POLITICAL CONFLICT AND DEMOCRATIZATION PATTERNS

EFFECTS ON PARTY NATIONALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Ronald Alfaro-Redondo
Correo electrónico: ralfaro@estadonacion.or.cr

Recibido 11/06/2012 – Aceptado 14/06/2012

Resumen

La homogenización del apoyo electoral a los partidos políticos, también llamada nacionalización de los partidos políticos, es un factor clave en los sistemas democráticos. En este documento se examina el impacto del contexto y variables intra-partidarias en la explicación de los patrones de nacionalización partidaria en América Latina. En las décadas de 1980 y 1990, varios países en la región experimentaron transiciones a la democracia. A pesar de existen similitudes en estos procesos, el proceso de democratización seguido por el país y la prevalencia de conflictos políticos son dos factores que restringen la nacionalización de los partidos. Concretamente, entre más fragmentado sea el sistema de partidos políticos y a mayor diversidad en la composición demográfica del país, menos nacionalizados son los partidos políticos. Estos resultados son robustos estadísticamente incluso cuando se controla por otros factores temporales y contextuales.

Palabras clave: partidos políticos, elecciones, nacionalización de los partidos políticos, fragmentación política

Abstract

Increasing the homogeneity of a party’s support across the nation - party nationalization- is a key concern to democracies. This paper
tests the impact of country and intra-party variables in explaining party nationalization changes in Latin America. During the early 1980s and 1990s, several Latin American countries experienced transitions to democracy. Although there are similarities in this process, both the democratization pattern followed by the country and the prevalence of civil conflict decrease the nationalization of parties. In addition, the more fragmented the political party system and the more diverse the ethnic composition of the country the less nationalized the political parties. These results are robust even when controlling for time and other contextual effects.

**Keywords:** political parties, elections, party nationalization, democratization patterns, political fragmentation.

### Introduction

Party nationalization has implications in democracies. It affects partisan behavior, government priorities, and democratic consolidation. When political party’s electoral returns are homogeneous across the country these parties are considered nationalized, otherwise party’s support is much more localized or regionalized. In terms of its implications, nationalized parties are more capable of aggregating social demands and implementing a broad spectrum of policies whereas local parties are prisoners of parochial initiatives for attracting voters.

But what factors modify significantly political parties’ geographical electoral support patterns in the long term? According to scholars only major social changes such as post-industrialization, civil war, depression, or massive population shifts, alter political party’s patterns considerably. I argue that there are other two main factors to take into account for explaining party nationalization in Latin America. Using time series cross sectional analysis, this paper examines the impact of civil conflicts and democratization patterns in explaining party nationalization changes in Latin America over the last sixty years (1950-2010). An important focus of the paper is to distinguish among factors that explain differences between parties, among countries, and across elections and time. I address the following main questions: Do democratization patterns and civil conflicts influence party nationalization? If so, how do they work? Specifically, I study the following questions: To what extent democratization trends and political instability in

---

Latin America have modified considerably political parties’ support patterns in the territory? Are there noticeable differences in party nationalization depending on democratization patterns and political instability?

In this research paper I argue that besides country factors, civil conflicts and democratization patterns contribute to understand party nationalization levels in Latin America. Concretely, I expect that the level of party nationalization decreases in context where civil conflicts have prevailed as a result of the political polarization during conflicts. Additionally, in those countries where democratization has been a back and forth process between authoritarianism and democracy, the distribution of parties’ electoral support is less homogeneous across districts as well.

Latin America is a good laboratory to study the effect of civil conflict on party nationalization because at several times countries in the region were involved in cruel internal conflicts. In spite of political instability and regardless of significant democratic progress over the last two decades in the region, the effects of both factors have been ignored in most of the literature. This oversimplification has ignored two key elements. First, the impact of civil conflicts in politics in the long run and second, the fact that democratization pathways varies remarkably by country. I claim that political instability and democratization pattern have negative effects on party nationalization scores. In striking contrast to most of the previous research on Latin American political parties’ performance, this paper seeks to overcome these limitations.

I examine the factors that determine the extent to what political parties in Latin America get more electoral support in some districts than others. The empirical data in this paper include exhaustive and systematic comparisons of party nationalization level across the entire region. Data show interesting inter- and intra-country differences in terms of geographic distribution of the parties’ vote.

This paper assumes that party nationalization is a prominent issue because the way in which democracy is shaped in the region depends on the nature of the political system of each country. Examining party nationalization scores is a salient issue for several key reasons. Firstly, fluctuations in the partisan distribution of the vote affect partisan behavior and government priorities. According to Aleman and Kellam, elections that are decided on local issues tend to make congressional parties a composite of different parochial
interest, and make harder the task of forming a legislative majority behind policy proposals that have a national scope. Nationalized electorates, in contrast, can strengthen parties despite electoral rules that emphasize personal characteristics (the personal vote) or decentralized candidate nomination procedures. Likewise, others suggest that under nationalized party system, public policy is more likely to be oriented toward the national common good. Conversely, elections that are decided on local issues require that the parties be flexible enough to adapt their programs to local realities.

Secondly, scholars argue that the nationalization of parties has a direct effect on the success of democratic consolidation and preserving democracy in countries with deep ethnic or national cleavages. Thirdly, identifying patterns of electoral change at the sub-national level can help scholars better understand national electoral volatility, electoral incentives, and executive strategies.

The structure of the document is as follows: the second section is dedicated to portrait the core characteristics of literature about party nationalization and my hypotheses for understanding electoral returns patterns in the region. Likewise, I provide methodological details about my data, unit of analysis, and model selection in the third section. Descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis results are fully depicted in the fourth section. Lastly, I present my conclusions.

**Literature on Party Nationalization**

Political parties are indispensable to the operation of democratic political systems. Chhibber and Kollman define a national party system as one in

---


which party systems at the constituency level, or at the state level or provincial levels, look similar to national party systems. This broad definition has encompassed two main concepts of nationalization: convergence in the level of partisan support across the nation, and uniform response of the different sub-units to political forces. In sum, as Ishiyama affirms party nationalization reveals to extent to which party politics locally mirrors party politics nationally. Consequently, party nationalization is high if party support is equally distributed across the territory of a country. Thus, a political party that is perfectly nationalized would be equally strong in all territorial units of a country, no matter how they are drawn.

A substantial body of literature has explored the different dimensions of civil conflicts. Some scholars investigate the causes of civil wars, their severity as well as their definition and diverse manifestations. Others focus on estimating the macroeconomic costs, the health impacts in the society, and the fiscal consequences associated with them. Another issue that has been driven scholars' attention is the duration an outcome of civil conflicts.

In contrast, here I examine the political impacts of civil conflicts on parties’ electoral support. Some scholars emphasize that the existence of political parties with uniform electoral support across geographical space is strongly linked to political

---

conflicts. Social or political cleavages are habitually the main source of party affiliation or party identification in societies\(^\text{18}\). These studies explain the party system as a mirror of organized social groups and social conflicts\(^\text{19}\). Caramani affirms that political cleavages characterize the divisions and oppositions within the space of political systems\(^\text{20}\). As a result, cleavages provide the bases of support for parties and structuring the party competition.\(^\text{21}\)

Based on the fact that this approach is by far the most prominent in comparative politics this paper relies on that framework. It highlights the nature of social cleavages that manifest themselves in party politics. Moreover, the literature on party systems in several countries is predominantly rooted in this tradition\(^\text{22}\). In those countries where civil conflicts have been prevalent, parties’ electoral support depends on post-conflict effects, particularly on emergent territorial cleavages. Theoretically, under armed conflict contexts political parties are considerably less nationalized. In short, I hypothesized that civil conflicts alter significantly patterns of parties’ support; specifically I determine the extent to what party nationalization scores decrease as a post conflict consequence.

In addition to the influence that civil conflicts could have on party nationalization, I explore the effects of democratization patterns as another alternative explanation for changes in the geographical distribution of parties’ votes. My assumption relies on the idea that the ways in which countries democratize matter in terms of having nationalized parties. Speaking of the third wave of democratization process, Samuel Huntington says that each of the first two waves was


followed by a reverse wave in which some but not all of the new democracies reverted to authoritarianism\textsuperscript{23}. Many Latin American countries perfectly illustrate this regime transition pattern named “bouncers” or “cyclers” meaning this back and forth process from authoritarianism to democracy\textsuperscript{24}. Munck and Leff argue that the process of transition from authoritarian rule, independently of the conditions that generated it, helps determine not only the prospects of democratic consolidation but also the success of the transition to democracy in the first place. They also argue that different modes of transition are likely to have distinct consequences for a country’s politics\textsuperscript{25}. Other observers claim that a country’s previous transition history may affect later democratization efforts\textsuperscript{26}. Consequently, one might expect that in “bouncers” countries less nationalized parties predominate.

Furthermore, other scholars have been trying to explain party nationalization using a set of intra-party variables, principally among them party age or ideology. The assumption of the former is simple. According to Caramani party nationalization derives from historical evolution\textsuperscript{27}. Indeed, Morgenstern et al. suggests that more mature democracies should have higher nationalization scores\textsuperscript{28}. If this assumption is accurate, the older the party the more nationalized, whereas the youngest parties are just trying to forge their electoral support. As a result, party age affects positively party nationalization. Therefore, as party age augments party nationalization should increase.

Also, political parties are crucial in democratic regimes not only because they are the only way to reach political power, but also because they reflect social differences. Generally speaking, parties with the same ideology tend to adopt equal positions to similar issues. However, how political parties embody social conflicts differs by party. It depends on many aspects, principally among them Party ideology. Thus, right or left parties tend to propose different solutions to the same problems. Based on the fact that, left or center-left parties are capable of forming alliances with a broader social groups, these parties tend to get more homogenous electoral support across territory. As a result,

\textsuperscript{24} Goldstein and Kocornik-Mina, 2005.
\textsuperscript{25} Munck, G. L. and C. S. Leff. “Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics 29(3) (1997): 343-362.
\textsuperscript{27} Caramani, D. Op Cit.
centrist parties could be more appealing to some geographical districts than others. At the same time, parties identified with a more ideologically extreme position could have a regional geographic base, especially if their appeal is more closely aligned with particular social groups. If party ideology is associated with party nationalization, ideological extreme political parties get lower scores of party nationalization than centrist parties.

In addition, political fragmentation is often associated with party nationalization. In particularly, under fragmented political contexts is much more difficult for parties to attract votes, because there are more competitors in the political arena. Also, fragmentation complicates coalition building in the legislature and inhibits compromise on policy issues. Additionally, Mainwaring argues that the combination of presidentialism and multipartism makes stable democracy difficult to sustain. So, this combination is more likely to produce immobilizing executive/legislative deadlock.

Similarly, previous research has shown the influence of ethnic differences on party’s electoral patterns. This approach is based on the assumption that ethnic diversity leads to regional heterogeneity of the party system. According to Morgenstern, Swindle et al., this argument rests on the idea that ethnic groups are geographically concentrated and have interests distinct from other sectors of the society. Furthermore, the greater the extent to which the population of a state is composed of a plurality of national, linguistic, religious, or cultural societies, the more complex politics becomes, since an agreement on the fundamentals of a democracy will be more difficult. The political implications of ethnic cleavages are particularly important in newly democratic countries, where social structure may have a larger impact than institutions in shaping political life. Briefly, in general, the greater the social diversity, the greater the fragmentation of parties in the legislature since parties will appeal to and represent distinct social cleavages. So, if ethnic

---

29 Loc. Cit.
33 Boschler 2006
36 Birnir, J. and D. L. V. Cott. "Disunity in Diversity: Party System Fragmentation and
fractionalization is significant, party nationalization should tend to decline.

**Methodology and data**

The purpose of the present research is to determine the effect of democratization patterns and political instability on party nationalization in Latin American nations using Legislative elections. Countries are included in this study based on two criteria: 1) availability of electoral data for measuring party nationalization by districts, and 2) a reasonable number of free and fair elections since democratization. The database includes time-series cross section comparisons of 15 countries with data collected on 46 political parties, 104 elections, and 326 electoral districts. The unit of analysis is the political party. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of study cases, and it also provides a fair picture of the region as a whole in terms of some electoral systems components.

The data combine electoral results by districts using official sources such as Electoral Courts in each country, and political instability data compiled in specialized datasets like COW Intra-State War Data and Political Survival Data. Also, I include country, intra-party predictors and control variables.

**Variables**

*Dependent variable:* Party nationalization, the dependent variable, refers to the homogeneity of a party’s support across the nation. To assess the dispersion of party strength across the territory I use the Party Nationalization Score (PNS), proposed by Jones and Mainwaring (2003). Basically, PNS is based on the Gini coefficient, a well-known measure of income inequality. So, a Gini coefficient is computed that reflects the vote distribution of each party. A coefficient of 0 signifies that a party received the same percentage of votes in every sub-national unit and the value 1 means perfectly unequal distribution (a party has exactly the same vote share across all territorial units). In a second step, the Gini coefficient is then subtracted from 1 so that high scores indicate a high level of party nationalization (PNS = 1 – Gini coefficient).

**Independent variables**

In this section I describe the operationalization of my set of independent variables.

**Conflict predictors**

*Political conflict* refers to the number of years in which there has been armed conflict in the
## TABLE 1: SEATS, DISTRICTS, AND ELECTIONS INCLUDED (MOST RECENT ELECTION)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1991-05</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1981-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1985-05</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1990-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1990-06</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1994-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1989-09</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1993-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1974-10</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2001-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1953-10</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1968-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1994-09</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1950-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1995-07</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>2,239</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** research dataset by the author.

Country for 1946-2008. The UCDP/PRI Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2009 is the source of information. This dataset defines conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”. I use an ordinal variable with four categories. The description of the categories is as follows: 0= 0 years of conflict, 1=less than 10 years with armed conflict, 2=among 10 and 20 years with conflict, and 3=more than 20 years of internal armed conflict.

Coups d’état considers the number of successful coups in the country from 1946 to 2009. I employ the Coups d’êts events codebook by the Center of Systemic Peace (version July 30, 2010). For purposes of that compilation, a coup d’état is defined as a forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition faction within the country’s ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime (although not necessarily in the nature of regime authority or mode of governance). This is an ordinal four scale variable that includes the following categories: 0= 0 successful coups, 1=less than 5 successful coups, 2=5 successful coups, and 3=more than 5 coups.

**Democratization pattern variables**

Third wave is a dummy variable in which countries that democratized in the third wave of democratization are coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.

Regime change is related to the history of regime changes in the countries that democratize according to Samuel Huntington. For the purpose of this paper I utilize a five-point scale predictor with the following categories: 0= democratic regime; 1=direct
transition (from a stable authoritarian system to a stable democratic system, either through gradual evolution over time or the abrupt replacement of the former by the latter; 2=second-try (a country with an authoritarian system shifts to a democratic one, later the democratic system fails and an authoritarian government then comes to power for a greater or shorter period of time. Eventually, however, a second and more successful effort is made to introduce democracy); 3=interrupted democracy (this involves countries that develop democratic regimes that exists for a relatively sustained period of time. At some point, however, instability, polarization, or other conditions develop and lead to the suspension of democratic processes); 4=cyclical pattern (countries alternated back and forth between democratic and authoritarian systems. This pattern was particularly prevalent in Latin America).

Years since transition, denotes the number of years since the last transition to democracy. The data come from Polity IV 2010 database.

Democratization processes, is associated with the country’s pattern of democratization using Huntington criteria. I employ a five-point scale with the following categories: 0=democracy; 1=transplacement (democratization is produced by the combined actions of government and opposition); 2=transformation (those in power in the authoritarian regime take the lead and play a decisive role in ending that regime and changing it into a democratic system); 3=replacement (democratization results from the opposition gaining strength and the government losing strength until the latter collapses or is overthrown); 4=intervention (there is a foreign government intervention for democratizing the country).

Political party predictors

Party age refers to the date when political parties were founded. I use the number of years each political party has been competing politically. Because I theorize that party nationalization derives from historical evolution I expect that the older the party is, the more nationalized. Despite party age does not necessarily reflect party stability, nevertheless it assess whether political parties get more nationalized as they age. Data for this indicator are available in Latin American Political Parties. Where necessary, data were updated and cross-checked with information available from political parties’ official websites.

Party ideology, according to the literature political parties

38 M., and F. Freidenberg.

reflect social differences, however, how political parties embody social conflicts differs by party. It depends on factors like party ideology. I coded each political party ideology using a five point scale that ranges from 0 = “Left”, 1 = “Center-Left”, 2 = “Center”, 3 = “Center-Right”, and 4 = “Right”.

**Country variables**

*Political fragmentation*, in fragmented party systems, small parties divide most of the vote, hence a powerful tendency towards low nationalization. Here, I use the Effective Number of Parties Index (ENPI) devised by Laakso and Taagepera to measure political fragmentation. The ENPI is calculated by squaring the proportion of the vote or seat shares of each party, adding these together, then dividing 1 by this total. The higher the ENPI value, the more fragmented the political system.

*Ethnic fractionalization*. Scholars argue, in short, that the regionalization of party systems among ethnic boundaries might reinforce ethnic identities and separation and deepen the cleavages further. Under multicultural context it is quite reasonable to hypothesize that ethnic diversity have a significant effect in the way in which parties’ votes are distributed across the country. In other words, in countries characterized for having a multi-ethnic composition party nationalization is determined by ethnic differences. In those territories, it is much more difficult to find nationalized parties because inter-ethnic differences predominate. To measure the impact of ethnic heterogeneity I use Alesina et al. Index. Using this variable I want to capture inter-country differences in the region.

**Control variables**

*Country Area* accounts for the fact that countries differ considerably in terms of their geographical territory. This variable considers the number of squared kilometers. I transform the variable using the log of the original value. Data come from United Nations official documents.

*Federalism* is a dummy variable with Federal countries coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.

*GDP per capita* in USD for the years included in the dataset. I use official data

---


published by the Economic Latin American Commission (ECLAC).

Elections refers to the number of parliamentary elections.

Dummies for specific years account for the fact that party nationalization have evolved as years passed by. The following events were considered for creating the dummies: 1994 and 1999=economic crisis in Mexico and Argentina; 2004=commemorates 15 years after the referendum for democratization in Chile; and 2009=international crisis.

My model is as follows:

\[
\text{Party nationalization score (PNS)} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Conflict} + \beta_2 \text{Coups d’état} + \beta_3 \text{Third wave} + \beta_4 \text{Regime change} + \beta_5 \text{Democratic pattern} + \beta_6 \text{Party age} + \beta_7 \text{Political fragmentation} + \beta_8 \text{Transition} + \beta_9 \text{Ethnic fragmentation} + \beta_{10} \text{Party ideology} + \beta_{11} \ln \text{Country area} + \beta_{12} \text{Federal} + \beta_{13} \text{GDP per capita} + \beta_{14} \text{Dummies years} + \epsilon
\]

**Empirical Results**

Table 2 depicts the main descriptive statistics of the variables included in the models. According to these results, there are remarkable differences among cases in party nationalization. The average of party nationalization in the region is 0.83. Using Jones and Mainwaring classification, this value is associated with an intermediate score of party nationalization.

### Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party nationalization</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>8.81</td>
<td>13.92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coups d’état</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third wave (dummy)</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party age</td>
<td>53.38</td>
<td>51.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political fragmentation</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>17.18</td>
<td>15.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fragmentation</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>3,341.69</td>
<td>1,921.39</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>8,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country area (km²)</td>
<td>1,053,262</td>
<td>2,003,476</td>
<td>21,141</td>
<td>8,514,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal (dummy)</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic processes</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country area (log)</td>
<td>12.59</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>9.96</td>
<td>15.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (log)</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>9.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** research dataset by the author.
Additionally, the dependent variable values range from 0.27 (COPEI, Venezuela in 2005) to 0.98 (five political parties in Costa Rica and one in Honduras). Some trends in party nationalization can be easily observable in Latin America. Overall the results provide good evidence of both national and local forces at work on the electorate. Speaking of inter-country differences, political parties in Honduras, Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica (in a lesser extent) look highly nationalized across the region. Conversely, Venezuelan (especially in the last decade), Peruvian, and Bolivian parties’ electoral support show the greatest differences among departments. In the middle of the nationalization scale, there are cases such as Brazilian, Salvadorian and Argentinean parties. Interestingly, there are different patterns in the region in terms of the distribution of parties’ support patterns. In some countries there are no significant changes over time (Honduras and Chile) whereas in others there occurs radical changes (Colombia and Venezuela). Likewise, in terms of intra-country differences (figure 2), there are at least four sub-sets of countries. In Chile, Honduras, and Nicaragua there are significantly less dissimilarities in electoral support patterns among political parties than in the rest of the region, whereas in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Uruguay one can consider the differences in party nationalization scores between parties as modest. In striking contrast, in El Salvador, Panama, and Paraguay parties’ scores show higher disparities. Finally, the most dramatic variations in parties’ electoral support patterns come from cases such as Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.

Within the lowest nationalized scores, seven out of the ten belong to three countries Venezuela (COPEI and AD), Colombia and Peru. In the opposite extreme category, all ten parties that show the highest nationalization scores are from three Central American countries: El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. The National Liberation Party (PLN) and Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) in Costa Rica are the two political parties that have been predominantly nationalized. These two parties are followed by Nationalist Republic Alliance Party (ARENA, El Salvador), and both Honduras’s parties: Honduran Liberal Party and The National Party (PLH and PNH, respectively).

**Multivariate analysis**

For assessing the effect of conflict and democratization predictors on party nationalization I employ Generalized Least Squares with Random Effects (GLSRE). Based on the fact that I have repeated observations per political party and thus my observations are not independent from each
FIGURE 1: BOX PLOT PARTY NATIONALIZATION SCORE BY COUNTRY

Source: research dataset by the author.

Other Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods are inappropriate because of the underestimation of standard errors and thus incorrect hypothesis tests. Since in my study the population error term (or residual) for one observation is related to the population error term of all other observations then it violates the no autocorrelation assumption of OLS. Specifically, my cases are temporally near one another and may have error terms that are related as well. Instead I estimate the model using GLSRE. I assume that both the individual effects and the error term mean-zero processes, uncorrelated with the regressors; that they are each homoscedastic; that they are uncorrelated with each other; and that there is no correlation over individuals or time. I employ several tests for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. On one hand, for the latter, I apply the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation. This test has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. The test for AR (1) process in first differences usually rejects the null hypothesis as in my case. In other words, there is autocorrelation in my model. Also, I plot the residuals over time to detect autocorrelation.

Table 3 reports the results of regressing party

---

44 Baum, C. F. An introduction to modern econometrics using Stata. College Station, Tex.: Stata Press, 2006.
nationalization on different sets of variables. Model 1 estimates multiple GLS regression without controlling for Country area in \( \text{km}^2 \) and Federalism. Model 2 includes social and political effects on the dependent variable plus intra-party and country predictors. Model 3

TABLE 3: MODELS ESTIMATIONS RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>model1 \ b/se</th>
<th>model2 \ b/se</th>
<th>model3 \ b/se</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflicts</td>
<td>-0.03*</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coups d’etat</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third wave</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>-0.04**</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
<td>-0.04**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic proces-s</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party age</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ideology</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political fragment-n</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionall-n</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country area (log)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>-0.18**</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 1994</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 1999</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2004</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2009</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.10***</td>
<td>0.76**</td>
<td>1.11***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-squared overall: 0.3697 0.4115 0.3927
Wald Chi-squared: 90.92 100.32 99.84
P>Chi-squared: 0.00 0.00 0.00
N: 254 254 254

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Source: research dataset by the author.

incorporates the number of elections and dummy variables for several years in order to control for time effects. In general, almost all of the independent predictors show a negative effect on the dependent variable but party age, GDP per capita, and Country area. All models provide support for the hypothesized negative effect of Armed
conflicts, Regime change, political fragmentation, democratization pattern and ethnic fractionalization on party nationalization. GDP per capita is the only predictor that is positively associated with party nationalization that reaches statistical significance (in models 1 and 2). Furthermore, years since transition show the effect in the opposite direction and fail to reach statistical significance when controlling for time effects. Also, party age, coups, and third wave effects are in the right direction but they are not significant. Moreover, the R-squared accounts for 39% of the variance in the party nationalization (Y) in the model 3 in comparison with 41% in model 2 and 37% in model 1.

According to Model 3 estimations, if everything is held constant, the effect of going from countries with no years with armed conflict and countries where there has been more than 20 years of conflict is associated with a decrease of 0.12 units in the party nationalization score. In other words, the cumulative stock effect of civil conflict is noteworthy. Equally, Regime change is coded using a five points scale that varies from 0 (Democracy) to 4 (Cyclical regime changes). As a result, the effect of going from democratic nations to “bouncy” countries is associated with a decrease of 0.20 units in the party nationalization score. Similarly, political fragmentation is coded using values that vary from 1.1 (one party system) to 9.3 (highly fragmented). So, holding everything constant, the effect of moving from the lowest fragmentation value to the highest one is related to a decrease of 0.16 units in the dependent variable scale. Likewise, the effect of democratization pattern on the dependent variable is negative and significant, meaning that there is a difference of 0.25 units in the party nationalization score among the parties that compete in democratic nations (using 1974 as the comparing point) and those that run in nations where democratization comes from foreign intervention.

Moreover, one additional unit increase in the ethnic fractionalization index is related to a decrease of 0.19 units in the nationalization scale. Thus, the effect of moving from the lowest ethnic fractionalization (0.1689) to the parties that run in Federal countries are less nationalized whereas Country area and time predictors show no effect on the dependent variable. This federal effect makes sense because these countries are bigger and
more diverse than non-federal nations.

So far, Models 2 and 3 yields substantively similar results meaning that the same variables are significant and the coefficients have pretty much the same magnitude and sign. If we compare the sub-sets of variables included in the model estimations, only one of the conflict predictors reach statistical significance, and three out of the four democratization variables are statistically significant; whereas in the set of the intra-party predictors any of the t-values exceeds the critical value. Lastly, both country predictors surpass the statistical significance threshold.

According to the regression analysis, all models offer support for a negative effect of years since transition (but not significant in model 3) on party nationalization, and conversely a positive effect if the country democratizes in the third wave of democratization (only significant in model 3). Both cases are striking because one might expect that the more years since democratization the higher the nationalization of the parties and similarly a negative impact for late democratization. However, the data do not support these two assumptions.

In addition, the test for the impact of Coups d'état, party age and party ideology failed to reveal statistically significant results. The last two outcomes contradict a well-known body of literature. Firstly, as Caramani suggests parties nationalized when getting older\(^{45}\) but the data for Latin America support exactly the opposite. And secondly, the no effect party’s ideology is not consequent with recent literature that suggest that parties identified with a more ideologically extreme position could have a locally focused base\(^{46}\). Thus, there are neither party’s age nor ideology effects on parties’ electoral support patterns.

In sum, GLSRE estimations confirm the hypothesized negative effect of Armed conflicts, Regime change, democratization pattern, political fragmentation, and ethnic fractionalization on party nationalization. The estimations that I provide in this paper are robust even when controlling for GDP per capita, Federalism, Country size and time effects. These results reinforce the argument that party nationalization in Latin America depends upon the existence of armed conflict, what kind of regime change pattern the countries have followed and the socio-political fragmentation that exists in the society.

Generally speaking, the literature on party nationalization in Latin America has taken for granted two

important factors. On one hand, the geographical distribution of parties’ electoral support is negatively impacted by armed conflicts. In Latin America civil conflicts have been prevalent and one might expect that political parties’ support patterns reflect these conflicts. On the other hand, regardless of the fact that most countries democratize relatively at the same time in the region, scholars have neglected that democratization has come in very different paths. Consequently, this study shows that the regime change pattern influences party nationalization.

**Conclusions**

According to Jones and Mainwaring, the importance of analyzing variance in nationalization is greater for new democracies than for advanced industrial ones. In this paper, I have offered a set of models that specifies the combination of country and party predictors for explaining the nationalization of political parties. The results showed that party nationalization in Latin America substantively reflects the influence of armed conflicts, democratization patterns and socio-political fragmentation even when controlling for time effects and other country predictors.

The analysis of electoral geography in fifteen countries in Latin America reveals remarkable, inter- and intra-country differences in terms of geographic distribution of the parties’ vote. Like Meleshevich suggests, although some parties manifest a tendency towards a greater regional uniformity of party support, the pace of this trend is different in different nations as well as it is in different parties. The findings presented in this document shed new light on patterns of electoral support in legislative elections in Latin America, using disaggregated electoral returns. My analysis of 104 parliamentary elections, 326 electoral districts, and 46 political parties during the years 1950-2010 show interesting, inter- and intra-country variations in patterns of partisan support over time. This work makes clear that party nationalization score varies markedly across countries and among parties.

This document contributes to reduce a gap in the specialized literature. Scholars on party nationalization that focus on Latin America has taken for granted two factors. First, in both pre and post-democratization civil conflicts predominate in the region. As a result, one might expect that armed conflicts influence parties’ performance in the territory. Secondly, despite countries democratize relatively at the same time (1980s and 1990s), democratization

---


pathways vary considerably among countries. Here, I provide evidence that “bouncy” nations, meaning those cases that show a back and forth between democracy and authoritarian regimes, have less nationalized political parties. In short, examining Latin American cases also help to test old and new hypothesis regarding this salient issue. This document complements other analyses of parties’ nationalization patterns by examining district-by-district changes across parties and among countries.

This paper also contributes to understand a crucial topic: the role that political parties play under new democratic circumstances. In Latin American cases, in spite of the fact that some political parties share similar backgrounds and paths, parties vary remarkably across nations as well as their do in nationalization support patterns. Lastly, I certainly believe that this document and my findings constitute an important step forward to party nationalization academic research.

Notes:

1In terms of Caramani, the formation of national electorates and party systems is not only a crucial aspect of the construction of national political space and of the structuring of party systems, but also of the development of a political democratic citizenship. In Western Europe, “the nationalization of electoral alignments and political parties has meant the transition from a fragmented and clientelistic type of politics dominated by local political personalities to national representation. National party organizations structured along nationwide cleavages replaced an atomized type of political representation” Caramani, D. The nationalization of politics: the formation of national electorates and party systems in Western Europe. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

References


Baum, C. F. An introduction to modern econometrics using Stata. College Station, Tex.: Stata Press, 2006.


