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dc.creatorCrespi, John M.
dc.creatorChacón Cascante, Adriana
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-10T20:19:39Z
dc.date.available2018-08-10T20:19:39Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.citationhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/agr.10081es_ES
dc.identifier.issn1520-6297
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10669/75342
dc.description.abstractThis review tests the conventional wisdom that U.S. marketing orders act as profit-maximizing cartels. It analyzes the marketing order for U.S. almonds in both the domestic and export markets. Such a case study is relevant to all U.S. marketing orders because the size and scope of the U.S. almond industry and the authority granted to a board of producers by the almond marketing order would seem to be conducive to profit-maximizing cartel behavior. Nevertheless, the authors find that the market power exerted by the Almond Board of California is significantly less than would be expected from a profit-maximizing cartel.es_ES
dc.language.isoen_USes_ES
dc.rightsCC0 1.0 Universal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/*
dc.sourceAgribusiness, Vol. 20(1), pp.1-26es_ES
dc.subjectCarteles_ES
dc.subjectMarket poweres_ES
dc.subjectMarketing orderses_ES
dc.subjectPrice leadershipes_ES
dc.subjectTradees_ES
dc.titleDo U.S. marketing orders have much market power? An examination of the Almond Board of Californiaes_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/agr.10081
dc.description.procedenceUCR::Docencia::Ciencias Agroalimentarias::Facultad de Ciencias Agroalimentarias::Escuela de Economía Agrícola y Agronegocioses_ES


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CC0 1.0 Universal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as CC0 1.0 Universal