefore, adverse as it may result, apprehending experience-disrupting images of history is a powerful way to create new interpretations of past events, which simultaneously delineates new approaches to present and future history.

It may seem that only violent or shocking images turn out to be disruptive, however, there is one final case that we must not overlook. Let us return to the examples that initiated our investigation and observe how images can turn out to be disruptive not because of *what* they depict, but because of *how* they depict. By studying paintings like Arrieta's (Fig. 3) and Rodríguez's (Fig. 9, 10, 13), we came to the conclusion that, besides the conflict between

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[73] "La violencia de lo visible no tiene otro fundamento que la abolición, intencional o no, del pensamiento y del juicio". (Mondzain, 2016, pp. 45-46)
[74] For a Husserlian account on videogames, see De Warren (2014).

the three components of image consciousness, there is a much broader conflict between image consciousness and perception. Whenever an image pushes us to the edge of perception and undermines our habitual notions of how things are to be seen, we find ourselves in yet another disruption of experience. Not being able to perform kinaestheses with certain image objects leaves their corresponding images in a state of suspense and, moreover, leaves our experience in a state of equal suspense.

We stated at the end of the first chapter that images broaden our experience of the material world, insofar they make us realize that seeing them is more than merely perceiving them. Now, we may add that this cannot occur without a certain degree of bewilderment, of which this investigation might be the ultimate proof. If it were not for the destabilization of experience that certain images provoke, no phenomenology and no philosophy of images would be necessary. If the blue circle in Arrieta's *Episodio #1* (Fig. 3) would not raise the question concerning what lies behind it or, better yet, if there is even something behind it, no reflections on adumbrations and kinaestheses would have been necessary. Because Mata's *Haciendo un paisaje* (Fig. 6) or Rodríguez's untitled painting (Fig. 13a) leave unanswered the question regarding what is in the front and what is in the background, we turned from an investigation on images to an investigation on a subjectivity that apprehends, interprets and enacts images.

As it has been usual throughout this inquiry, examples outnumber the attained conclusions. But, in spite of the impossibility to attend all possible examples, it becomes evident that the notions of body, action and future and their life-world correlates of person, praxis and history are at the center of what we have been calling all along a constitution of subjectivity. Whether it is by perpetuating the familiar world, turning alien experiences into familiar ones, or placing us in the borders of uncertainty and difference, the incorporation of images to our experience contribute to the inscription of our bodies and actions not in the anticipation of a future, but in multiple productions of futures. This is also inseparable from our historical existence. Images always concern the personal and interpersonal praxes that we sustain as part of traditions and ruptures, two movements that contribute to the march of history.

As part of his vast phenomenological project, Husserl's account of images addressed the question concerning how does consciousness apprehend images. In this investigation, we asked instead how do images constitute subjectivity, which led us to explore what do we do with images and what do images do with us. In order to achieve this, we took the model of image consciousness as a departure point and established a series of relationships with

other regions of Husserl's thought. After passing through perception and logic, we finally came to the life-world and realized that the ontological structures of this stratum of existence are the ones that images affect the most.

Such a transition from epistemological considerations on images to a rather cultural and historical approach to them is something that Husserlian philosophy favored quite easily. Thanks to the author's notion of an embodied, multilayered (ranging from transcendality to the life-world), and time constituted and constituting subjectivity, we were able to determine that images convert bodies into persons, actions into praxes, and future into history. Moreover, Husserlian phenomenology showed us that it is not only the image-thing, the image object and the image subject what define the existence of images, but also the things, objects and subjects that come into play side by side with images in the world. It is out of the entanglement of images, lives and worlds that we are constituted as subjects of images.

CONCLUSION

Husserl was careful enough to identify that a philosophical reflection on images must depart from the recognition of the equivocity of the term 'image'. In the most immediate level, 'image' designates a virtual infinity of entities that have accompanied humankind from the earliest stages of its history. But it is not only because of the extension of the term that we must predicate equivocity of it. As Husserl's model of image consciousness showed us, the intension of 'image' is threefold, i.e. image-thing, image object and image subject. Moreover, images are fluctuations between multiple stages of conscious life, at whose intersections subjectivities are constituted. Let us recapitulate our findings on the subject.

Our first approach to the question concerning the subjectivity that images constitute consisted in the demarcation of the limits between image consciousness and perception. Certainly, this is a question that belongs to what we may consider an epistemology of images, however, it took us also to some ontological remarks. In order to describe the apprehension that consciousness makes of images, we examined their modes of givenness. We found thus that images are able to detach themselves from perception and, furthermore, that they dictate their own perceptive regime. As a consequence of this, the existence of an image has no engagement whatsoever with the actual existence of a corresponding image subject. With all this in mind, we came to the conclusion that every image is absolute.

At the end of the first chapter, it became evident that the particular phenomenological status of images confers a tremendous power on them. Thusly stated, it would seem like images render subjectivity powerless, leaving no other choice for subjects than becoming spectators. By studying how do subjects bestow sense upon images, we determined in the second chapter that passivity is not the only possible condition. More specifically, we analyzed Husserl's assertion that judgements about image objects are neither true nor false, but possible. Deepening into this idea, we finally came to the conclusion that the apprehension of an image object is nothing else than the apprehension of the possibility of experiencing it as an actual object.

Later in the second chapter, we observed that, since image objects are ideal objects, bestowing sense upon images implies a transposition of subjectivity from the ideal stratum of existence to the empirical one. By querying how is such a transition possible, we determined the active side of subjects before images. However unbound to the empirical world idealities may be, subjects can always draw them into the actual world by means of corporeal actions or, as we called them, actualizations. The analysis of various cases of

actualization proved us that, more than spectators, images constitute agents in a wide variety of fields. This active subjectivity is fulfilled according to two main operations. On the one hand, images determine and predetermine subjective experiences of the actual things that they depict; on the other hand, subjects become the image subjects of images. At the end of the second chapter, we defined three main features of the subjectivity that images constitute, i.e. body, action and future. The incorporation of images into the subjective experience sets all three components in motion, thusly constituting an enactive and projective kind of subjectivity.

Even though our access to images was Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, by the end of the second chapter we met with practices of scarce transcendental relevance, such as science, politics, art, and others. Given that it is in the life-world where all of the examined cases of actualizations take place, we addressed in the last chapter the life-world ontology in order to adjust our conclusions to more adequate terms. We found out that body, action and future manifest in the life-world as person, praxis and history. As a part of the life-world experience, images contribute to our constitution as persons engaged with the development of praxes and the production of history.

On the other hand, we foregrounded two poles in the midst of which every life-world event fluctuates, i.e. the familiar and the alien. We returned to the actualization of images and determined that there are three ways according to which this operation takes place in the life-world. First, actualizing images may help us to perpetuate our familiar world by guiding us through actions that do not interrupt the steady flow of experiences. Second, there are images whose actualization introduces an alien element in experience that will gradually be incorporated as part of the familiar world. In the third place, we find images whose actualization will never cease to result somewhat alien to our experience or, as we also put it, images that will always disrupt to some degree our experience.

After completing this investigation, there is no doubt that the question concerning the subjectivity that images constitute is better answered by asking simultaneously in which stratum of existence is such subjectivity constituted. The fact that Husserl addressed both transcendentality and the life-world as part of his philosophical endeavor helps us to give a much more detailed account of how images and subjectivity are related. As any other objects of intuition, images have particular modes of givenness, which at the same time prescribes a particular modality of consciousness. However, it is not until we consider images as part of the life-world experience that we are able to observe more clearly that the constituted subjectivities are of praxial, social, political, and cultural orders.

It is worth noticing that, just because the subjectivity constituted by images has a much more evident manifestation in the life-world, our transcendental stage of investigation is not superfluous. Knowing that images contribute to higher order formations of conscious life such as society, politics, and culture, we can go back to our outcomes from the first and second chapter and reconsider them under such scopes.

One of the most interesting conclusions to which we arrived in the first chapter concerns the capability that images have of defying perception. Within the Husserlian frame, this has of course a great epistemological relevance, however, if one associates this idea with other philosophical works, new and interesting lines of research may arise. Following Rancière's (2006) notion of the distribution of the sensible, according to which an assortment of sensible capabilities and qualities underlies every political action, it is possible to continue our reflection on images under a much more political scope. Given this strong link between aesthetics and politics, images take part in political scenarios both as instruments for impositions of sensible distributions and as mechanisms of dissent before these impositions. Political actions often determine what is to be seen and what is not, how are things to be seen and how not, which is precisely at the core of the visualizations carried out by images.

Of course, an investigative initiative like the aforementioned would force us to find out in the first place how to connect Husserlian and Rancièrian philosophies or, even further, to determine if they are connectable at all. Phenomenological initiatives such as Jean-Luc Nancy's (2005), Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's (1989), Marie-Jose Mondzain's (2004, 2016) or James Dodd's (2009, 2017) might be a first point of encounter between the phenomenology of images and other traditions of political thought.

At the same time, our findings in regards to perception result quite valuable if one wants to enhance epistemologically lines of research such as visual and cultural studies, theory of image, and history of art. Husserl's take on images endows these fields with a robust conceptual apparatus, which might result into interchanges with other paths of investigation that are not usually associated with the cultural and political side of images. In this respect, our reflection on the coincidences and distances between perception and image consciousness might easily dialogue with cognitive and psychological investigations on the subject, such as Van Buren and Scholl's (2018). On the other hand, the embodied character of subjectivity that we find in Husserl constitutes an interesting intersection with research on embodied cognition where images play an important role like the ones edited by Hampe and Grady (2005).

Logic is perhaps the most unsuspected field with which this investigation coped. Within logics, images are frequently discarded as objects of study, insofar they are not considered as bearers of veritative values. However, this should not be an obstacle for studying images from a logical point of view. Just as we did in the second chapter, the incorporation of logics into the study of images is possible by attending to the judgements that we make of them. Hence, our logical considerations on images might become a pathway for those who want to relate Husserlian philosophy with analytic approaches to art and aesthetics (especially those motivated by works such as Goodman's (1976) or Danto's (1981)).

Evidently, the conclusions of this investigation contribute to a variety of fields outside Husserlian studies, which reveals how relevant is the author's thought in the contemporary philosophical context. But let us go back to our very own investigation, in order to make some final remarks.

Our main question was "How do images constitute subjectivity?". At the beginning of this final section, we summed up the most important features of both images and subjectivity that we managed to determine. But the question with which we started this inquiry concerned not only the description of images and subjectivities, but also a way in which the former cause a particular configuration of the latter. In other words, we sought to describe both that which becomes constituted and the constitution as such. After passing through various levels of Husserlian philosophy, it becomes evident that, in the context of images, constitution always occur under the form of a transition. Subjectivities are constituted by images insofar they make us go through different stages.

The first transition that we undergo takes place from the very apprehension of an image. With his notion of conflict, Husserl indicates how images takes us from their bare materiality to something that, in spite of becoming visible by material means, exists not as an actual thing. But then we suffer yet another passage when that which becomes visible launches us back to actuality, where we are supposed to find something that the image depicts. Second, there is the transition that occurs when we shift from the ideality to the actuality of the life-world by means of actualizations of images. Finally, within the life-world, images make us move between different praxes, social groups, identities, and others. Thus, images constitute us as subjects insofar they subject us to multiple transpositions, the most general of which is the one that goes from consciousness to action.

Investigating from a Husserlian point of view brought us to some interesting remarks. However, it is not the internal consistency within the author's thought what determines the

validity of our conclusions, but rather their consistency with our world and our experience of it. This being said, do images truly constitute subjectivities in the contemporary context or, better yet, in our life-worlds?

A first reason to respond affirmatively to the aforestated question resides in all of the examples that we examined. Not only have the mentioned praxes maintained their use of images, but also such usage has grown over time. Let us briefly mention three cases that occurred during 2019. First, one of the major scientific events of this year consisted in the production of an image of the black hole that stands at the center of Messier 87 galaxy, which gathered hundreds of researchers around the world. Second, October 25th the most crowded political protest of the year in Latin America took place in Santiago, Chile. Nearly a million people went to the streets protesting against both past governmental measures and the President's call for a state of emergency accompanied by a harsh presence of military forces. The protests were centered in Baquedano Square, where the image of a military figure of Chilean history stands. Needless to say, the monument was not the only image therein present, but a myriad of banners made by protesters and, of course, an extensive amount of live footage shot by TV cameras and cell phones. Third, on the side of fiction, *Joker* (one of the most anticipated motion pictures of the year) caused both expectancy and fear. The FBI even asked local police departments in the US to stay alert outside movie theaters, in case anyone would decide to actualize the latest version of Batman's villain. Whether it is under the form of scientists, political agents or anti-establishment social outcasts, images keep on functioning today as a means for constituting subjectivities.

The last examples are just three from many others that we can recall in order to confirm our conclusions, but it is not necessary to exhaust all of them. Suffice it to say that the enormous quantity of examples that proves the relevance of our conclusions is due to the contemporary profusion of imaging techniques. On the one hand, a vast majority of people can nowadays produce an image at any time in just a second by pressing a button. On the other hand, we often live with more than one device where images are constantly circulating, being shared, edited and transformed, which might as well be said of us subjects.

Finally, there is yet another reason to confirm our conclusions, however, it is not precisely what we may call *stricto sensu* an argumental proof. The Husserlian notion of possibility showed us that the production of that which is possible occurs in its enunciation or, in the case of images, in its visualization. This means that an image is not a description of something previously undetermined, but rather determinations themselves of indeterminacies. But such a determination does not seem to be completely fulfilled until the

actualization of the image occurs. By actualizing images, the possible is proven actual and the undetermined is proven determinable. This is something that we already knew, something about which we could write pages and pages with arguments and never proving actually anything, because the only way to prove actualizations is by performing them. The ultimate proof that we may give of the actuality of this investigation will have always have the form of future actions, ones that create experience out of possibility and, hopefully, as well out of the impossible.

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