Frege’s puzzle and the a priori
In this paper I offer a reconstruction of Stavroula Glezakos’ claim that there is no Frege’s puzzle. I identify the main theses doing the philosophical work in her argument and examine a possible difficulty: her argument may have the consequence of ruling out all a priori knowledge. I try to dispel the difficulty and restore her argument. En este artículo ofrezco una reconstrucción de la defensa de Stavroula Glezakos de que no hay un puzzle de Frege. Identifico las tesis principales, elaborando una reconstrucción filosófica de su argumento, y examino una dificultad posible: su argumento puede tener la consecuencia de excluir todo conocimiento a priori. Intento disipar la dificultad y restaurar su argumento.
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